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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
INDIVIDUALS’ FORMAL POWER AND  
THEIR SOCIAL NETWORK ACCURACY 
 
Previous research has suggested that individuals differ in their accuracy of perceptions of 
the social environment, and some research suggests that powerful individuals in 
particular tend to be lazy, disinterested observers of the social world. A handful of field 
studies and lab experiments linking power with individuals’ perceptions of others’ social 
networks have generally supported this view. However, recent theory addressing the 
psychological consequences of power for the power-holder claim that in certain 
circumstances and for some kinds of social information, power is linked to increased 
accuracy of social information. This dissertation tests this idea by drawing on social 
network theory and the situated focus theory of power. I examine the relationship 
between individuals’ formal power and their perceptual accuracy of social network 
relationships. I propose that individuals’ perceptual accuracy is affected by 1) their 
formal power in the organization 2) the type of relationship being perceived 
(expressive/instrumental, positive/negative), and 3) the dependence relationship with the 
target of perception (whether the perceiver is dependent on the perceived to get their 
work done). Predictions were tested using cognitive social network data collected from a 
call center within a division of a large corporation in the US. Results showed that formal 
power was linked to increased accuracy for some relationship content (particularly 
negative expressive relationships), and managers tend to be more accurate when 
perceiving their own incoming relationships than non-managers.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The social network tradition views organizations as a web of informal social 
relationships where each individual occupies a unique position based on their ties or 
relationships to others (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass, & Labianca, 2009).  Research based on 
this view suggests that these informal relational ties are key sources of benefits for 
individuals, including unique information and social support, and also liabilities, 
including negative gossip and undermining, all of which can influence individual 
outcomes (e.g., Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004; Duffy, Ganster, & Pagon, 
2002; Ellwardt, Labianca, & Wittek, 2011; Kilduff & Brass, 2010; Labianca & Brass, 
2006; Mehra, Kilduff, & Brass, 2001).   
The predominant approach to studying social networks tends to assume that the 
network exists independent of each actor.  The network view is based on a principle of 
structural relations which represent regular structural patterns of interaction among 
entities (Knoke & Yang, 2008).  Network ties can be measured and analyzed as structural 
features of the social environment (Borgatti et al., 2009).  
However, recent research and thinking on cognition or perceptions of social 
networks suggests this traditional view might tell only part of the story. This cognitive 
perspective  assumes that each individual holds a unique view or perception of the 
informal ties and relationships around him or her in the social network (Krackhardt, 
1987).  These perceptions of informal relationships form individuals’ mental maps of the 
social world, or cognitive social structures (CSS) (Krackhardt, 1987). Cognitive social 
structures are the relationships that a person perceives to exist among actors (including 
one’s own ties) in the network. For example, individuals hold perceptions of who 
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interacts and who are friends in a network, and these beliefs and perceptions can be 
unique for each individual in the network  (e.g., Freeman, Romney, & Freeman, 1987).  
These structures may be integral to how individuals interpret,  experience, and interact 
with the social environment  (e.g., Baldwin, 1992). This is because the degree to which 
individuals are aware of or perceive the informal relational ties in the network might be a 
crucial factor influencing their decisions and subsequent behaviors.  
 Given the nearly infinite amount of information individuals are exposed to in the 
social environment, it is reasonable to believe that not all information is processed, or 
perceived equally (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Thus, individuals’ perceptions of the social 
world, and social relationships among actors can vary, which can lead to some people 
having more accurate perceptions of social ties translating to better accuracy of the social 
network (e.g., Casciaro, 1998).  Indeed, a wide body of research has shown that  
individuals’ cognitive maps—or the perceptual maps of the social network ties in their 
surrounding environment – vary and are prone to error (Krackhardt, 1987).  This is not 
surprising when considering that a network with only 25 individuals has 600 (N*(N-1)) 
potential network relationships.  
 This potential for complication and information overload makes errors highly 
likely, and errors can have real life consequences.  The degree to which individuals are 
accurate about or aware of the relationships in the social network might be a vital 
resource unto itself, giving the cognitively accurate individual an information advantage 
which can be related to outcomes, such as increased influence in the network (e.g., 
Krackhardt, 1990), and improved performance.  For example, if a manager needs to 
assign employees to a work team, but is unaware of which employees have conflict or 
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negative relationships, this can likely create a less effective team than if the manager can 
select team members who have more positive relationships with less relationship conflict 
(Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Jehn, Greer, Levine, & Szulanski, 2008; Shaw et al., 2011).  As 
another example, knowing the patterns of interactions among others might provide 
political advantages, leading to influence in the organization (Krackhardt, 1990).   
 The consequences for having wrong (or correct) perceptions of the relationships 
in an organization might be heaviest for individuals in the organization who influence the 
outcomes of others, control resources, and make decisions—that is, powerful individuals. 
Social network scholars have been investigating the role of power in organizational 
settings for some time. Their approach has been to consider power as a product of one’s 
relational influence, such that individuals who have a high degree of centrality in the 
network tend to wield critical influence in the decisions of the firm (e.g., Brass, 1984; 
Brass & Burkhardt, 1993). This view has generated important insights into the informal 
power that individuals can accumulate through social relationships. However, other 
scholars have considered power not as a product of one’s relational ties, but as a product 
of one’s mental map acuity of the broader social structure. That is, informal power is due 
not just to their position in the network, but is also partly based on a person’s knowledge 
of the social network (Krackhardt, 1990). A person who has greater knowledge of the 
interpersonal interactions of others in the firm, can navigate the political world more 
easily, influencing work processes and decisions. Thus, power might play an important 
role in individuals’ perceptions of the social network.  This line of thinking parallels 
recent work by social psychologists suggesting that power has behavioral and cognitive 
 
4 
 
consequences for the power holder affecting how individuals perceive and process 
information (e.g., Guinote, 2010). 
Power—here defined as individuals who can determine the rewards and punishments 
of subordinates and affect the behavior of others by controlling valued resources (Fiske 
and Berdhal, 2007;Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; French and Raven, 1959)—
has been linked to behavioral and cognitive consequences for those who wield it 
(Galinsky, Rus, & Lammers, 2011). Guinote noted in her summation of the current 
research on the effects of  power on individuals that  “[p]ower has a fundamental impact 
on how individuals perceive the world around them and how they behave”  (2010: 141).   
This brings to the forefront the question of how power relates more broadly to social 
network perception in an organization.  Some network scholars, drawing on a variety of 
theoretical arguments,  have found evidence that suggests individuals in higher 
hierarchical positions see the network differently from those lower in the formal 
hierarchy (Casciaro, 1998) and individuals who experience power differ from those low 
in power in how they perceive the social network (Krackhardt, 1990; Simpson, 
Markovsky, & Steketee, 2011).  
 Research on power has increased greatly over the last decade, generating a 
number of research articles and book chapters which have concentrated on the  
consequences of power for individuals who experience it (Galinsky et al., 2011).  The 
core findings from this research are that while power is related to more automatic 
processing (i.e., use of stereotypes), and low power is generally related to more 
controlled processing (i.e., more systematic), the powerful have more flexible and 
selective attention in where and when controlled processing of social stimuli is activated 
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(Guinote, 2007a).  In other words, while in a general sense power might relate to 
cognitive processing that leads to general inaccuracy, powerful individuals’ motivated 
cognitions will affect cognitive priorities and filter out what they are motivated to regard 
as peripheral, non-essential information, allowing them to focus more attention on task 
and goal contexts than the powerless. These motivated cognitions can influence focus and 
attention on social information and accuracy of particular social perceptions, such as 
social network ties in the organization.  
 The most obvious role in organizations which is directly related to the study and 
concept of power is the manager, a position of formal power fundamental to 
understanding behavior in organizations (Mintzberg, 1973). Indeed, managers are central 
to information gathering and dissemination, of incoming and outgoing lines of 
communication, and information flow in both formal and informal organizational 
networks (Barnard, 1938; Mintzberg, 2009).   Thus, examining the role of managerial 
status on social network perceptions speaks directly to the understanding of how 
individuals in these formal positions might use (or misuse) their perceived knowledge of 
the network in the work of managing.  
 How managers see their own social relationships, those of their subordinates and 
those within the broader workplace social network is important because many practical 
decisions by managers are influenced by these perceptions. Perceiving employees in 
conflict or as informal stars who attract many friends can influence managerial decisions, 
such as whether to place people together on particular tasks or who to put forward for 
promotion. Managers might get things wrong, but they also might get things right; what 
we do know is that they, along with others in organizations, perceive relationships and 
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ties among others with varying degrees of accuracy. However, a fundamental question is 
whether accuracy of perceptions are related to the formal power role of being a manager 
and subsequent consequences of power, or due to just being an actor in the complicated 
social structure of an organization. Understanding how formal managerial role might 
influence the accuracy (or inaccuracy) of social information, such as the social network 
ties in the organization, can help scholars understand the potential perceptual biases 
affecting managers that lead to (sub)optimal decisions affecting employees and 
organizations.  More broadly, answering this question can refine and extend social 
network and psychological theories related to power and perception.  
In summary, I test the relationship between formal power and individual’s 
accuracy of social networks. I define managers as possessing formal authority (power), in 
that they can determine the rewards and punishments of subordinates, and can affect the 
behavior of others by controlling valued resources (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 
2001). I take the perspective that the experience of formal authority (power) induces 
certain behavioral, affective, and cognitive effects on the power holder, and these effects 
can be distinguished from those of the less powerful subordinates (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; 
Fiske, 1993a; Galinsky et al., 2011).   I propose that managers’ perceptions of social 
relationships are affected by their role requirements such that they will be more accurate 
about specific relationships which are more related to goal and task achievement due to 
dependence relationship requirements and the relational content the ties convey.  
Research Question 
Despite the promising insights that a better understanding of individuals’ social 
structure cognitions offers to organizational scholarship, there has been relatively little 
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attention paid to this area of research.  There has been an up swell of research which has 
begun to untangle the role of social structure perception in social network research. 
However, despite clear relevance, key advances in both social network theory (e.g., 
Social ledger theory Labianca & Brass, 2006) and the social psychology of power (e.g., 
Situated Focus Theory Guinote, 2010), have had little theoretical and empirical impact on 
social structure perception research. In fact only the broadest predictions of how power 
affects social structure perception have been tested (Casciaro, 1998; Simpson et al., 
2011).  To date, results of these studies testing the effect of power on social structure 
perception have been generally consistent but limited in scope—power tends to be related 
to decreased accuracy of the social network.  
 Casciaro (1998) tested a number of variables such as personality and hierarchical 
level in relation to accuracy of the friendship and advice network among a group of 24 
Italian scientists. She predicted that formal position would be positively related to 
accuracy of the advice network due to the likelihood that people in positions of power 
had better access to work-flow related information. She also predicted that they would be 
inaccurate with regard to the friendship network because those in high formal positions 
are likely to avoid friendships to subordinates and subordinates would be reticent about 
befriending those in power. Results supported the predictions about friendship accuracy, 
but not for advice tie accuracy—both advice and friendship tie accuracy were negatively 
related to formal position.  
 Simpson et al., (2011) used a lab setting to test the relationship between power 
and social structure perception. They found that being high in power was related to less 
accurate recall of relationships in an influence network, suggesting that high-power 
 
8 
 
individuals perceived more relationships than actually existed.  However, power did not 
significantly relate to learning the relationships that did exist (Simpson et al., 2011). 
Overall, it’s clear that these studies suggest that power is associated with decreased 
accuracy of the social network.  
 Meanwhile there have been advancements in the social psychology of power 
which suggests that power might not be so clearly related to inaccuracy of the social 
environment.  An accumulation of new theoretical insights and research suggests that 
power is related to increased flexibility in attention and cognition to social information 
(Guinote, 2007b), and the powerful are able to block out peripheral information that is 
not task or goal oriented, while the powerless do not possess the same “situated” 
cognition (Guinote, 2010). The Power as Control Model (Fiske, 1993a) argues that the 
powerful view the less powerful differently than vice versa. For example, the powerful 
tend to use stereotypes in thinking about other people because they are less motivated to 
pay attention owing to the fact that their power position allows for less cognitive effort in 
thinking about the social environment (Fiske, 1998). Additionally, the dependence 
relationship between parties is a key component in understanding the effects of power on 
social cognition (Overbeck & Park, 2006) . This body of work, which I will review in 
Chapter 2, suggests that power can lead to accuracy in certain situations, such as task and 
goal oriented contexts and for role-activated social content—and I argue this applies to 
task and goal oriented relationships in the social network, as well as the attention of the 
powerful toward the less powerful.  
 Second, there have been important advances in the study of social relationships, 
specifically negative relationships as a component of the social environment in 
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organizations (e.g., Labianca & Brass, 2006).   The social network tradition has generally 
been dominated by attention to positive relationships, such as friendship and advice 
seeking, to the detriment of studying negative ties (Cornwell, 2005; Labianca & Brass, 
2006). Negative ties are broadly defined as “recurring, enduring, negative affective 
intentions or behaviors toward another person” (Labianca & Brass, 2006) and include 
relationships characterized by negative content such as interpersonal conflict, dislike, 
avoidance, or distrust (Chua, Ingram, & Morris, 2008; Labianca, Brass, & Gray, 1998; 
Marineau, Labianca, & Kane, 2012). Most importantly, there is an acute lack of current 
research which directly theorizes about individuals’ negative relationship perceptions.  
While scholars have tested social network perceptions of friendship, advice and influence 
ties (e.g., Casciaro, 1998; Casciaro, Carley, & Krackhardt, 1999; Simpson et al., 2011), 
there is a clear gap in knowledge about negative tie perception.  Based on Social Ledger 
Theory (Labianca & Brass, 2006), I argue that negative ties are critical relationships in 
the social environment and these relationships will factor in to network accuracy of those 
with formal power. 
The broad empirical question I am focusing on in this dissertation is:   
How does formal power (i.e., manager status) relate to individuals’ 
perceptions of social network ties?  
 
Testing this question can contribute to the study of both social networks and the 
social psychology of power, by showing that high power individuals are not clueless 
observers of the social world as some research suggests (e.g., Fiske, 1993b), but are 
focused on those key social relationships in the environment, activated constructs, which 
are related to task and goal completion (e.g., Guinote, 2010).  This study can also 
contribute to theory and research by providing a framework for testing key questions that 
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go beyond the basic individual differences covariates of social structure accuracy, to 
begin to unravel the key social and relational factors critical to social structure 
perception. These social contexts include relational and structural factors of the perceiver 
and others in the network (i.e., the perceiver’s formal relationship to others, the level of 
network perception being tested). In addition, by testing a wider range of relationship 
types, we can begin to understand additional key factors which impact social structure 
perceptions of managers.  
Chapter 2 will present three empirical studies testing theoretically derived 
hypotheses all of which are aimed at answering the main research question. Study 1 will 
compare managers’ and non-managers’ accuracy for the entire constellation of network 
relationships. Study 2 will consider how managers and non-managers are accurate about 
each others’ social networks. And, Study 3 will compare managers’ and non-managers’ 
accuracy for their own incoming social network ties. Chapter 3 will provide a broad 
discussion of these results, limitations, future research directions, managerial implications 
and a final conclusion of this dissertation.  
Copyright © Joshua Eric Marineau 2012 
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Chapter 2 
Study 1 
Introduction 
 Network scholars argue that one’s ties in the social network provide social capital, 
and lack of ties can disadvantage one’s  social capital (e.g., Adler & Kwon, 2002; Lin, 
2002). For example, having ties to individuals in the organization with resources such as 
knowledge, ability, or clout can provide benefits to those with access to those individuals.  
However, a lack of ties to others in an organization can make accessing resources in the 
network challenging, potentially putting that person at a disadvantage.  The accurate 
perception of social network ties in a network can play a similar function.  A person who 
perceives social networks accurately can act upon that knowledge, while a person who 
does not perceive those ties has less intentional, actionable opportunities.  This is because 
a person who is unaware of the ties among others in the network can easily miss 
connections which would prove beneficial and can stumble into ties that might prove 
detrimental.  For example, having knowledge of the relationships of an influential 
individual might provide in-roads to accessing that influential person, where lack of that 
social network knowledge would put one at a disadvantage.  Similarly,  having a 
friendship with someone who is (unknowingly to you)  in a personal conflict with your 
current friend can cause psychological strain or stress for the parties involved  (Heider, 
1958).  Thus, a person who sees the network accurately will likely be imbued with 
opportunities and helpful knowledge which the less accurate person will not possess 
(Krackhardt, 1990).  
 In studying the accuracy of social network perceptions, it makes sense to focus on 
those individuals in an organization for whom social information is highly relevant in the 
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course of executing and achieving organizational goals.  Individuals that fit these criteria 
are those in the organization with positions that involve power. However, power is 
associated with a distortion of perception of social information (e.g., Fiske & Dépret, 
1996; Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske, 1998); 
therefore, I will focus on those individuals in the organization where distortions of social 
perceptions can have far reaching consequences.  This is not to say that those without 
power are not susceptible to distortions of social perceptions.  But, by comparing the 
powerful to the powerless, the effects of power on social perceptions can be more clearly 
illuminated.   
 Power and authority in organizations formally resides in the manager role and 
managing requires attention to and accumulation of information, especially social 
information (Barnard, 1938; Mintzberg, 1973). Researchers have been very active in 
studying individuals’ experience of power and how power affects behavior, cognition and 
judgment (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2011). Organization and management theorists 
(predominantly from the leadership perspective) highlight the importance of attending to 
information for managers’ execution of organizational goals (e.g., Mintzberg, 2009; 
Yukl, 1989).  However, accumulating and possessing information is not enough; that 
information needs to be accurate and usable to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity (Daft & 
Lengel, 1984). Lacking accurate information impedes one’s ability to manage because 
decision making and intentional action without good information can lead to poor 
decisions and undesirable results. If managers demonstrate active biases in information 
and perception, especially as it applies to social network perceptions, this has critical 
implications for our understanding of manager roles and how work is done in 
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organizations. Understanding how managers perceive the social relationships in the 
network is an important endeavor because it provides critical insight into organizational 
behavior.  How individuals with power (i.e., managers with formal position) perceive the 
social landscape is therefore an important question for management scholars.  
 
Power Defined   
 Power here is defined as formal social power, where individuals possess power 
and authority to determine the rewards and punishments of others (such as subordinates), 
and can influence the behavior of others by control of valued resources (Keltner et al., 
2001; Overbeck & Park, 2006).  Social power is the power a manager has in the 
organization, and that power allows for more latitude in behavior, and ability to act on 
social information, such as knowledge of the social network. It also allows the manager 
to influence the behavior of others, due to the resource control a manager has compared 
to non-managers and subordinates.  
 A key corollary of the above definition is that the individual designated as a 
manager is endowed with legitimate authority, which actualizes the experience of power 
on the power holder.  In an organization, a manager’s power is based on his or her 
relationship to other individuals and made legitimate by the organization’s designation of 
authority on that person.  While there are other sources of power (e.g., French & Raven, 
1959), the manager role is a clear institutional signal of authority to the manager, 
subordinates, and others in the organization.  The authority and means to distribute 
organizational resources and affect the rewards and punishments of others is made 
concrete in the role of the manager, thus the special quality of legitimate authority of 
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power in an organization brings with it a very salient experience of power. For these 
reasons, this study uses managerial role as the primary measure of individuals’ formal 
power in the organization to understand how power is related to social network 
perception and accuracy.  
 Here I am also differentiating power from status, which is a related, but distinct 
construct (for a thorough review comparing status and power, see Magee & Galinsky, 
2008). Status can be defined as respect and admiration (Fast, Halevy, & Galinsky, 2011), 
and is closely related to the notion of social hierarchy. Social hierarchy is defined as 
“implicit or explicit rank order of individuals or groups with respect to a valued social 
dimension” (Magee & Galinsky, 2008: 352).  A person’s power in this study relies on the 
degree to which they have outcome control, or fate control over others, and is not based 
on how much personal status a person has given the social hierarchy in the organization. 
While these two constructs can be related in that individuals with power might also have 
status (and vice versa),  the theoretical arguments used in this study draw on the effects of 
power on individuals’ behavior and cognition, and not the inferred status that they have 
in the social hierarchy.  This is because individuals with high social status do not 
necessarily have the outcome and fate control which explicitly comes with formal power 
roles, such as the ability to affect the behavior of subordinates through control of valued 
resources.  
Review of relevant literature 
 In examining the role of power in social network perception and accuracy, there 
have been a very limited number of studies undertaken.  For some of these studies power 
was not the primary variable of interest used to explain social network accuracy (i.e., 
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Casciaro, 1998), but there have been key studies which did focus in on the role of power 
in individuals’ accuracy of the social network.  The key finding from these studies 
suggests that power relates to decreased accuracy of the social network (Casciaro, 1998; 
Simpson & Borch, 2005; Simpson et al., 2011) (cf, Krackhardt, 1990). This conclusion 
agrees with much of the past research on the effects of power on perception from the 
social psychology research tradition.  
 The predominant view of how power affects perception has been that power 
results in increased use of stereotypes and more heuristic processing of social 
information, while powerlessness is related to increased systematic or controlled 
processing of social information  (e.g., Depret & Fiske, 1993; Fiske, 1993a; Goodwin et 
al., 2000; Goodwin et al., 1998). Power relates to less perceptual attention and less 
perceptual accuracy—powerful individuals are cognitive misers, very limitedly 
expending cognitive energy on the less powerful , and generally more lackadaisical in 
attending to social information (Fiske, 1993a).  Powerful individuals are less attentive to 
their subordinates because they have more control over their own outcomes, and can 
afford to ignore others, while subordinates are reliant on the powerful for their outcomes, 
thus attend to the powerful more actively (Keltner et al., 2001).  Additionally, powerful 
individuals are generally few while powerless are many, thus powerful individuals—in 
the case of a manager with multiple subordinates—have a higher cognitive load 
compared to subordinates who only focus on one person. These factors suggest that 
“attention follows power” and predicts that on average,  individuals with power will be 
less accurate about the social world than the powerless (Fiske, 1993a). The studies 
 
16 
 
reviewed below which have included power in relation to social network accuracy, have 
generally supported the powerful-as-cognitive-miser view.   
 Krackhardt (1990) tested the relationship between individuals’ accuracy of the 
advice and friendship networks on those individuals’ informal power as perceived by 
others in the organization.  He argued that controlling for formal position, an individuals’ 
informal power will be due to their social network accuracy because accuracy perceptions 
of the information flows of the network will provide a rich understanding of the political 
landscape, allowing for more effective political maneuvering and a reputation for power. 
Results in this cross-sectional study suggested that an individual’s accuracy of the advice 
networks—or who goes to whom for work related advice—was related to informal power 
(measured as a peer-rated index of informal influence and charisma). Pertaining more 
directly to the current study was Krackhardt’s inclusion of a formal power control 
variable reflecting the hierarchical level within the small organization. Levels ranged 
from the three owners of the firm (3), five managers (2), and 28 employees (1): thus there 
were 8 individuals with formal position above that of employees (22%). Krackhardt 
predicted a relationship between formal power and network accuracy.  Interestingly, this 
particular variable was not significantly correlated to network accuracy.   
 Formal position showed the strongest relationship to informal power (r = .656, p 
< .001) and was related to centrality in the advice network (r = .566, p < .001). Formal 
position was not significantly related to accuracy of the advice network (r = .240, ns), nor 
to accuracy of the friendship network (r = .041, ns). In the OLS regression model, formal 
position was a strong predictor of informal power (b = .782, p < .001), along with 
centrality in the friendship network (b = .0195, p < .001) and advice network accuracy (b 
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= 5.091, p < .01). This study intended to test the relationship between formal power and 
social network accuracy, however because there was no evidence to support that formal 
power related to accuracy, “more elaborate tests of the path coefficients for [the model] 
were not necessary, beyond the overall test provided for by the hierarchical regression 
reported […]” (Krackhardt, 1990: 356). The important conclusion to this study was that 
formal power was not found to be related to network accuracy, which was contrary to 
Krackhardt’s (1990) predicted model.  
 Casciaro (1998) tested a number of potential correlates to network accuracy 
among a group of 24 Italian scientists. Casciaro included a measure of hierarchical level, 
or formal position, which she argued would be differentially related to network accuracy. 
The networks of interest were friendship and advice seeking, similar to Krackhardt 
(1990).  She hypothesized that friendship network accuracy would be negatively related 
to hierarchical level, while advice network accuracy would be positively related 
hierarchical level.  Casciaro argued that individuals in higher hierarchical positions will 
have a greater interest in and access to work-related ties in the organization, such as 
instrumental advice ties.  In contrast, individuals in hierarchical positions were argued to 
have less accuracy of expressive ties, such as friendship ties,  because subordinates will 
be reticent to befriend those in higher positions, and those high up the hierarchy were 
likely to be “isolated” from friendships of those lower in the hierarchy (Casciaro, 1998: 
335).  Using a similar methodology to Krackhardt (1990), OLS model results indicated 
that hierarchical level was negatively related to both friendship and advice network 
accuracy. Thus, power related to significantly less accuracy of the social network.   
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 The third study of interest was by Simpson and Borch (2005), who tested the 
question of whether low-power individuals were more accurate about social network ties 
than high-power individuals in exchange networks, using social distance as a moderator 
(defined as the number of links between the observer and the target of perception). They 
essentially posed competing hypotheses, that either “power begets perception” or 
“dependence begets perception”. For “power begets perception”, they argued that  
individuals with power are likely to experience more state positive affect, and  positive 
affect relates to more distal accuracy of network ties (i.e., Casciaro et al., 1999). Thus, 
individuals with power will be more accurate than low power individuals as the distance 
to the network tie increases. They posed a competing view based on the arguments from 
Fiske and colleagues (Fiske, 1993a; Fiske & Dépret, 1996) that low power will relate to 
better network accuracy than high power because individuals will attend closely to the 
network ties of those on whom they are dependent. And contrary to the high-power 
hypotheses, as distance increases, accuracy will decrease less for low-power compared to 
high-power actors. This is due to the notion that individuals with power have less need to 
collect information beyond their immediate connections, and thus will be less accurate 
for ties at greater distances.  
 Individuals were given positions in either a 7-person or 10-person network, and 
each individual could see their position in the network. Each position was established as 
either a “high-power” or “low-power” position through an exchange network game—
those positions which garnered the highest scores from the game were considered high-
power (the participants were not told which were high and low powered positions, but 
they did see the relative scores of each exchange among participants in their network).   
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Network perception accuracy was measured by asking respondents whether a tie existed 
or did not exist between each pair of actors after the exchange game was completed. 
Accuracy was the “proportion of correct responses for relations that actually existed” 
(2005: 283). 
   Findings from Simpson and Borch (2005) suggested that low power individuals 
were more accurate than high power individuals for ties beyond one step removed --
“[…]distance reduces perception, but [that] the effects are weaker for low-power than for 
high-power actors” (284).  They did not find a direct effect for high-power reducing 
accuracy for close ties, which suggests that high-power does not always necessarily result 
in less accuracy of the social network.  
 In a follow up study, Simpson and colleagues  (Simpson et al., 2011) investigated 
more precisely the role of power on network accuracy. They used an experimental 
approach where subjects were asked to learn a novel network and then were scored based 
on their accurate recall of the network (e.g., Janicik & Larrick, 2005). This approach has 
been used widely as a method of testing accuracy and use of schemas in learning 
networks (DeSoto, 1960; DeSoto & Bosley, 1962; Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & 
Ames, 2006). The authors theorized that low power individuals would make fewer errors 
when recalling the social networks than high power individuals. Power was determined 
by a common priming method where high power subjects are asked to recall and write a 
brief paragraph about an event or time when they had power over others, while low 
power subjects are asked to recall an event or time when someone had power over them 
(see Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003).   
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 Subjects (n=97) learned the networks by being presented with a number of 
descriptions about who influences whom in a fictitious network. There were six dyadic 
descriptions, such as “Mike influences Bob” and “Steve influences Doug”, etc. (Simpson 
et al., 2011). One minute after being exposed to the network descriptions, subjects were 
asked three questions pertaining to the presence of ties and seven questions pertaining to 
the absence of ties.  Statistical tests showed that when the errors were decomposed into 
three categories: “absent + present” (total error for all 10 questions); “absent” (7 
questions); and “present” (3 questions), low power individuals were significantly more 
accurate than high power individuals for “absent + present” and “absent” ties, but not 
“present” (Simpson et al., 2011). It is important to highlight here that high- and low-
power positions did not differ statistically when only considering ties that existed 
(present), meaning power was not a factor in recalling those ties that were actually part of 
the network.   As a novel robustness check the same power priming procedure was used 
but with a network of one-way streets (non-social network) and there were no statistical 
differences in accuracy for high- and low-power individuals.  
 Simpson et al. (2011) seemed to suggest that low-power individuals have a 
tendency to learn and recall social networks with more accuracy than high-power 
individuals. This conclusion supports the social cognition view of power, which argues 
that power reduces controlled cognition in favor or more heuristic processing of social 
information (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). This can result in low-power individuals having 
more precise social cognitive information processing, leading to better accuracy, while 
high-power individuals are less attuned to individuals and their social ties, leading to 
decreased accuracy.  
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 These studies suggest that power has some influence on how individuals perceive 
social information generally, and social networks specifically. This agrees with much of 
the research from the social psychology literature that power induces certain cognitive 
effects on the power holder, and these effects can be distinguished from those of the 
powerless (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Fiske, 1993a; Galinsky et al., 2011).   These 
results also suggest that different types of ties might relate differently to accuracy. For 
example, Krackhardt (1990) found that accuracy of the advice network was related to 
informal power, while Casciaro (1998) found that friendship and advice tie accuracy 
were negatively related to hierarchical level.  The Simpson studies (Simpson & Borch, 
2005; Simpson et al., 2011) found that accuracy of the exchange network was not directly 
related to either high- or low-power positions, but did find that accuracy of a novel 
influence network was related to perceptual accuracy for low-power primed individuals.   
 It is therefore important to select network relationships which are relevant and 
pertinent to understanding how formal power is related to social network accuracy.  
Because this study is investigating relationships within an organization, it is further 
important to focus on network relationships which are predominantly involved in work 
and task completion.   
 
Relationship typology 
 Social networks are the informal patterns of interactions and relationships among 
actors (Knoke & Yang, 2008) and social network ties can have different kinds of 
information and content. What constitutes a social network tie can include many different 
kinds of relations (e.g.,  Borgatti et al., 2009). In organizations, those ties which are most 
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closely related to interdependencies of work and working among individuals are the ones 
of interest in this study. These work-related, organizationally relevant ties can be 
understood along two broad categories of interpersonal relationships, which have direct 
relevance to perceptual accuracy of social networks at work: instrumental ties and 
expressive ties.   
Instrumental ties are broadly defined as when actors “contact one another in efforts to 
secure valuable goods, services, or information” (Knoke & Yang, 2008: 12). A 
relationship central to such instrumental exchange in organizations is trust. Establishing 
and maintaining trust in organizations is important because it facilitates efficient and 
timely exchange of work-related content and aids cooperation (e.g., Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; 
Levin & Cross, 2004). Here,  I am specifically referring to cognitive, or task-trust (as 
opposed to "affective-based" trust, see McAllister, 1995). Task related trust relates to 
“judgment based on evidence of another’s competence and reliability”(Chua et al., 2008 
:437). Following Chua (2008), I define task trust as when a person relies on another to 
“complete a task they agreed to do […] and have the knowledge and competence needed 
to get tasks done” (442).  
 Expressive ties are broadly defined as “actors expressing their feelings of 
affection, admiration, deference, loathing or hostility toward one another” (Knoke & 
Yang, 2008: 12).  One type of common expressive relationship found in organizations is 
friendship. Individuals in organizations often develop and maintain friendship ties with 
others. While it is difficult to provide a precise definition of “friend”,  its general use is 
associated with themes of interaction, affection, and time (Krackhardt, 1992) and can be 
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characterized as relationships in which individuals hold positive views of each other and 
their motives (Chua et al., 2008).  
 There has been an assumption in the social network literature that expressive and 
instrumental ties (or most ties in general) are typically positive or neutral (e.g., Cornwell, 
2005; Labianca & Brass, 2006). This assumption has implicitly applied to cognitive ties 
as well, as evidenced by a lack of negatively valenced ties for studies considering 
cognitive networks (cf, Bondonio, 1998; Casciaro, 1998; Casciaro et al., 1999; Freeman 
et al., 1987; Krackhardt, 1987; Krackhardt, 1990).   
  Thus, both expressive and instrumental ties among individuals in an organization 
can have a negative valence (See Figure 1.1). Specifically, I include task distrust (i.e., 
negative instrumental tie) which is the belief that a person will not complete a task that 
they agreed to do and does not have the knowledge and competence to get tasks done 
(Chua et al., 2008). And I include dislike (i.e., negative expressive tie), which is 
characterized as a relationship with “recurring, enduring, negative affective intentions or 
behaviors toward another person” (Labianca & Brass, 2006).  
Figure 2.1 Network relationship typology 
 
 
Theoretical Framework: Power and perception 
A critical component of  how social information is perceived and processed in 
organizations  is the experience of power (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2011), and this experience 
of power will influence social network accuracy. There has been a recent increase in 
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interest in power research in social psychology.  This is evidenced by a surge in 
theoretical developments and empirical research publications over the last two decades 
(Galinsky et al., 2011). Much of this recent work has been focused on the consequences 
of power, linking experience of power to individuals’ cognitions, behaviors and emotions 
(e.g., Galinsky et al., 2011; Guinote & Vescio, 2010b; Keltner et al., 2001). This research 
stream has taken up key questions going back to Kipnis’ (1972), who initiated early 
interest of how power affects the individual power holders. This research was a shift in 
focus from questions about how individuals obtain and maintain power, to how power 
actually affects the individual who wields it (Overbeck, 2010). 
 The traditional approach to power and social perception was based on 
foundational concepts within the social cognition tradition, that individuals are faced with 
an infinitely complex amount of social information and this information is processed 
selectively (Higgins & Bargh, 1987).   According to this view, humans have limited 
cognitive capacity, and therefore limit their use of cognitive energy – individuals don’t 
process all available social information and are “cognitive misers” (Fiske and Taylor, 
1993).  However, the goals and motivations of individuals can affect the level and type of 
processing a person employs toward social stimuli (Brewer, 1979; Fiske, 1998). The 
ways in which individuals process information are generally separated into dual-
processing models which broadly identify two ways people process information, and 
these are generally referred to as heuristic or automatic processing and systematic or 
controlled processing  (Chaiken & Trope, 1999: see Appendix A for additional 
discussion). 
 
25 
 
Recent research and theory from the social psychology of power has built on the 
information processing view to help explain the effects of power on social perception by 
understanding cognition as situated, in that individuals’ social cognitive processes are 
adaptive and not static or insulated from context (Smith & Semin, 2004). Cognitive 
processing operates selectively, as it adapts to the “primary factors” of the situation, such 
as environmental cues, expectancies, and goals (Guinote, 2010: 147-148). This approach 
has shed light on previous theoretical views which have limited the powerful to heuristic, 
automatic processing such as the power as control model (e.g., Fiske, 1993a; For a 
complete description, see Appendix B) .  Recent work has shown that powerful 
individuals are not cognitive automatons, but have flexibility and focus in where and how 
they prioritize their attention and cognitive energy (e.g., Overbeck & Park, 2006).  This 
view is best articulated by the situated focus theory of power (Guinote, 2010) , which 
accounts for how the powerful can inhibit peripheral information and instead focus on 
information related to relevant constructs such as goals, needs, or tasks (Guinote, 2007c).   
 The situated focus theory combines a cognitive bias view and an objective view to 
explain the various effects of power on individuals’ judgment and behavior variability. 
The bias approach relates to mindsets, or higher cognitive level biases that are “strategic 
information-processing orientations” (Guinote, 2010) such as approach and inhibition, 
selectivity, and a use of a wider range of mental processes. The objective approach relates 
to basic cognition, such as flexibility in attention and focus. The reasoning is that 
individuals in positions of power have fewer constraints, and are therefore able to 
selectively aim their attention at goals and needs. The powerless are more constrained, 
and lack control, therefore they attend to a multiple sources of information in order to 
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reduce uncertainty and increased predictability and control (Guinote, 2010). Individuals 
with power are able to focus attention toward goal-relevant cues, expectancies and 
information which aid goal achievement, and block out peripheral information not 
relevant to the activated constructs (Guinote, 2007b; Overbeck & Park, 2006) 
 This model reconciles findings that suggest power produces both focused, as well 
as less focused attention for information processing (Guinote, 2007b; Overbeck & Park, 
2006). The key component of this model, as mentioned above, is the notion that cognition 
is situated; that is, context or situation plays a key role in how power affects cognitive 
and behavioral processes. For example, while powerful individuals use heuristic 
processing when thinking about others (stereotyping) (Fiske, 1993a; Guinote & Phillips, 
2010), they are sometimes actually more individuating in their perceptions of others, and 
less reliant on stereotypes (Overbeck & Park, 2001).  
Generally, powerful individuals are more likely to filter out task-irrelevant 
information, maintain focus on goal oriented information, and remain flexible in their 
cognitions in order to maintain their goal pursuit orientation.  This theory is a result of a 
link between social psychological concepts, such as an emphasis on social perception, 
and the effects of social interdependencies on information processing (Guinote & Vescio, 
2010a). Individuals navigate the social world with limited cognitive capacity, and they 
are guided by social psychological processes which “guide social attention and depth of 
processing”—and interdependence, or social power is a particularly important factor 
affecting these differences (Guinote & Vescio, 2010a: 2).  Thus, how individuals 
experience power affects their attentional focus, social perception, and goal orientation. 
The focus of attention will also trigger different attentional processes and behaviors, 
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leading to increased or decreased controlled information processing for information with 
particular content (e.g., task-related or task-relevant content).   
According to this view, power is associated with ability to ignore peripheral 
information as well as cognitive flexibility in processing information in the environment. 
Powerful individuals are able to selectively attend to information which is aligned with 
active goals. An empirical example of this is a study by Guinote (2007b) who tested the 
flexible attention of the powerful and the powerless by subjecting them to a series of 
visual tasks, where the goals required either attention to context (background), and or to 
the object where the background was peripheral, or to both the object and the background 
(i.e., the "framed-line" test, see Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003). Powerful 
individuals were better able to inhibit peripheral information relative to the task when 
required, and focus on the object and ignore the peripheral information when the task 
required, while the powerless were not able to ignore peripheral information, even when 
it was required to do so (Guinote, 2007b). 
In other words, while in a general sense power might relate to cognitive 
processing that leads to general inaccuracy, powerful individuals’ motivated cognitions 
will affect cognitive priorities and filter out peripheral, non-essential information 
allowing them to focus more attention on task and goal contexts and content than the 
powerless, relating to increased accuracy of particular social perceptions (Guinote, 2010).  
Thus, I argue that managers will generally focus on and process information in the social 
environment that is relevant to task completion or goals, such as specific interpersonal 
social relationships of others in the social network.  
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Hypothesis Development 
 Consistent with themes in the situated focus theory, I argue that the situation 
(work-related goals and priorities activated by manager status) will differentially affect 
perceptions of different social relationships (friendship, dislike, task trust and task 
distrust). Power affords individuals the freedom to focus on features of the environment 
which are important and to pay less attention to information that isn’t. Managers are 
likely to prioritize social information pertinent to their primary function, which is the 
management of individuals in their achievement of tasks and goals. An important aspect 
of task and goal achievement in a work setting is how individuals interrelate 
instrumentally, in terms of getting tasks done they said they would complete and having 
the competence to do the task correctly (Chua et al., 2008). Instrumental distrust can also 
arise when individuals do not believe that others are competent with a task or able to 
complete it.  
 For features of the social environment which are the highest priority, such as goal 
and task relevant social ties, managers are able to apply a motivated, focused attention to 
those features of the environment more than non-managers. They can selectively attend 
to those ties which are most relevant, and filter out those which are not.   This applies to 
both positively valenced instrumental ties (i.e., task trust) and negatively valenced 
instrumental ties (i.e., task distrust).  
 Thus, individuals with formal power (in managerial roles) are more motivated 
than subordinates to perceive and focus on those relationships and perceive them 
accurately in the network which are related to goal and task completion. 
H1: Manager-status will be positively related to accuracy of the 
instrumental task trust and task distrust networks. 
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Given that managers are able to prioritize their attention and focus on the social 
environment due to their power position, and that those priorities will fall in line with 
work related ties, it is likely that positive expressive ties, such as friendship, will be less 
attended to. This is because all individuals have limited cognitive capacity and managers’ 
ability to focus attention allows flexibility in where they spend that limited cognitive 
energy. 
 If it is the case that managers will be able to attend to some information and 
disregard other information, then information less likely to be attended to would be 
information less directly related to task and goal completion or impediment. This is not 
an argument that managers will be inaccurate about friendship, but rather, given the 
motivated priorities of their power position, they will pay less attention to positive 
expressive content than to other relationships and thus managers are likely to be 
relatively inaccurate about friendship ties compared to non-managers. 
H2: Manager-status will be negatively related to accuracy of the 
positively valenced expressive friendship network. 
 
 However, managers are also motivated to perceive those relationships which 
impede goal completion, more so than those individuals without formal power for the 
reasons stated above. Moreover, managers, rather than subordinates, have a greater 
tendency to be mediators of interpersonal disputes, as conflicts tend to be dealt with by 
those with the authority and power to mediate or arbitrate those conflicts. Managers’ 
greater awareness and exposure will relate to greater accuracy of expressive negative ties 
relative to non-managers.  
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H3: Manager-status will be positively related to accuracy of the 
negatively valenced expressive dislike network 
 
 See Figure 2.2 for a depiction of the expected relationships between manager 
status, type of tie, and whether the manager (or non-manager) will be significantly 
accurate (+) or inaccurate (-) about the instrumental and expressive positive and negative 
social relationships.  
 
Figure 2.2 Empirical Model Predictions (Hypotheses 1-3).  
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Methods 
Sample Setting 
The setting for this research was the call center of a large manufacturing and 
services firm.  This firm was part of a large global group based in Europe with a 100 year 
history in manufacturing restaurant equipment. It included subsidiaries in the United 
States, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, the UK, and Japan. The headquarters was 
based in Switzerland, and including all subsidiaries, comprised a company in excess of 
10,500 employees. The site for this research was the North American (US) subsidiary, 
based in the Southern United States, which employed about 350 individuals.  
An important consideration in selecting a setting for this study was the physical 
proximity and distance of individuals, especially in relation to those with formal power 
and those without. It is not uncommon for individuals in high formal positions to be 
located separately from subordinates, in offices or even off-site from where subordinates 
work. Thus, in investigating the accuracy of powerful individuals on the social 
interactions of others in the organization, it was important to select a setting where this 
potential issue could be mitigated. This allowed a clearer test of power on social network 
accuracy, rather than social or physical distance. This setting described in more detail 
below, provided a layout which minimized this potential problem because the managers 
and subordinates worked in one space, which was not separated by physical distance, and 
with very few physical barriers. 
The company used for this research was a leading manufacturer of a specific 
segment of cutting edge restaurant equipment; however the main focus was a line of 
advanced automatic coffee (espresso) machines. The research took place within the 
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technical call center which directly services customers (e.g., restaurants) and service 
providers (e.g., on-site service techs) with service support, primarily by phone. 
Employees were highly trained and skilled because they were charged with 
troubleshooting and problem-solving for a technologically sophisticated, ever-evolving 
line of equipment. Each employee went through at least a week of training, with 
opportunities for additional training on a regular basis. Depending on the particular area 
the employee worked, they had additional in-depth field training in order to work through 
complicated machine repair problems with customers.  
The employees within the call center were housed on a single floor (see Figure 
2.1), within one large space with only one enclosed office—that of the operations 
manager. The remaining employees were in open areas, with only partial cubicle barriers 
between them, but the space remained open and most areas of the space were clearly 
visible from anywhere in the room.  
 
33 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Department Floor Plan and Personnel Layout 
  
 
Data collection occurred over the course of two weeks, during which time I 
engaged in direct observation of the department.  It was clear that the employees 
interacted almost constantly with each other over the course of the day. It was common at 
any given moment for two or more employees to be huddled together talking, either 
about work-related or non work-related topics. This was possible because each call center 
agent was equipped with a mobile headset, allowing them to roam from their work 
stations and still be able to talk to customers over the phone. The room was set up so that 
the primary exit was along a narrow, short corridor. Over the course of the day, 
employees would have to walk through the small area to enter and exit the call center, 
and I observed many brief social encounters and conversations among employees within 
that space. Thus, the employees were interactive throughout the day. 
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Employees within the department were in one of four groups. Group 1 was 
responsible for service calls directly from the businesses which purchased the equipment. 
These calls were primarily trouble shooting problems encountered by the equipment 
operators, and ranged from help with programming the machines’ computer to finding 
the source of water leaks. This group was the largest of the four, consisting of 25 
individuals, of which five were managers. The work in this group was 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week. Thus, the employees worked different shifts. For example, there were 
weekdays, weeknights, weekend days, and weekend nights. Important to note here is that 
all these shifts were scheduled to overlap. Additionally, the members of the groups would 
congregate for a Monday morning meeting, so all shifts were present. This allowed for 
continuing communication among the employees and manager for the various shifts. This 
meant that all employees were up to date on work-related matters and were able to 
interact with others over the course of their respective shifts within Group 1.  
Group 2’s work was similar to Group 1, in that these employees were involved 
with fielding calls related to equipment service and repair. However, Group 2 agents 
primarily dealt with the service providers, or those contracted professionals who were on-
site, working on the equipment. When the service providers have questions or problems, 
Group 2 would handle those calls. These calls tended to be more technical, and required 
more hands-on experience and a higher level of technical ability than Group 1 calls. Most 
of the agents in Group 2 had field experience with machine repair.  Group 2 had 17 
individuals, with five managers. The high mobility was especially critical for the Group 2 
agents, as they were often talking directly to service providers on site of a client working 
on the equipment. The mobility allowed the Group 2 agents to access identical equipment 
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and machines set up in their area while talking to the service provider. Thus, if a service 
provider had a question about a machine that was difficult to answer directly, the agent 
could use an identical running machine to help work through the problem.  The area 
where the machines were set up also served as a key social hub, as most agents would use 
the espresso machines to make coffee for themselves during the day.  
Group 3 consisted of six individuals with one manager.  This group was 
responsible for periodic maintenance and installation of new equipment. When a new 
customer purchased a machine, the service contracts accompanying the equipment 
included pre-determined maintenance which had to be scheduled and performed for the 
customer. This group was responsible for all the scheduling and follow up for this 
scheduled maintenance. Unlike Groups 1 and 2, Group 3 did not field service calls for 
unscheduled repairs.  
Group 4 consisted of the administrative staff. This included the operations 
manager responsible for the department as a whole, and technical specialists who were 
responsible for administrative tasks such as developing and running reports, coordinating 
invoice disputes (for example when a customer did not agree with a charge made to 
repair a machine), and other office duties.  
Beyond the informal interactions among employees, at-least weekly meetings 
were conducted for designated groups by supervisors to communicate changes to 
essential protocols and processes. These meetings were a major part of the culture of the 
division and the managers were very focused on open, consistent communication among 
both supervisors and employees. I was present for two of these meetings and was able to 
observe how the meetings were conducted. They were lead by the overall manager of the 
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Group guided by a pre-circulated agenda, and the operations manager was always 
present. Each manager in the group typically gave a brief report, and issues and new 
procedures were discussed. All individuals invited to the meeting, regardless of rank, 
were given opportunity to talk and respond. They sat or stood in a large circle, with no 
clear hierarchy in the arrangement. The meetings lasted about twenty minutes.  
This setting was an appropriate one for research examining the perceptions of 
relationships at work. This is because the physical setting was open, allowing individuals 
to not only see others interacting, but hear them as well if they were close enough. The 
layout of the department was such that it encouraged social interactions. The work flow 
provided opportunities for individuals and small groups to work together often.   The 
mobility of the call-center agents, with the ability to move about the room was also an 
important feature of this setting.  The emphasis on communication in the department, 
from the informal meetings to the predetermined meetings among the Groups, allowed 
for additional interactions.   
Data Collection 
 I used a three-stage data collection method. Stage one consisted of on-site semi-
structured interviews, which I used to provide qualitative data prior to creating and 
administering a survey (see Appendix C for Interview Protocol). This qualitative data 
was used to inform the questionnaire and items of interest for the main study (See Table 
2.1 for description of all data-collection stages).  
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Table 2.1 Data Collection Stages 
Stage Data N Format Date (2012) Respondents 
1 Semi-structure qualitative interviews 25 
Digital Recording/ 
Transcription 4/16-4/18 Stratified sample 
2a Demographics, self-reports, networks 52 Online survey 8/1-8/5 All employees 
2b Performance ratings 12 Online survey 8/1-8/5 All managers 
3 CSS data 42 Pen and paper 8/8-8/12 Groups 1 and 2 
 
The second stage of data collection was for the social networks and psychometric 
questionnaire (2a) (see Appendix D for list of all variables), which consisted of questions 
that were administrated to all employees on a voluntary basis. This stage also included a 
survey given to all managers which contained performance ratings for employees (2b). 
During all phases of data collection, I was available on site to help answer questions and 
explain the survey and research to each employee who agreed to take part in the study. 
The initial digital survey was provided by email via a secure link directly to employees 
(via www.qualtrics.com). Employees could take the survey at their private stations during 
their shifts, and were able to work at their own pace. The survey automatically saved 
progress so respondents could complete the survey when it was most convenient. The 
link was emailed to groups timed according to employee shifts over the course of a three 
day period. The respondents could refuse to take the survey either by ignoring the 
emailed link or, if they followed the electronic link, by selecting “no” on the digital 
consent form.  Only one individual did not take part in the survey by ignoring the link. 
Another individual was out of town at the time of the survey. 
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Stage Three collected only the cognitive social structure (CSS) data (Krackhardt, 
1987)—these were mental maps of the social network according to each person’s 
perceptions. This was done by providing respondents with two matrices in which the 
names of all members of their work group (Group1 or Group 2) were listed along the top, 
bottom, and sides. One matrix was for the expressive positive and negative ties 
(friendship and dislike) and the other matrix was for the instrumental positive and 
negative ties (task trust and task distrust) (see Appendix E for examples of these 
matrices). The respondents were limited to these groups for a number of reasons. First, to 
include the entire sample (n=52) in the CSS data collection would pose an extremely high 
demand on respondents. The number of possible relational ties among 52 individuals is 
on the order of (n*(n-1)) or 2652 possible ties. The time and cognitive energy required to 
fill out such a large matrix made respondent fatigue highly likely, possibly resulting in 
decreased reliability of the responses. Second, two of the groups were extremely small, 
consisting of only four and six individuals, respectively (Groups 3 and 4). Any variance 
in the responses within these small groups was likely to be minimal, and as they were not 
subgroups of the other larger groups, the cost to adding them to the CSS data collection 
outweighed the potential benefits.  Third, the groups selected for the CSS data collection, 
Group 1 and 2 (with 25 and 17 individuals respectively) were of comparable size to 
previous work in the CSS literature, where sample sizes are between 15 and 36 
individuals (cf, Casciaro, 1998; Casciaro et al., 1999; Krackhardt, 1990; Krackhardt & 
Kilduff, 1999). This made the data sample comparable to previous studies of this type.  
Fourth, the groups were not combined into one matrix, because even 42 individuals in a 
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single CSS would be likely to create high respondent fatigue. Thus, the Group 1 and 2 
CSS matrices were collected separately. 
 
Sample 
 The total sample consisted of 42 individuals. During phase 2 and 3 of the data 
collection, one individual declined to participate. Two other individuals provided 
incomplete surveys. One individual filled out the CSS survey but not the online 
questionnaire, and another employee filled out the online questionnaire but not the CSS 
survey. Of the total sample, there were ten managers, all of whom participated. Overall, 
the response rate, including the individual who declined and the partial data from two 
other individuals was 93% (see Table 2.2).  Critically important, the CSS data response 
rate was nearly 95%, with only two individuals missing from Group 1, and no missing 
data from Group 2.  
 
Table 2.2  Description of Group 1 and 2 Response Rates 
 Group 1  Group 2 
Total 25 17 
Managers 5 5 
Response 88%* 100% 
Survey yes  yes  
CSS yes  yes  
*CSS and electronic survey missing responses differ 
No manager responses are missing from data 
 
 The total sample was 33.3% female, and 38.5% were non-minority (two 
individuals did not disclose their ethnicity) (See Table 2.3) In terms of education, 35.9% 
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finished high school, and 25.6% had graduated college (See Table 2.4). Tenure at the 
Company ranged from 5 months to 160 months (M = 34.4). 
 
Table 2.3 Ethnicity Demographics  (n =39) 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Asian/Pacific Islander 6 15.4 15.4 
Black/African American 5 12.8 28.2 
Caucasian 22 56.4 84.6 
Hispanic 2 5.1 89.7 
Other/Multi-racial 2 5.1 94.9 
No response 2 5.1 100.0 
Total 39 100.0   
 
 
Table 2.4  Education Demographics (n = 39) 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Some High School 1 2.6 2.6 
Finished High School 14 35.9 38.5 
Technical/Professional/ Cert. 4 10.3 48.7 
Associate Degree 10 25.6 74.4 
Graduated from College 10 25.6 100.0 
Total 39 100.0   
 
Variables  
Cognitive Social Structure Networks 
 The social networks representing each individuals’ perceptions of their work 
group network, or cognitive social structures (CSS) (Krackhardt, 1987) were collected 
using a matrix design (Casciaro, 1998).  The matrices were created so that the 
respondents were only required to fill out two complete matrices—one for expressive and 
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one for instrumental ties. The survey listed the names of the individuals within the 
respective work groups repeated along the sides and top and bottom of a square matrix 
(see Appendix E).  Individuals were asked to indicate the relationship among coworkers 
(and themselves) in their workgroup by filling in the box within the matrix for each row 
and column where they perceived a relationship. For example, if person A was believed 
to have a particular relationship with person M, the respondent would indicate that 
relationship by marking the box in row A, column M, and so on, for all pairs of names for 
which the respondent perceived a relationship. For the expressive matrix, respondents 
would write a “1” for friendship or a “2” for dislike, and for the instrumental network 
they would write a “1” for task trust or a “2” for task distrust.  Respondents were 
instructed to leave the answer blank if they did not know or were unsure about the 
relationship.  They were also asked to fill out their own row and column first, before 
moving on to the other names in the matrix (See Appendix E) 
 This design has some advantages over the traditional method of collecting CSS 
data pioneered by David Krackhardt (e.g., Krackhardt, 1987; Krackhardt, 1990).  The 
traditional method asks each respondent about the social networks of all other 
individuals’ social networks by asking a network question (e.g., who is a personal friend 
of Bob’s?) followed by a list of all people in the network. The respondents check the 
names of those they considered to be a friend of Bob’s. This process would then be 
repeated for all members of the network, and repeated for different network questions 
(such as, who goes to Bob for advice?). This method would have required 25 network 
questions (for Group 1 alone) for just a single relationship (with 24 possible answers for 
each question). This study contained four networks, which would result in a total of 100 
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questions for each respondent. While the matrix format cannot eliminate the taxing nature 
of CSS data, I believe it did reduce the strain on the respondents.  There is also the 
advantage of being able see the pattern of ties while filling out the matrix. I do not 
presume that the respondents were thinking of these as “networks” in the sense I am here, 
but the matrix method does provide a much closer approximation to a network view than 
the dyadic question method.  
 After these matrices were collected, they were recoded into a digital format in MS 
Excel 2007. Multiple coders were used to insure that the matrices were 100% accurate 
before they were used in analysis by rechecking the digital versions with the originals. 
These matrices were then imported into UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002) 
and separated into four binary networks (friendship, dislike, task trust, and task distrust) 
for each group for analysis.  
Dependent Variables: Network Accuracy 
 The dependent variable, network accuracy, was calculated using the Jaccard Index 
from UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). The Jaccard index is a widely used measure of 
correlation in the social sciences, because it identifies the occurrence of agreement 
among sets of binary data.  For the cases where the data was valued, I used a modified 
version of the Jaccard index that calculated correlation for valued data in UCINET 
(Borgatti et al., 2002) using the same underlying mathematical properties (this was only 
necessary for the Bayesian network model described below). 
 The definition of the Jaccard coefficient is the size of the intersection divided by 
the size of the union of sample sets:  
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𝐽(𝐴,𝐵) =  
𝐴 ∩ 𝐵
𝐴 ∪ 𝐵
 
 
Another way to illustrate this measure is to think of it as a Venn diagram, where the 
circles (A and B) represent the sample sets, and the overlap (C) represents the 
intersection, or agreement (Figure 2.1):  
 
 
 
 This measure captures the agreement among two sets of responses as a proportion 
of the set of all responses. Thus, a person’s accuracy was based on the proportion of 
agreement their network had with the criterion network compared to the total set of ties 
reported in both networks.   
 The more common method of using a Pearson correlation via the Quadratic 
Assignment Procedure (e.g., Casciaro, 1998) was problematic because most accuracy 
scores were undefined due to the number of zeros (absence of  ties). This was especially 
true for the negative tie networks which were generally sparse. For example, nine CSS 
dislike matrices and eight task distrust CSS matrices lacked ties. In contrast, no CSS 
friendship or task trust matrices were lacking ties.   
 
 
Figure 2.4 Jaccard Index Example 
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Criterion Networks 
 Calculation of individuals’ cognitive social structure (CSS) accuracy requires two 
variables: a criterion network and a comparison network. The criterion network is the 
“true” network derived from the data. The comparison networks are the network 
perceptions of each individual for the network in question.  What constitutes the “real” or 
criterion network is not clear cut. Scholars have argued for two basic approaches to 
defining the network to calculate CSS accuracy. These are the “locally aggregated” 
(LAS) approach and the “consensus” approach (e.g., Bondonio, 1998; Krackhardt, 1987). 
Because the network can exist as an aggregation of individuals’ objective responses, or as 
a compilation of all individuals’ collective inter-subjective perceptions (i.e., consensus), I 
am including both these possibilities as separate measures. Justification of these views 
comes from different sources. The LAS view is based on the logic that the individuals 
“closest” to the tie should have the most knowledge of the tie. The consensus view 
(which is the use of each individuals’ complete cognitive social structure to determine the 
true network) is based on the logic that the agreement of actors on some feature of the 
social environment, such as culture or the pattern of social relationships (e.g., Krackhardt 
& Kilduff, 2002), is correlated with the truth about those features (e.g., Romney, Weller, 
& Batchelder, 1986).  It should be noted that I am not hypothesizing different results 
based on these methods of generating the criterion networks and accuracy scores. Rather, 
by using both methods I am able to generalize to a greater degree about the relationship 
between formal power and social network accuracy.  
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Locally Aggregated Network 
 The objective measure of the “true” network was calculated as the locally 
aggregated structure (LAS; Krackhardt, 1987) where each actors’ nominations of others 
in the network were used together to form the criterion network from which accuracy is 
calculated. This method of determining the criterion network has face validity because it 
relies on a person’s “locally” reported ties, and these ties are taken as how the network 
actually exists—this is because the ties derive directly from the individuals reporting 
them and are close to the individual reporting them. For each person, their “out” ties from 
their own CSS network map were joined with all others’ out ties from each person’s 
responses. This formula uses the following notation: i is the row, j is the column, and k is 
the observer, and R is the NxN network. Using this notation, the definition of this “row 
dominated” LAS is as follows (Krackhardt, 1987): 
𝑅′𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑖  
Thus, criterion network R’ was a compilation of i to j ties for all k’s, where k = i. To 
calculate the accuracy of each individual, the row dominated  LAS network was 
correlated to each individual’s reported CSS network using the Jaccard Index correlation 
in  (Borgatti et al., 2002). It is important to note that versions after 3.6 of UCINET 
excluded k’s accuracy of their own ties in calculations of accuracy. This was because a 
person’s accuracy would be artificially inflated to the degree they reported ties to others, 
as those ties would covary perfectly with the row dominated LAS criterion network for 
their self-reported ties. This method of aggregation was performed for all four networks 
(friendship, dislike, task trust, and task distrust), and accuracy was calculated with the 
same process for all row dominated LAS networks. 
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Bayesian Network Accuracy Model 
 The  consensus-based “true” network was calculated by using a Bayesian 
Network Accuracy Model (BNAM) (Butts, 2003). This model, while technically more 
sophisticated, essentially provides a mathematically derived consensus of the network 
based on each person’s complete individual cognitive social structure map.  The key 
advantage of this model over traditional consensus models, and over the LAS models, is 
that it incorporates error terms into the calculation of the network. Unlike nearly all other 
measurements in social science, social network measurements are generally devoid of 
error calculations, i.e.,  the probability of false positives and false negatives in 
individuals’ perceptions of the network ties (Butts, 2003).  Individuals can inaccurately 
perceive ties that do not exist and can also fail to perceive ties that do exist. This 
approach allows for the incorporation of these error terms in the network model. This 
method also produces a probabilistic output of the network, where the “ties” are valued 
probabilities of that tie’s existence.   
 For this research, I followed Butt’s Bayesian Network Accuracy Model (BNAM) 
to calculate the criterion network. A number of conditionals are required in the execution 
of this model, and other than the prior probabilities necessary for the Bayesian approach, 
I adopted the recommended parameters from Butt’s (2003) paper (the basic code for this 
can be found in Appendix G). One of the features of the Bayesian approach is the 
establishment of prior probabilities which are used to predict the expected densities of the 
networks. For the positive tie networks, I used a prior probability of .3, which is the 
recommended density prior. However, because negative tie networks are much sparser 
than positive tie networks (Casciaro & Lobo, 2008; Labianca & Brass, 2006), I chose a 
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prior density of .08 based on previous work and because negative networks are generally 
much less dense than positive tie networks.  
 The traditional consensus method uses a decision rule to determine the 
“existence” of a tie—generally 50%; that is, if a majority of the respondents agree the tie 
exists, it is counted as existing. The critique of this approach isn’t just the use of a 
somewhat arbitrary rule, but rather that some networks (i.e., negative tie networks) are 
very unlikely to have a majority agreement on any tie.  This is because negative tie 
networks are much sparser than the positive tie networks for which these rules were 
created, and are subject to different social and relational realities (Labianca & Brass, 
2006).  Using another arbitrary rule does not fundamentally address the problem either 
(such as using a lower threshold, such as >25% agreement, or >10% agreement—because 
in some cases there might be only one person that perceives a tie, or two people who 
perceived the tie in small networks, which would be counted the same weight as when 
multiple individuals perceive a tie). Such rules are difficult to justify, and most of this 
difficulty can reduced by using the Bayesian method, which uses features of the data 
itself to determine the probabilistic network, rather than imposing threshold rules. (For 
additional details and assumptions pertaining to this method, see Appendix G.) 
Independent Variable: Formal Power 
 Formal power was measured by using the companies’ formal hierarchy. 
Specifically, I used manager status as the measure of formal power. This approach is 
consistent with previous work on power and network accuracy (e.g., Casciaro, 1998).   
 The managers and supervisors in this setting held particularly strong positions of 
power over subordinates—this was due to two key reasons. First, this particular division 
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does not give raises, such as merit raises, cost-of-living increases, or increases based on 
tenure. Rather, pay increases are wholly based on goal achievement, which is set for both 
individuals and departments by the direct supervisor and department head, respectively. 
The company called this goal-setting system “3PM”. Achieving one’s goals is the only 
way to increase income through a bonus incentive—thus goal setting and goal 
achievement, which are largely presided over by the manager, held particular sway and 
interest to subordinates.  Second, in our qualitative interviews I found that a large 
majority of employees wanted to stay with this particular company. However some 
wanted to move to a different department within the company (generally those that were 
in Group 1). Because they felt that these transfer opportunities were rare, it was in the 
employees’ best interest to be diligent and pro-active about following up on new 
openings. However, the managers who provide reviews of their subordinates could 
drastically affect the possibility of individuals being able to apply for new positions. The 
main barrier to promotion, other than factors related to the applicant herself, was 
receiving a “negative write up” by a manager, which makes an individual ineligible for a 
promotion or new position for a six month period.  These positions gave the managers 
particularly meaningful power over items the employees cared about a great deal: 
monetary bonuses and promotions within the company.  
The formal hierarchical levels for this study were as follows (See Table 2.5):  
Table 2.5 Hierarchical Levels in the Organization 
Level Title N 
1 Employees 32 
2 Managers 8 
3 Group Managers 2 
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 The difficulty of using these hierarchical levels as the measure of power was that 
there were a very limited number of individuals at each level, and only three levels. For 
example, there were only two people in level 3, and eight individuals in level 2. This 
makes any results of network accuracy related to formal level very difficult to support 
because of the small sample sizes. For the sake of simplicity, and to capture more 
accurately the role of formal power as the key variable of interest, level 2 and 3 manager 
status was collapsed into a single measure of formal power (resulting in 10 managers, 
where 1 = manager, 0 = non-manager).  
Control variables 
Workflow Centrality 
 Individuals in the department often worked with others both within and outside 
their workgroup. Such interactions are important because they might provide additional 
information about their own workgroup through others, as additional information about 
the network can travel along these required workflow ties. Thus, I controlled for this 
possibility by including a measure of one’s centrality in the required workflow network. 
Using a roster method, each individual was asked to select those people in the department 
for which they either received inputs from, or sent outputs to. See question below: 
“… please indicate who you receive inputs from, provide outputs to, or both in 
order to accomplish your task(s) at work. For example, you might require the 
input of certain items before you can do your work. And others must receive 
specific items from you before they can do their work. If you don’t receive inputs 
or provide output for the person, please don’t check those boxes.” 
 
The answers to this question were used to create a 39x39 matrix of workflow ties. Using 
this network, in-degree work flow centrality was calculated in UCINET (Borgatti et al., 
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2002) using the full sample (n = 39) of respondents as the number of nominations a 
person received as someone who receives outputs from others. This resulted in the 
variable “Workflow centrality”.  
 
Network centrality 
 An individuals’ position in the network of social ties can provide individuals an 
information advantage due to access to others in the network. Some individuals might be 
more central, and thus would access more information about the network, and central 
individuals will also have local access to more ties than those less central to the network 
(e.g., Bondonio, 1998; Casciaro, 1998; Casciaro et al., 1999; Krackhardt, 1990). 
Therefore, I controlled for individuals centrality in the positive and negative tie networks 
for the instrumental and expressive network accuracy models.  
 For each individual I calculated the number of nominations a person received 
from their respective work groups (Group 1 and Group 2) to control for their structural 
position in the network (e.g., Casciaro, 1998; Casciaro et al., 1999). Negative tie network 
centrality was also calculated because one’s centrality in the negative tie network can 
reduce information and positive social support (Labianca & Brass, 2006). These 
measures were calculated from the raw CSS data via the LAS row-dominated 
aggregations which consisted of each person’s (i’s) nominations of others (j) for each 
network relationship (see description above). Each person’s in-degree centrality was 
calculated from these matrices using UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). The normalized 
scores were used because the groups consisted of different sizes. This resulted in four 
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variables: “Task Trust Centrality”, “Task Distrust Centrality”, “Friend Centrality”, and 
“Dislike Centrality”.   
CSS Density 
 The number of ties that a person perceives in their CSS can vary significantly. For 
example, some individuals responded with no perceptions of ties for some negative tie 
networks (i.e., dislike and task distrust), while others saw many.  These perceiver 
differences were controlled for by including the CSS density for each person in the 
regression models (e.g., Casciaro et al., 1999) calculated in UCINET (Borgatti et al., 
2002). Density of a network is calculated as the number of ties recorded over the total 
number of ties possible in the network.  Thus, for each individual’s CSS network, there 
were four variables corresponding to the four networks for each person, called “CSS 
Density”.  The density variable included in the statistical models matched the network in 
the dependent variable. For example, when testing Friend Accuracy, the density measure 
for Friend CSS was included, and when testing Task Trust Accuracy, the density measure 
for Task Trust CSS was included, and so on.  
Group  
 To ensure that group differences were not driving accuracy results, I controlled 
for group membership for each individual.  This was intended to control group effects on 
accuracy, but also any group level demographic differences.  Group 2 was coded as 1, 
and Group 1 was coded as 0, resulting in the variable “Group”.  
Analytical Approach 
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Linear regression with robust standard errors was used to model the relationship 
between formal power and network accuracy (Hansen, Mors, & Løvås, 2005; Moulton, 
1986; Rogers, 1994). This was because the association between the dependent and 
independent variables was predicted to be linear and the data was cross-sectional.  All 
network accuracy models were run in STATAv11 (StataCorp, 2011).  
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Results 
 Pearson correlations (2-tailed) showed that network accuracy was positively 
related to manager status for task distrust accuracy (r = .352, p < .01) and dislike 
accuracy (r = .520, p < .01) for the BNAM models.  However, the correlation of manager 
status and dislike accuracy was not significant for the LAS models (r = .218, ns). 
Manager status was significant and positive for the task trust accuracy LAS (r = .352, p 
< .01); but not task distrust accuracy LAS (r = .175, ns). (See Table 2.6 below). 
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  Variable Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Task Trust Accuracy (BNAM) .18 .09 -       
2. Task Distrust Accuracy (BNAM) .09 .09 -.275 -      
3. Friend Accuracy (BNAM) .14 .06 .790** -.225 -     
4. Dislike Accuracy (BNAM) .04 .04 .208 .342* .290 -    
5. Task Trust Accuracy (LAS) .34 .16 .719** -.004 .518** .284 -   
6. Task Distrust Accuracy (LAS) .06 .06 .103 .448** .090 .423** .465** -  
7. Friend Accuracy (LAS) .25 .13 .561** -.111 .742** .358* .477** .085 - 
8. Dislike Accuracy (LAS) .07 .08 .580** .014 .451** .511** .465** .305 .418** 
9. Manager Status .26 .44 .158 .352* .116 .520** .352* .175 .308 
10. Task Trust Centrality 53.95 19.45 .271 .104 .323* .462** .275 .428** .186 
11. Task Distrust Centrality 10.36 8.83 .132 .011 -.066 -.214 .033 -.292 -.019 
12. Friend Centrality 39.21 16.36 .464** -.328* .512** -.006 .223 .052 .283 
13. Dislike Centrality 4.33 5.52 .011 .281 .028 .267 .040 -.057 .147 
14. Workflow Centrality 19.82 7.10 .383* .235 .417** .165 .483** .275 .264 
15. Task Trust CSS Density .36 .24 .445** .056 .230 .274 .910** .503** .303 
16. Task Distrust CSS Density .05 .06 -.033 .242 -.065 .193 .405* .816** -.044 
17. Friend CSS Density .24 .22 .389* -.165 .441** .334* .446** .118 .869** 
18. Dislike CSS Density .03 .04 .152 .302 .113 .150 .246 .570** .213 
19. Group .44 .50 .835** -.494** .749** .157 .515** -.014 .573** 
*p < .05 **p<.01          
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8. Dislike Accuracy (LAS) -           
9. Manager Status .218 -          
10. Task Trust Centrality .257 .338* -         
11. Task Distrust Centrality -.021 .074 -.648** -        
12. Friend Centrality .275 .104 .529** -.224 -       
13. Dislike Centrality -.077 .230 -.107 .363* -.321* -      
14. Workflow Centrality .106 .434** .416** .129 .333* .226 -     
15. Task Trust CSS Density .403* .374* .162 .057 .092 .001 .362* -    
16. Task Distrust CSS 
Density 
.135 .117 .211 -.261 -.020 -.166 .159 .543** -   
17. Friend CSS Density .410** .298 .208 -.110 .213 .092 .119 .386* .017 -  
18. Dislike CSS Density .302 -.073 .161 -.005 .016 -.120 .204 .197 .454** .194 - 
19. Group .511** .076 .290 -.007 .627** -.046 .222 .328* -.045 .457** -.013 
 *p < .05 **p<.01           
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Accuracy tables 
 The mean accuracy scores for managers compared to non-managers shows a 
consistent pattern of results for instrumental and expressive positive and negative ties 
(See Table 2.7). For the BNAM accuracy scores, managers consistently had higher mean 
accuracy scores compared to non-managers. The same held true for the LAS accuracy 
scores (See Table 2.8). Thus across all scores, the mean accuracy was greater for 
managers compared to non-managers.  
 
Table 2.7 Mean Network Accuracy for  BNAM Model (n = 39) 
  Instrumental Ties Expressive Ties 
Positive Ties Manager  .20   .16  
 Non-manager  .17  .14  
Negative Ties Manager  .15  .08  
 Non-manager  .07  .03  
 
Table 2.8 Mean Network Accuracy  for Row Dominated LAS (n=39) 
  Instrumental Ties Expressive Ties 
Positive Ties Manager  .43   .23  
 Non-manager  .30  .15  
Negative Ties Manager  .08  .10  
 Non-manager  .06  .06  
        
Perceived ties 
 I calculated the average number and total number of perceived ties for managers 
and non-managers for each network (task trust, task distrust, friendship and dislike). The 
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number of perceived ties of managers and non-managers shows that on average and in 
most cases, a manager perceived more ties in the network than non-managers (See Table 
2.9).  The exception was for dislike ties, where managers (M = 11) reported fewer ties 
than non-managers (M =13). In all cases, managers had less total number of ties 
perceived compared to non-managers, however this was to be expected given the 
difference in number of managers (n =10) to non-managers (n =29).   
Table 2.9 Means and Total Number of Network Ties Perceived Study 1 
 Task Trust Task Distrust Friendship Dislike 
 Mean Total Mean Total Mean Total Mean Total 
Manager 215 2154 29 291 123 1231 11 112 
Non-manager 131 3809 19 540 86 2504 13 371 
 
Test of hypotheses: 1-3 
 Hypothesis 1 proposed a significantly positive relationship between manager 
status and instrumental tie accuracy. To test this hypothesis, both the LAS and BNAM 
accuracy measures for task trust and task distrust were regressed on manager status (See 
Table 2.10).  For task trust accuracy, neither the LAS (b = -.035, t = -0.544, ns) or the 
BNAM (b = -0.074, t= -0.731, ns) network accuracy measures were significantly 
predicted by manager status. For task distrust (LAS), manager status was not significant 
(b = -0.078, t = -0.762, ns); however manager status was marginally significantly related 
to task distrust in the BNAM model (b = .244, t =1.775, p<.1 ). This provided partial, but 
weak support for Hypothesis 1: manager status was marginally significantly related to 
task distrust accuracy.  This suggests that managers were more accurate than subordinates 
for task distrust ties which were generally perceived by individuals in the organization 
(BNAM), but not those ties in which the actors reported direct involvement (LAS).   
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Table 2.10 Results of  Linear  Regression Model for Accuracy of the Task Trust and Task 
Distrust Networks 
 Task Trust Accuracy Task Distrust Accuracy 
 LAS Model BNAM Model LAS Model BNAM Model 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Group 0.224** 0.216** 0.733** 0.718** -0.095 -0.105 -
0.619** 
-
0.589** 
 (3.482) (3.171) (7.900) (7.573) (-0.981) (-1.072) (-4.454) (-4.203) 
         
CSS Density 0.783** 0.793** 0.140+ 0.162+ 0.776** 0.783** 0.181 0.161 
 (13.256) (12.387) (1.713) (1.960) (6.211) (6.592) (1.358) (1.092) 
         
Workflow 
Centrality 
0.154+ 0.156+ 0.091 0.096 -0.030 -0.020 0.172 0.138 
 (1.742) (1.745) (0.720) (0.752) (-0.282) (-0.186) (0.922) (0.800) 
         
Task Distrust 
Centrality 
-0.030 -0.014 0.200 0.233 0.192 0.228 0.249 0.135 
 (-0.262) (-0.112) (1.133) (1.180) (1.377) (1.497) (1.207) (0.682) 
         
Task Trust 
Centrality 
-0.000 0.022 0.127 0.173 0.429** 0.476** 0.336+ 0.189 
 (-0.000) (0.136) (0.600) (0.735) (2.891) (2.752) (1.752) (0.975) 
         
Manager Status  -0.035  -0.074  -0.078  0.244+ 
  (-0.544)  (-0.731)  (-0.762)  (1.775) 
                  
N 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
R-sq 0.901 0.902 0.770 0.774 0.754 0.759 0.428 0.469 
adj. R-sq 0.886 0.883 0.735 0.731 0.717 0.713 0.341 0.370 
F 61.65 52.53 21.00 17.77 15.84 15.09 4.824 6.973 
df m 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 
df r 33 32 33 32 33 32 33 32 
Standardized beta coefficients; t-statistics in parentheses     
Note: Standard errors are 
robust. 
       
+ p<.10 * p< .05 **p< .01. Two-tailed.      
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 Hypothesis 2 proposed that manager status would be significantly negatively 
related to Friendship Accuracy. To test this hypothesis, friendship accuracy for the LAS 
and BNAM models were regressed on manager status (See Table 2.11).  Manager status 
was not significantly related to either LAS or BNAM friendship accuracy (b = 0.008, t= 
0.075, ns; b = -0.111, t = -0.879, ns, respectively). Thus, there was no evidence to 
suggest that managers were less accurate than subordinates for friendship ties in the 
organization when those ties were reported directly by those involved in the ties (LAS), 
or those ties which had some level of consensus among actors in the organization 
(BNAM). This contradicts prior network accuracy research. 
 Hypothesis 3 proposed that manager status would be significantly positively 
related to dislike accuracy. To test this hypothesis, dislike accuracy for the LAS and 
BNAM networks were regressed on manager status. Results showed a positive, 
significant coefficient for both LAS (b = .304, t = 2.056, p<.05) and BNAM dislike 
network accuracy (b = .574, t =3.517, p < .01). Thus hypothesis 3 was supported, 
indicating that managers were more accurate than non-managers about dislike network 
ties in the organization. Managers were more accurate for those ties individuals indicated 
they were directly involved in (LAS) and for those ties which were more commonly held 
as a consensus by actors in the network (BNAM).  
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Table 2.11 Results of  Linear  Regression for Accuracy of the Friendship and Dislike 
Networks 
 Friendship Accuracy Dislike Accuracy 
 LAS Model BNAM Model LAS Model BNAM Model 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Group 0.238** 0.239** 0.640** 0.619** 0.578* 0.586* 0.203 0.219 
 (3.492) (3.326) (5.288) (5.070) (2.336) (2.469) (0.767) (0.938) 
         
CSS 
Density 
0.754** 0.751** 0.120 0.155 0.318* 0.364* 0.176 0.262+ 
 (6.131) (6.489) (0.837) (1.107) (2.495) (2.569) (1.228) (1.885) 
         
Workflow 
Centrality 
0.132 0.129 0.268* 0.311* -0.053 -0.187 0.046 -0.206 
 (1.207) (1.034) (2.149) (2.429) (-0.502) (-1.167) (0.229) (-1.010) 
         
Dislike 
Centrality 
0.040 0.039 -0.017 -0.003 -0.027 -0.062 0.265 0.199 
 (0.442) (0.443) (-0.135) (-0.022) (-0.175) (-0.355) (1.437) (1.101) 
         
Friend 
Centrality 
-0.057 -0.058 -0.009 -0.001 -0.083 -0.088 -0.066 -0.075 
 (-0.646) (-0.645) (-0.053) (-0.007) (-0.322) (-0.363) (-0.221) (-0.286) 
         
Manager 
status 
 0.008  -0.111  0.304*  0.574** 
  (0.075)  (-0.879)  (2.056)  (3.517) 
                  
N 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
R-sq 0.816 0.816 0.639 0.648 0.365 0.436 0.137 0.391 
adj. R-sq 0.788 0.781 0.584 0.581 0.269 0.330 0.006 0.277 
F 20.68 21.37 14.21 11.81 6.604 8.222 1.463 5.746 
df m 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 
df r 33 32 33 32 33 32 33 32 
Standardized beta coefficients; t-statistics in 
parentheses 
    
Note: Standard errors are robust.       
+ p<.10 * p< .05 **p< .01. Two-tailed.      
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Discussion Study 1 
 This study tested the role of formal power on individuals’ accuracy of the social 
network. Drawing on the situated focus theory of power (Guinote, 2010), I hypothesized 
that individuals with formal power will be more accurate for those relationships which 
contained instrumentally important content, namely task trust and task distrust.  Because 
managers were motivated to focus on instrumental ties, they were likely to be less 
focused, and therefore less accurate, about positive expressive ties (i.e., friendship) than 
non-managers. Finally,  I argued that accuracy of negative expressive ties (i.e., dislike) 
would be positively related to manager status, because such negative ties are pertinent to 
factors relating to cohesion and cooperation in a group, affecting instrumental outcomes, 
motivating increased attention from managers. Results of linear regression analysis did 
not find a significant relationship between accuracy of task trust and task distrust ties and 
manager status (i.e., formal power). Results also did not support the argument that 
managers would be less accurate about friendship ties compared to managers, either. 
However, results were consistent that managers were more accurate about dislike 
network ties than non-managers, suggesting that power is not always related to 
inaccuracy of the social network, and formal power has an influence on how individuals 
perceive social networks in organizations.  
 Given only partial support of the hypothesized relationships, questions remain as 
to why managers were not accurate about task trust and task distrust ties compared to 
non-managers. Turning first to the question of task trust, if power is related to focused, 
motivated cognition about task and goal related information, managers should 
demonstrate better accuracy of those instrumental network ties. Table 2.9 shows task trust 
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(LAS: r = .352, p<.05) was positively and significantly correlated to manager status, but 
this did not translate to significance in the regression models. If accuracy can also be 
attributed to position in the network, such as centrality, then manager status might not 
provide additional accuracy beyond what individuals realize from their network position.   
 Both task trust measures (LAS and BNAM) were significantly correlated to 
workflow centrality, but again, this centrality variable did not translate into significant 
predictors in the regression models (however, workflow centrality was marginally 
significant at the p<.1 level in the task trust accuracy model). Other features of the 
organization might explain these results as well. It was not incidental that Group 
designation was significant in both the LAS and BNAM task trust accuracy models. 
Group designation controlled for which group the individual was part of, and based on 
the regression in Table 2.9, Group 2 (based on the positive coefficient) was much more 
accurate as a whole than Group 1 for task trust ties. There are some possible explanations 
for this. First, Group 2 was smaller (n = 17) than Group 1 (n= 25), and therefore 
individuals in Group 2 were subjected to less cognitive strain in learning and perceiving 
potential social network ties, and the small size of the group might have made centrality 
(and manager status) within the group less important to gaining an advantage in 
perceiving the network accurately (cf, Krackhardt, 1990). Second, Group 1 worked in 
different shifts, and while the individuals in theses shifts did interact, the level of contact 
they had was more sporadic than Group 2 members who worked essentially the same 
hours. Group 2 had more consistent access to network information across members 
compared to Group 1.  A related point is that Group 2 had significantly more friendship 
ties than Group 1 based on the correlation between Group and friendship centrality (r = 
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.627, p<.01). Thus, the more cohesive Group 2 was more aware of their networks than 
Group 1, and this cohesiveness was a stronger predictor than effects of formal power on 
perception and accuracy of task trust social networks. Overall, the structural elements of 
the groups, and positions of individuals in those groups might have related to increased 
knowledge and accuracy of some networks, thus these factors explained variance in the 
task trust models that formal power did not. Additional variance explained by adding the 
task trust accuracy variables was less than 1%, reinforcing the notion that formal power 
and the attendant consequences were not significant when the structural factors of group 
were present in the models.  
 Task distrust accuracy was hypothesized to also be significantly related to 
manager status, but it had only a marginally significant coefficient in the BNAM model 
(b = .244, t = 1.775, p<.1), and was not significant for the task distrust LAS network.  
The lack of a significant effect in the task distrust model for manager status might be 
related to the lack of Group effect on accuracy, and the positive, significant effect of task 
trust centrality. Group membership was not significantly related to accuracy of the task 
distrust network, but task trust centrality was. Thus, being central to the task trust 
network did not provide an advantage in accuracy of the task trust network, but this did 
provide an advantage to accuracy of the task distrust (LAS) network. Individuals who 
were trusted by others gained accurate knowledge of who others said they distrusted in 
the network to a greater degree than those who were not central to the task trust network. 
Managers were more central to both the task trust and workflow networks than non-
managers, potentially nullifying the information processing advantages theorized to 
positively affect managers’ perceptual accuracy: their central position in the network 
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provided greater direct access to ties (high centrality can indicate ties are local to the 
perceiver) which was a stronger predictor of network accuracy than manager status (when 
managers tend to be more central in the task trust networks than non-managers).  
Combined with the results on task trust accuracy, this suggests there are limits to the 
theory that formal power increases motivated attention and focus on some network ties.  
One’s position in the network and features of the network itself can nullify the positive 
effects attributed to the powerful in perceiving network ties accurately.  
 Third, I hypothesized (H3) that individuals with formal power will be less focused 
on ties which were not directly instrumentally related, such as friendship ties. This was 
not an argument for inaccuracy, but rather, relative to non-managers, I argued that 
managers would be less accurate about positive expressive ties. Results of linear 
regression found that manager status was not significantly related to accuracy of the 
friendship network. The correlations between friendship tie accuracy and manager status 
were not significant, but they were positive. Similarly to the task trust accuracy models, 
Group designation was positively related to both the LAS and BNAM friendship 
accuracy models. This indicated (similar to task trust accuracy) that being in a small 
cohesive group was highly relevant to accuracy of the network. Most importantly, there 
was no evidence that formal power was related to perceptions of positive expressive 
ties—while clearly not conclusive, it was somewhat consistent with the arguments put 
forward.  
 Lastly, I argued that this instrumental content explanation would also extend to 
negative expressive ties, such as dislike ties, because these negative relationships can be 
detrimental to group task and goal achievement, and such detrimental ties can negatively 
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impact achievement of work goals. These factors would make negative expressive ties 
important and therefore a tie for which managers would have motivations to attend to. I 
also argued that managers who were in a position of formal authority tend to preside over 
interpersonal conflict disputes, and were therefore more likely than non-managers to have 
knowledge of such conflicts, increasing managers’ awareness and accuracy of such ties. 
Results of linear regression analysis suggested that managers were more accurate than 
non-managers for those negative expressive relationships. Thus, the advantages of being 
in a formal power position provide increased accuracy of dislike relationships in the 
organization. This was the result for both the LAS and BNAM models, suggesting that 
the advantages of formal power relate to both those objective, locally identified dislike 
ties as well as the consensus-based dislike ties that are generally agreed to exist by actors 
in the network. This suggests that managers do have an accuracy advantage compared to 
non-managers for some network relationships. Thus, it is important that researchers 
include negative ties in the analysis of social network accuracy in future studies, because 
individual differences (i.e., formal position) can impact the degree of accuracy 
individuals have for these negative ties.   Beyond this finding, there were other key 
results that deserve comment at this point, especially because most of the results were 
consistent between the two network accuracy models (LAS and BNAM).   
 I will turn now to a brief discussion of the differences between the LAS and 
BNAM, because these approaches are considered by many to have fundamentally 
different interpretations (Bondonio, 1998; Krackhardt, 1987). In these data, correlations 
of individuals’ accuracy based on the LAS-derived networks and the BNAM-derived 
networks were positive and significant for all like-networks; i.e., individuals who were 
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accurate in one network (e.g., task trust LAS), were also accurate in the counterpart 
network (e.g., task trust BNAM). This would seem to indicate that some underlying 
consistent reality was perceived in the network as it was understood from the objective 
view of the person sending the tie, or the consensus of the actors in the network.  
Additional investigation of the differences between these approaches is needed to better 
refine the underlying assumptions and key features of these network views. However, it 
could be that the differences between an LAS approach and consensus approach might 
differ based on features of the network itself, especially size. As networks increase in 
size, it might be easier for individuals in the periphery of the network to be accurate 
about the generally held view of the network because they are less connected to 
individuals involved in the direct relationships.  They are further from the “action”, while 
more central individuals have better access to the core source of relationships in the 
network. This would also suggest that sparse networks (i.e., negative tie networks) will 
provide less advantage to the central actors than for dense networks, and the difference in 
accuracy between locally determined versus consensus networks will be minimal in 
sparse networks. This could be operating in this data, as the negative tie networks were 
much sparser than the positive tie networks.  
 In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that individuals with formal power 
do, in fact, perceive the network accurately for some social network ties. Contrary to 
previous findings which have only found negative relationships between power and 
network accuracy, I explored conditions in which power might actually relate to accuracy 
of the social network.  Specifically, results suggest that individuals with formal power 
(i.e., manager status) can be more accurate about the negative expressive ties in the 
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organization than those without formal power. These results were consistent for both 
locally aggregated networks and a Bayesian, consensus approach to network aggregation.  
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Study 2 
Introduction 
 Study one argued that individuals with formal power (i.e., managers) prioritize 
their attention and focus on social information by concentrating on some relationships 
and not others, resulting in more accuracy than subordinates for some network 
relationships.  I argued that managers would be more accurate about instrumental 
relationships (task trust and task distrust) as well as expressive relationships with a 
negative valence (dislike). Thus, power motivates focus on certain relational content in 
the network.  However, individuals’ perceptions of social relationships can also center on 
specific nodes or people in the network (e.g., Bondonio, 1998), and there is evidence that 
power can motivate attention and focus on particular individuals, such as subordinates.   
In an attempt to show that not all managers ignore subordinates and are lazy 
observers of the social world, Overbeck and Park (2001) argued that high-power 
individuals will be more likely to focus on the lower-power individuals over which they 
had outcome control than low-power individuals would focus on those who had power 
over them. Their reasoning contrasted the assumptions about the nature of the “powerful” 
person as depicted in the power as control model (Fiske, 1993a: see Appendix A for more 
detail), to a more realistic form of the power relationship as found in modern 
organizations.  While the power as control model might predict that managers will not 
attend to subordinates because “attention follows power” (Fiske, 1993a), Overbeck and 
Park argue that despite a manager or CEO being relatively outcome-independent 
compared to the subordinate, some attention to them is still necessary. These managers 
still need to maintain attention toward subordinates because those individuals occupying 
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the manager or CEO role are expected to be responsible for the success of their 
subordinates. Managers (i.e., high-power individuals) “must fulfill certain obligations 
that come with the powerful role” (2001: 549-). In a series of experimental studies, they 
found that high-power individuals were better able to recall information and behavior of 
subordinates than subordinates were able to recall about their superiors.  
In a later set of studies, Overbeck and Park (2006) found that individuals were 
able to report information consistent with their stated goals—such that powerful 
individuals with “people-centered” goals recalled more people-oriented information, 
while powerful individuals with “product-centered” goals recalled more product-oriented 
information. This suggests that powerful individuals were able to flexibly pay attention to 
social information, and to attend less to non-goal relevant information when it was tied to 
goal accomplishment.  
Gruenfeld and colleagues (2008) argued that power will affect individuals’ focus 
on the value of others; however, this focus will be in terms of instrumental goals rather 
than in terms of individuals’ personal qualities (e.g., such as similarity, kindness, beauty, 
etc.). Through a series of studies, they supported this view by showing that high power 
individuals described relationships more objectively (e.g., in instrumental terms), and 
were more likely to select job candidates based on their instrumental rather than personal 
qualities, and high power individuals liked dissimilar targets based on their 
instrumentality, more so than low power individuals. They concluded from these results 
that “[p]ower increases instrumental appraisal and approach” and leads to objectification: 
powerful individuals were more likely to evaluate others in terms of their usefulness to 
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achieve instrumental goals, rather than in terms the person’s value outside of those goals 
(Gruenfeld et al., 2008 :123). 
This series of studies by Gruenfeld and colleagues and Overbeck and Park are 
departures from much of the previous work on power in social psychology. The 
traditional understanding of how power affects attention and behavior is to characterize 
power as related to automatic cognition, and an orientation toward rewards which 
precludes attention to low power individuals such as subordinates (Fiske & Dépret, 1996; 
Goodwin et al., 2000; Keltner et al., 2001). The findings of these studies above challenge 
these views and demonstrate that power can be  associated with increased attention and 
individuation, not less, when the target of attention is goal- or task-relevant (i.e., 
instrumental). They also suggest that a rewards orientation does not preclude attention to 
subordinates, but rather can motivate more targeted perceptions.  
In line with these arguments, how managers perceive and focus on particular 
others or nodes (rather than relationships generally) is a key component of disentangling 
those contextual factors which, when present, will impact managers’ perceptual accuracy 
of others’ individuals’ networks. Individuals with formal power are able to focus on some 
nodes more than others because they are more flexible in their cognition. This means they 
can more easily block out peripheral information, and focus on only that information 
which is pertinent and important (based on their activated constructs, i.e., goals and 
tasks). Additionally, a formal power role, such as a manager, can motivate targeted 
perceptions of particular individuals. My argument is that this will extend to managers 
focusing on some individuals and not others and will relate to accurate perceptions of 
network relationships those nodes have.  
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Hypotheses Development 
The situated focus theory argues that the experience of power influences 
individuals’ perceptual motivations and cognitive flexibility, allowing for selective 
controlled processing of information, and this also applies to the target (node) level 
(Guinote, 2010)—that is, power affords the flexibility to pay attention to some people 
more than others. The theory emphasizes the instrumental prioritization of focus and 
attention, as well as the cognitive flexibility that power affords the perceiver in terms of 
attentional focus: “the ability to focus attention and inhibit task-irrelevant information” 
(Guinote, 2010: 167). This claim is not that the powerful process less information than 
the powerless, or process information with less effort; but rather, that their position 
allows for greater flexibility to process relevant information more extensively and 
selectively (Guinote, 2010), such as for some targets over others. 
Managers are motivated to pay greater attention to some individuals compared to 
others in the organization. Those individuals most important to managers will be those 
which are related to the managers’ task and goal priorities. Specifically, individuals with 
formal power are likely to focus on those relationships in the social network which are 
most relevant to goal and task completion—and this focus will most readily apply to 
relationships within the managers’ domain of authority (i.e., their subordinates). This is 
because managers are by definition responsible for their direct reports, and the 
performance of subordinates reflects upon the manager (Overbeck & Park, 2006). 
Managers will prioritize their own subordinates’ relationships over the relationships of 
others in the network, increasing their attention and perceptual focus, resulting in greater 
accuracy.  
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H4: Managers will be more accurate about their subordinates’ social 
networks than about non-subordinates in their organization.  
 
 From a dependence view, as attention follows power (Fiske, 1993a), I cannot 
ignore the arguments which suggest that subordinates might also be motivated to attend 
to their managers. Therefore, I also expect that subordinates will be more cognizant of 
their own managers’ networks compared to the networks of others in the work group, 
such as other managers and other subordinates.  This is because individuals in positions 
of low power are motivated to attend to those who have the power  to control their 
outcomes (Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Keltner et al., 2001). Increased motivation to predict 
their own outcomes, over which subordinates have little direct control, will increase 
attention and accuracy toward those who do possess that control.  
H5a: Subordinates will be more accurate about their managers’ social 
networks than about others’ social networks in their organization. 
 
 In addition, there should also be cognitive energy devoted toward the source of 
the subordinates’ potential rewards and punishments in relation to others the subordinate 
with whom they might have a dependence relationship. While subordinates may be 
dependent in terms of their goal and task outcomes on their peers, they should be more 
intensely motivated to attend to their manager than their fellow subordinates.  Thus, 
subordinates should be accurate about their manager’s social network ties, and they 
should be more accurate for their managers’ network ties than the social network ties of 
peers. 
H5b: Subordinates will be more accurate about their manager’s social 
network than for each other.  
 
 Based on the arguments already presented in Study 1, individuals with formal 
power are likely to be accurate about certain key relationships in the network. In Study 1 
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I argued this to be the case for a manager perceiving the whole network of social ties, 
here I argue that managers will again be more accurate than subordinates, but on the 
dyadic level, across the population of individuals in his or her work group. Thus, similar 
to study 1, I expect that individuals with formal power will be more generally accurate 
for others’ instrumental network ties and individuals with formal power will be more 
generally accurate for negative expressive ties than those lacking in formal power. 
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Method 
Sample  
 The sample used for this study was identical to that of Study 1. It consisted of a 
total of 42 individuals with 32 employees and ten managers.  (Please see Study 1 methods 
for detail).  
Analytical Approach 
 This study’s focus is on examining one person’s accuracy of another person’s 
network as a function of those individuals’ relationship to each other (manager or 
subordinate). This type of dyadic relational data is not independent, which is a violation 
of the assumptions of OLS regression. Because I am testing the dependence of 
individuals to each other, it is important that the method of analysis used to test these data 
allow for non-independence. For this reason I use Multiple Regression Quadratic 
Assignment Procedure (MRQAP), which handles dyadic non-independent relational data 
(Dekker, Krackhardt, & Snijders, 2007; Krackhardt, 1988). To facilitate MRQAP, all 
data used were in square 42x42 matrix form. Network responses from three individuals 
were missing, and these were left blank as missing data. Additionally, because the 
Groups were different sizes, and the CSS data was collected within Groups (not across) 
the dependent variable matrices have additional missing data between groups. To 
facilitate the differences in groups, the “Double-Dekker Semi-Partialling MRQAP” or 
Double Semi-Partialling MRQAP (DSP-MRQAP) (Dekker et al., 2007) algorithm in 
UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002) was used. This MRQAP method of analysis allowed for 
partitioning the variable for groups to permute within groups or “node classes” (Borgatti, 
2012). The vector used in this analysis indicated Group 1 and Group 2 membership for 
each respondent (n=42).  
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Measures 
Dependent Variable: Network Accuracy 
 In Study 1 the variable of interest was individuals’ accuracy of the social network, 
calculated as the Jaccard Index correlation of the criterion network (LAS and BNAM 
models) using each individual’s CSS. Study 2, however, was focused on individuals’ 
accuracy of particular others’ social networks, and not an individuals’ general accuracy 
score. Thus an aggregation of the social network (or “true” network based on all 
individuals) would not be appropriate because it is an individual’s personal network that 
was of interest, not the whole network. This required a different approach to calculating 
the accuracy measure. To capture the accuracy of one person toward another person’s 
network, the reported ties of each person to others in the network were used as the 
criterion network, which were then compared to each person’s perceptions. I will explain 
the process for calculating accuracy scores below.  
 Converting  these CSS networks into dyadic level (person to person) accuracy 
scores required three steps, all of which were done in UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). 
First, the CSS matrices were stacked together into one file, where matrix Rn was k’s 
perceptions of all i to j ties (i.e., CSS networks of each respondent, i.e.,  Rijk ). This 
resulted in eight files: two groups and four networks each. These files were then 
reordered independently such that matrix R1 ′ contained i’s perceptions of 𝑗1’s outgoing 
tie network and R2 ′ contained i’s perceptions of 𝑗2’s network, and so on for all j’s. Thus, 
the rows in these individual matrices contained each person’s (i’s) perception of a 
particular individual in the network (𝑗𝑛).  Second, a correlation of similarities was 
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calculated on these matrices (i.e., the Jaccard Index) in UCINET such that each row was 
correlated with all the other rows in the matrix. It should be noted that each matrix Rn ′  
contained 𝑗n ‘s own reported outgoing ties (i.e., their “true” network), thus i’s accuracy of 
𝑗n   can be calculated for all i’s. To extract these scores into a matrix of dyadic level 
accuracy, the row dominated LAS aggregation was used. This resulted in a single matrix 
which included i’s Jaccard Index accuracy score for all j’s. This process was repeated to 
calculate the “incoming” dyadic level tie accuracy by using the transpose of the original 
CSS data, and then following the same steps as above. These steps were identical for 
each network relationship.  
 Using this method, two accuracy scores were calculated for each network (task 
trust, task distrust, friend, and dislike): 1) accuracy of others’ outgoing ties, and 2) 
accuracy of others’ incoming ties. These outcome matrices (for Groups 1 and 2) were 
then joined together into eight dependent variable (42x42) matrices on the diagonal: 
“Task Trust Incoming Tie Accuracy”, “Task Trust Outgoing Tie Accuracy”, “Task 
Distrust Incoming Tie Accuracy”, “Task Distrust Outgoing Tie Accuracy”, “Friendship 
Incoming Tie Accuracy”, “Friendship Outgoing Tie Accuracy”, “Dislike Incoming Tie 
Accuracy”, and “Dislike Outgoing Tie Accuracy”, where each ij cell corresponded to i’s 
accuracy of j’s network ties.  
 It should be noted that not all managers had incoming and outgoing dislike and 
task distrust ties. This made calculations of subordinates’ accuracy of managers 
problematic, because some targets had no ties to be accurate about in some cases. This 
made calculations of the Jaccard Index result in a value of 0, because the criterion 
network contained no positive responses, in these cases the values for accuracy were left 
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as undefined in the matrices (missing). However, while this means that the results for 
these networks need to be interpreted with some caution, I do not believe this adversely 
affected the pattern of results here. For a more detailed discussion, see Appendix H. 
Independent Variables (Matrices) 
 To test the accuracy of managers toward their subordinates and subordinates 
toward managers (H4-5) two matrices were created based on the formal reporting roles 
provided by the organization. The “manager of” variable was a matrix which indicated if 
person i was the manager of person j. The “subordinate of” (or reports to) variable was a 
matrix which indicated if person i was the subordinate of j, which was the transpose of 
the “manager of” matrix.  If the relationship between individuals ij was present, that cell 
received a “1” and a “0” otherwise. This resulted in two 42x42 matrices: “Manager of” 
and “Subordinate of”. 
 To test whether manager status was related to accuracy across all dyadic 
relationships, a variable “Manager Status” was created. The manager status variable was 
constructed from the manager status column vector (where 1 = manager, and 0 = non-
manager) which was copied across all columns, forming a 42x42 matrix.  
Other variables (Controls) 
Network Ties 
 Individual’s ties to others in the network can be important conduits of information 
by which individuals might learn about and be exposed to others’ networks (Casciaro, 
1998). Because I am interested in the effects of power (and power differences) on 
perception and accuracy in this study, it was important to control for these structural 
effects. Thus, to control for the relationships between individuals, I included a matrix of 
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social network ties from i to j (outgoing ties), and the ties from j to i (incoming ties) for 
the task trust, task distrust, friendship and dislike networks:  if a tie was present, the ij cell 
received a “1”, otherwise a “0”; similarly for the ji (incoming tie) cells. I created the 
networks from the CSS data by calculating the row dominated LAS for each network 
(task trust, task distrust, friendship and dislike) for the “outgoing” network ties. I 
calculated the “incoming” network ties by transposing the row dominated LAS networks. 
This resulted in eight matrices: “Task Trust Out”, “Task Trust In”, “Task Distrust Out”, 
“Task Distrust In”, “Friend Out”, “Friend In”, “Dislike Out”, and “Dislike In”.  For 
additional information on these matrices (i.e., reciprocity, density) see Appendix F. 
Workflow ties 
 It was important to control for the possibility that relationships within and 
between groups were relevant to knowledge and accuracy of one’s network. Thus, I 
controlled for workflow relationships by using a combination of the work input and work 
output matrices to create a workflow variable which included the workflow relationships 
among the 42 individuals in the network. In the digital survey portion of the data 
collection (Stage 2a) respondents were asked to list the individuals to whom they sent 
work outputs, and from whom they received inputs.  I then matched up those responses 
where i recorded receiving an input from j, and j recorded sending an output to i: if  i ->j 
= j <- i, then 1, otherwise 0. Thus, ties were counted where both parties agreed. This 
42x42 matrix “Workflow” was not localized to groups, meaning that individuals in 
Group 1 could  have workflow ties to individuals in Group 2 and vice versa.  
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Dyadic Similarities 
 The similarities among individuals are likely to be related to knowledge and 
information sharing (e.g., McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). This “homophily” 
principle can impact the sharing of network information and relate to individual’s 
accuracy of others’ networks. Thus, I controlled for similarities among respondents 
within work groups to account for this possibility. I created “similarity” matrices from the 
attribute vectors for Ethnicity, Gender, and Manager using the “Attribute to matrix” 
function in UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). For each matrix a “1” was recorded for an 
exact match on the attribute between individuals, and “0” otherwise. For example, if 
person i and person j had the same manager, the ij cell received a “1”. The same method 
was used to create the gender and ethnicity matrices. This resulted in three 42x42 
matrices: “Same Gender”, “Same Ethnicity”, and “Same Manager”.  
Sender and Receiver Effects 
 A benefit of the dyadic network approach is that it allows for controls related to 
how some individual targets might be more likely to attract attention (receiver or target), 
and whether some individuals might be likely to focus more attention toward others, or a 
propensity to pay attention (perceiver). These differences might relate to increased or 
decreased accuracy of others’ networks. Some individuals might be more likely to attend 
to some others’ networks due to either the sender or receiver’s status, such as gender.  
Additionally, managers’ social networks might, as a whole, receive more attention from 
others in the network, relating to increased accuracy. 
 Thus, three variables were created to control for these possibilities: “Gender”, 
“Gender (target)”, and “Manager (target)”.  I created the Gender variable by copying the 
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attribute vector for gender column-wise to form a 42x42 matrix.  To create the “target” 
variable the Gender 42x42 matrix variable was transposed.  For the Manager (target) 
variable, I transposed the “Manager” 42x42 matrix independent variable (see 
Independent Variables).   
Embedded (Simmelian) Ties 
 Individuals who are strongly tied to others through third parties can exhibit strong 
bonds and similarities (Krackhardt & Kilduff, 2002; Krackhardt, 1999) . These ties, often 
referred to as “Simmelian” ties [after Georg Simmel’s (Simmel, 1950) theoretical work 
on triads], refer to dyads which have a common third party, and have been associated 
with increased similarities in network perceptions (Krackhardt & Kilduff, 2002). Because 
the dependent variable in this study was accuracy of network ties of others, it was 
reasonable to think that individuals who were strongly tied (i.e., in embedded Simmelian 
triads) will have increased accuracy of each others’ networks due to the reinforcement 
and confirmation of beliefs that comes from a shared third observer. In other words, two 
friends might be more accurate about the others’ network when a strong third party can 
help confirm beliefs about the others’ relationships. Individuals without this strong third 
party triad might be disadvantaged. To the degree that two people were embedded in 
strong triads (i.e., Simmelian ties) they should exhibit greater accuracy about each others’ 
networks that those not involved in these triads.  
 To create this variable, the Friendship network was used to create a matrix which 
counted the number of embedded ties each pair of individuals was involved in. For 
example, if i  and j were involved in two such triads, cell ij would contain a “2”, and so 
on for all ij pairs. I used the “Simmelian/Embedded Tie” algorithm in UCINET  
 
81 
 
(Borgatti, 2012). Each triad was created such that only reciprocated friendship ties were 
counted, consistent with the theoretical nature of the embedded triad. Thus, only those 
ties were counted in which both i and j reported a friendship tie to each other and to the 
same third party.  This resulted in the 42x42 matrix variable “Simmelian Tie”.  
 
Analysis 
 I used Double Semi-Partialling Multiple Regression Quadratic Assignment 
Procedure (DSP-MRQAP) to test the hypothesized relationships between the independent 
and dependent variables (Dekker et al., 2007). This method uses a permutation (i.e., 
randomization) method to determine the beta coefficients and t-statistics for determining 
significance. This method neutralizes the issues related to non-independence of the 
network data, which precludes using traditional OLS regression (Dekker et al., 2007; 
Krackhardt, 1988). Specifically, the routine first performs a standard multiple regression 
on the independent and dependent variables, storing the resulting R² and beta 
coefficients. Then, the algorithm randomly permutes both the rows and columns of the 
dependent matrices (in my case, within groups) thousands of times, storing the resulting 
R² and beta coefficients to generate standard errors for the coefficients.  To determine 
significance, the algorithm counts the number of times a coefficient is as extreme as the 
original betas from the original multiple regression. To be significant at the .05 level, five 
percent of the permuted betas must be as extreme (larger or smaller) than the original 
betas from the first step.  The DSP-MRQAP differs from MRQAP in that it partials out 
colinearity by performing additional regressions on the residuals and independent 
variables (Dekker et al., 2007). Correlations among the matrix variables were performed 
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with a similar quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) to determine significant 
correlations in UCINET  (Borgatti et al., 2002). 
 
Results 
 QAP Pearson Correlations of the variables used in this study show that Manager 
status was significantly related to accuracy of all the dependent variables used in this 
study (See Table 2.12). The independent variables “Manager of” (A is B’s manager) and 
“Subordinate of” (B reports to A) were mixed. Because the nature of the data was dyadic, 
each correlation score represents the degree of accuracy of one person toward another 
based on a relationship between the two parties. For example, being a manager of the 
target (Manager of) was not significantly related to higher outgoing task trust tie accuracy 
and incoming task tie accuracy (r = .052,ns; r = .023,ns), but it was for subordinates 
toward managers (Subordinate of) (r = .143,p<.01; r = .147,p<.01). Outgoing distrust tie 
accuracy was significantly related to being the target’s manager (r = .068, p < .05) and 
being the target’s subordinate (r = .119, p < .01). However, incoming distrust tie 
accuracy was not related to either being the target’s manager or subordinate (r = .040,ns; 
r = .033,ns, respectively). Being the target’s manager was marginally significantly 
related to accuracy about outgoing friend ties (r = .063, p < .1) but not incoming friend 
ties (r = .040, ns). Being the target’s subordinate was significantly related (r = .097, p < 
.05) to outgoing friend tie accuracy, but was related to incoming friend tie accuracy (r = 
.137,p<.01). The negative tie networks showed a different pattern of results. Being a 
manager of or a subordinate of a target was not related to either outgoing dislike tie 
accuracy (r = .045, ns; r = .050, ns) or incoming task distrust tie accuracy (r = .033,ns; r 
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= .040,ns). However, both variables were not significantly positively related to outgoing 
task distrust tie accuracy (Manager of: r = .068, p < .01; Subordinate of: r = .119, p 
<.05). For incoming dislike tie accuracy, only being the target’s manager was 
significantly, positively related (r = .146, p < .05; Subordinate of: r = .004, ns). 
 Manager status was significantly positively related to outgoing task trust accuracy 
(r = .212, p < .01), outgoing friendship accuracy (r = .133, p < .01), incoming task trust 
accuracy (r = .180, p < .01), incoming friendship accuracy (r = .115, p < .05), incoming 
dislike accuracy (r = .187, p < .01), and marginally related to incoming task distrust 
accuracy (r = .056, p < .1). 
 This pattern of results shows that manager status was a positive indicator of 
network accuracy across some of the various networks. However, when considering the 
dependence relationship between individuals-- whether a manager-subordinate 
relationship or a subordinate-manager relationship-- the results were very weak and 
mixed. (For a discussion of the Jaccard Index and the limitations of accuracy measures to 
these results, see Appendix H). 
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1 Outgoing Task Trust Tie Accuracy              
2 Outgoing Task Distrust Tie Accuracy 0.213 **             
3 Outgoing Friend Tie Accuracy 0.322 ** 0.105 *           
4 Outgoing Dislike Tie Accuracy 0.090 + 0.179 ** 0.095 +         
5 Incoming Task Trust Tie Accuracy 0.544 ** 0.190 ** 0.281 ** 0.081        
6 Incoming Task Distrust Tie Accuracy 0.075  0.104 + -0.008  0.232 ** 0.094 +     
7 Incoming Friend Tie Accuracy 0.300 ** 0.099 + 0.613 ** 0.081  0.354 ** -0.022    
8 Incoming Dislike Tie Accuracy 0.085 + 0.108 + 0.116 * 0.414 ** 0.110 + 0.352 ** 0.051  
9 Manager 0.212 ** 0.057  0.133 ** 0.018  0.180 ** 0.056 + 0.115 * 
10 Manager of 0.052  0.068 * 0.063 + 0.050  0.023  0.040  0.040  
11 Subordinate of 0.143 ** 0.119 ** 0.097 * 0.045  0.147 * 0.033  0.137 ** 
12 Workflow 0.277 ** 0.051  0.206 ** 0.059  0.292 ** 0.058  0.228 ** 
13 Task Trust In Tie 0.242 ** 0.169 ** 0.135 * 0.071  0.352 ** 0.039  0.164 * 
14 Task  Distrust In Tie -0.067  -0.020  -0.098 * -0.021  -0.086 + 0.010  -0.052  
15 Friend In Tie 0.084  0.125 * 0.067  0.051  0.121 + 0.018  0.161 * 
16 Dislike In Tie -0.026  -0.036  -0.069  -0.040  -0.001  -0.007  -0.094 + 
17 Task Trust Out Tie 0.306 ** 0.101 * 0.186 ** 0.040  0.392 ** -0.011  0.247 ** 
18 Task Distrust Out Tie 0.032  0.081 + -0.003  0.019  -0.058  0.126 * -0.052  
19 Friend Out Tie 0.184 ** 0.074  0.192 ** 0.110 * 0.169 ** 0.012  0.233 ** 
20 Dislike Out Tie 0.010  0.088 + 0.015  -0.015  0.002  0.072  -0.008  
21 Gender -0.166 * -0.044  0.058  -0.001  -0.145 * -0.033  0.006  
22 Gender (Target) -0.018  0.144 ** 0.091  0.022  -0.021  0.010  0.113 + 
23 Manager (Target) 0.282 ** 0.190 ** 0.118  0.105 + 0.324 ** 0.093 + 0.200 * 
24 Same Gender 0.064 + -0.025  0.004  0.002  0.050  0.030  -0.017  
25 Same Ethnicity 0.123 + 0.046  0.017  0.058  0.158 * 0.008  0.067  
26 Same Manager 0.028  0.046  0.082 * 0.072 * 0.014  0.081 * 0.093 * 
27 Simmelian Tie 0.170 * 0.095 * 0.240 ** 0.124 ** 0.111 + 0.016  0.276 ** 
5000 Permutations +p<.01 * p<.05 **p<.01           
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  8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
9 0.187 **                    
10 0.146 * 0.425 **                  
11 -0.004  0.040 * -0.024                 
12 0.064  0.042  -0.014  0.146 **              
13 0.148 * 0.136 ** 0.096 ** 0.082 * 0.164 **            
14 -0.058  0.021  -0.027  0.004  -0.009  -0.402 **          
15 0.110 + 0.038  0.075 * 0.041  0.088 + 0.331 ** -0.069         
16 -0.023  0.047  0.056 + -0.052 ** -0.051  -0.138 ** 0.312 ** -0.18 **      
17 0.083  0.216 ** 0.082 * 0.096 ** 0.120 ** 0.145 ** 0.027  0.17 ** -0.062     
18 -0.039  0.028  0.004  -0.027  -0.038  0.027  -0.078 + -0.05  0.031  -0.402 ** 
19 0.032  0.050  0.041  0.075 * 0.088 * 0.168 ** -0.051  0.31 ** -0.098 * 0.331 ** 
20 -0.036  -0.051  -0.052 ** 0.056 + 0.036  -0.062  0.031  -0.10 * 0.004  -0.138 ** 
21 0.030  0.044  0.077 + -0.002  -0.094 * 0.036  0.013  -0.02  0.098 ** -0.044   
22 0.038  -0.001  -0.002  0.077 + 0.007  -0.044  -0.056  -0.06  -0.071  0.036   
23 0.022  -0.038 * -0.015  0.402 ** 0.315 ** 0.216 ** 0.028  0.05  -0.051  0.136 * 
24 -0.039  0.017  0.010  0.010  0.016  0.012  0.003  0.04  -0.029  0.012   
25 0.004  0.014  -0.026  -0.026  0.130 * 0.089 + -0.027  0.07  -0.056  0.089 + 
26 0.143 ** 0.062 * -0.053 ** -0.053 ** 0.093 ** -0.016  0.017  0.10 ** 0.049 + -0.016   
27 0.117 * -0.054  0.019  0.019  0.022  0.238 ** -0.028  0.67 ** -0.122 ** 0.238 ** 
5000 Permutations                   
+p<.01 * p<.05 **p<.01                                   
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  18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
19 -0.069                   
20 0.312 ** -0.182 **                
21 -0.056  -0.06  -0.071               
22 0.013  -0.024  0.098 ** -0.024 **            
23 0.021  0.038  0.047  -0.026 + 0.040           
24 0.003  0.04  -0.029  -0.237 ** -0.237 ** 0.019         
25 -0.027  0.066  -0.056  -0.015  -0.015  0.032  -0.007       
26 0.017  0.1 ** 0.049 + 0.015  0.015  -0.065 * -0.027  0.000     
27 -0.028  0.67 ** -0.122 ** -0.017  -0.017  0.063  -0.004  0.025  0.021   
5000 Permutations                 
+p<.01 * p<.05 **p<.01                               
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Results: Hypotheses H4 and H5a  
 Hypotheses H4 and H5a were tested by using DSP-MRQAP. These models test 
the significance of dyadic level variables. For example, this method tests whether a 
persons’ accuracy of another person’s network was related significantly to whether one 
person was the manager of the other person. To test Hypothesis H4 and H5a, a total of 
eight hierarchical models were used, one model for each of the eight dependent variables 
(See Table 2.13): 
Table 2.13 Dependent Variables in Study 2 
Outgoing Task Trust Tie Accuracy 
Outgoing Task Distrust Tie Accuracy 
Outgoing Friend Tie Accuracy 
Outgoing Dislike Tie Accuracy 
Incoming Task Trust Tie Accuracy 
Incoming Task Distrust Tie Accuracy 
Incoming Friend Tie Accuracy 
Incoming Dislike Tie Accuracy 
 
 Each dependent variable was regressed with the three independent variables: 
Manager of, Subordinate of, and Manager Status. These variables refer to the relationship 
between parties, whether A was a “Manager of” B, or whether A was a “Subordinate of” 
B, and “Manager Status” refers to whether A was a manager or a non-manager (in 
relation to the other party). The models had four steps where each variable was entered 
independently, and then all variables were entered together in the final step. First only the 
controls were entered (0); then “manager” status (1); followed by “manager of” (2); 
“subordinate of” (3); and finally all variables simultaneously (4).  For each step in the 
models, the resulting R^2 and adjusted R^2 were calculated. Additionally, each step in 
the model was permuted 2000 times to generate the R^2 and p-values for each 
coefficient.  
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 Hypothesis 4 argued managers will be more accurate about the social networks of 
their subordinates compared to others in the organization.  Results showed that being a 
manager of the target resulted in a significant positive relationship after entering the 
control variables for accuracy of incoming dislike ties (Table 2.14, step 2: b= .130, 
p<.05). There was only marginal positive significance for being a manager of the target 
and outgoing task trust tie accuracy (Table 2.15, step 2: b = 0.059, p<.1). However, 
being the target’s manager was not significantly related to accuracy of outgoing 
friendship ties (Table 2.16, step 2: b = 0.047, ns), or accuracy of outgoing dislike ties 
(Table 2.17, step 2, b = 0.054, ns), incoming task trust ties (Table 2.18, step 2, b = 0.003, 
ns), incoming task distrust ties (Table 2.19, step 2, b = 0.045, ns), incoming friendship 
ties (Table 2.20, step 2, b = 0.026, ns) and outgoing task distrust ties (Table 2.21, step 2, 
b = 0.049, ns).  There was some evidence that for some network ties, managers were 
significantly more accurate for their own subordinates compared to others in the 
organization. Importantly, these effects were largely eliminated when the manager status 
variable was included in the full model. The only model where the “manager of” variable 
retained some significance was for incoming dislike tie accuracy, and only marginally 
(Table 2.14, step 4: b = 0.076, p<.1).  Thus, when manager status was included in the 
models, Hypothesis 4 received little to no support that being a manager of the target was 
a significant predictor of network accuracy.  
 Hypothesis 5a argued that subordinates will be accurate for their managers’ 
networks compared to others in the organization. This hypothesis was tested in the same 
models as Hypothesis 4. Results show that being a subordinate to the target was not 
significantly related to accuracy any of the networks. Being a subordinate of the target 
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was not significantly related to accuracy of any of the tested networks: incoming dislike  
(Table 2.14 step 2, b = 0.018, ns), outgoing task trust (Table 2.15, step 2, b = 0.035, ns), 
outgoing friendship (Table 2.16, step 2, b = 0.029, ns), outgoing dislike (Table 2.17, step 
2, b = 0.001, ns), incoming task trust (Table 2.18, step 3: b = 0.023, ns), incoming task 
distrust (Table 2.17, step 2, b = 0.043, ns),  incoming friendship (Table 2.16, step 3: b = 
0.0491, ns), and outgoing task distrust (Table 2.21, step 3: b = 0.044, ns).  Thus, there 
was no evidence supporting Hypothesis 5a that subordinates would be more accurate for 
their managers’ networks than for others in the organization. In sum, managers were 
generally more accurate about the social networks of others compared to non-managers, 
but there was no clear evidence that the manager-subordinate dependence relationship 
influenced network accuracy for managers or subordinates.  
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Table 2.14 DSP-MRQAP Outgoing Task Distrust Tie Accuracy Model 
  0 1 2 3 4 
Workflow -0.016  -0.014  -0.013  -0.018  -0.015  
Task Trust In Tie 0.111 * 0.110 * 0.106 * 0.112 * 0.107 * 
Task  Distrust In Tie 0.032  0.032  0.029  0.033  0.030  
Friend In Tie 0.042  0.044  0.039  0.043  0.040  
Dislike In Tie -0.042  -0.043  -0.041  -0.042  -0.041  
Task Trust Out Tie 0.108 * 0.098 * 0.102 * 0.106 * 0.097 + 
Task Distrust Out Tie 0.129 * 0.126 * 0.127 * 0.131 * 0.128 * 
Friend Out Tie 0.003  0.006  0.006  0.000  0.003  
Dislike Out Tie 0.066 + 0.067 + 0.068 + 0.063 + 0.064 + 
Gender -0.009  -0.012  -0.016  -0.009  -0.017  
Gender (Target) 0.123 * 0.123 * 0.124 * 0.120 * 0.121 * 
Manager (Target) 0.113 * 0.115 * 0.115 ** 0.098 * 0.099 * 
Same Gender 0.015  0.014  0.014  0.015  0.014  
Same Ethnicity 0.075 * 0.074 * 0.075 * 0.077 * 0.076 * 
Same Manager 0.031  0.030  0.038  0.036  0.044  
Simmelian Tie 0.028  0.026  0.024  0.029  0.024  
            
Manager   0.027      0.009  
Manager of    0.049    0.048  
Subordinate of      0.039  0.044  
             
R^2  0.105 ** 0.106 ** 0.107 ** 0.106  0.112 ** 
Adjusted R^2 0.075  0.075  0.076  0.075  0.087   
2000 Permutations            
+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01                     
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Table 2.15 DSP-MRQAP Outgoing Task Trust Tie Accuracy Model 
  0 1 2 3 4 
Workflow 0.133 * 0.144 * 0.138 * 0.132 * 0.142 * 
Task Trust In Tie 0.065 + 0.063 + 0.058 + 0.066 * 0.065 + 
Task  Distrust In Tie -0.016  -0.015  -0.020  -0.015  -0.013  
Friend In Tie -0.054 + -0.044 + -0.056 + -0.054 + -0.043 + 
Dislike In Tie -0.039  -0.045  -0.038  -0.039  -0.045  
Task Trust Out Tie 0.292 ** 0.228 ** 0.286 ** 0.291 ** 0.227 ** 
Task Distrust Out Tie 0.150 ** 0.124 ** 0.146 ** 0.151 ** 0.125 ** 
Friend Out Tie 0.043  0.056  0.046  0.041  0.054  
Dislike Out Tie 0.015  0.019  0.017  0.012  0.016  
Gender -0.122 + -0.150 * -0.130 + -0.122 + -0.150 * 
Gender (Target) -0.051  -0.050  -0.051  -0.054  -0.053  
Manager (Target) 0.179 ** 0.195 ** 0.182 ** 0.166 ** 0.182 ** 
Same Gender 0.008  0.005  0.007  0.008  0.005  
Same Ethnicity 0.055  0.040  0.055  0.056  0.041  
Same Manager 0.038  0.045  0.046  0.042  0.049  
Simmelian Tie 0.065  0.048  0.060  0.064  0.047  
             
Manager   0.186 **     0.189 ** 
Manager of     0.059 +   -0.006  
Subordinate of       0.033  0.035  
             
R^2 0.257 ** 0.287 ** 0.26 ** 0.258 ** 0.288 ** 
Adjusted R^2 0.239  0.269  0.242  0.239  0.268   
2000 Permutations            
+p<.1 *p<.05 
**p<.01 
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Table 2.16: DSP-MRQAP Outgoing Friendship  Ties Dyadic Accuracy Model 
  0 1 2 3 4 
Workflow 0.178 ** 0.184 ** 0.182 ** 0.177 ** 0.184 ** 
Task Trust In Tie -0.014  -0.015  -0.020  -0.013  -0.016  
Task  Distrust In Tie -0.065 * -0.064 * -0.068 * -0.064 * -0.064 * 
Friend In Tie -0.118 ** -0.113 ** -0.119 ** -0.118 ** -0.113 ** 
Dislike In Tie -0.052  -0.055  -0.051  -0.052  -0.055  
Task Trust Out Tie 0.153 ** 0.119 ** 0.148 ** 0.152 ** 0.119 ** 
Task Distrust Out Tie 0.040  0.027  0.037  0.041  0.028  
Friend Out Tie 0.025  0.031  0.027  0.023  0.030  
Dislike Out Tie 0.035  0.037  0.036  0.033  0.035  
Gender 0.117 * 0.102 * 0.111 * 0.116 * 0.100 * 
Gender (Target) 0.097 * 0.098 * 0.097 * 0.095 * 0.096 * 
Manager (Target) 0.029  0.038  0.032  0.019  0.027  
Same Gender 0.028  0.027  0.028  0.028  0.026  
Same Ethnicity -0.012  -0.020  -0.012  -0.011  -0.018  
Same Manager 0.061 + 0.065 + 0.067 + 0.064 + 0.070 + 
Simmelian Tie 0.241 ** 0.232 ** 0.237 ** 0.240 ** 0.230 ** 
             
Manager   0.098 +     0.092 + 
Manager of     0.047    0.016  
Subordinate of       0.027  0.029  
             
R^2 0.159 ** 0.168 ** 0.161 ** 0.160 ** 0.169 ** 
Adjusted R^2 0.139  0.147  0.14  0.139  0.145   
             
2000 Permutations            
+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01                     
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Table 2.17: DSP-MRQAP Outgoing Dislike Tie Accuracy Model 
  0 1 2 3 4 
Workflow 0.060  0.060  0.064  0.060  0.062  
Task Trust In Tie -0.010  -0.010  -0.017  -0.010  -0.017  
Task  Distrust In Tie -0.007  -0.007  -0.011  -0.007  -0.012  
Friend In Tie -0.031  -0.030  -0.031  -0.031  -0.031  
Dislike In Tie -0.061  -0.062  -0.060  -0.061  -0.059  
Task Trust Out Tie -0.003  -0.006  -0.008  -0.003  -0.002  
Task Distrust Out Tie 0.030  0.029  0.023  0.030  0.024  
Friend Out Tie 0.058  0.059  0.059  0.058  0.057  
Dislike Out Tie -0.026  -0.026  -0.023  -0.026  -0.023  
Gender 0.065 * 0.064 + 0.056 + 0.065 * 0.058 + 
Gender (Target) 0.050  0.050  0.049 + 0.050 + 0.050 + 
Manager (Target) 0.099 * 0.099 * 0.099 * 0.099 * 0.097 * 
Same Gender 0.026  0.025  0.024  0.026  0.024  
Same Ethnicity 0.094 * 0.093 * 0.096 * 0.093 * 0.098 * 
Same Manager 0.081 + 0.081 + 0.090 + 0.081 + 0.091 + 
Simmelian Tie 0.116  0.115  0.111  0.116  0.113  
            
Manager   0.008      -0.019  
Manager of     0.054    0.062  
Subordinate of       -0.002  0.001  
             
R^2 0.070 ** 0.070 ** 0.073 ** 0.070 ** 0.073 ** 
Adjusted R^2 0.030  0.028  0.030  0.027  0.025   
             
2000 Permutations            
+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01                     
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Table 2.18: DSP-MRQAP  Incoming Task Trust Tie Accuracy Model 
  0 1 2 3 4 
Workflow 0.116 * 0.123 * 0.116 * 0.115 * 0.120 * 
Task Trust In Tie 0.147 ** 0.145 ** 0.146 ** 0.147 ** 0.151 ** 
Task  Distrust In Tie -0.032  -0.031  -0.032  -0.031  -0.027  
Friend In Tie 0.024  0.030  0.024  0.024  0.032  
Dislike In Tie 0.013  0.010  0.013  0.013  0.009  
Task Trust Out Tie 0.341 ** 0.300 ** 0.341 ** 0.341 ** 0.298 ** 
Task Distrust Out Tie 0.085 * 0.068 * 0.085 * 0.086 * 0.070 + 
Friend Out Tie 0.084 + 0.092  0.084 + 0.082 + 0.089 + 
Dislike Out Tie 0.032  0.034  0.032  0.030  0.032  
Gender -0.107 + -0.125 * -0.107 + -0.107 + -0.122 * 
Gender (Target) -0.056  -0.056  -0.056  -0.058  -0.057  
Manager (Target) 0.167 ** 0.178 ** 0.167 ** 0.158 * 0.169 ** 
Same Gender -0.019  -0.021  -0.019  -0.019  -0.021  
Same Ethnicity 0.082 + 0.072 + 0.081 + 0.082 + 0.072  
Same Manager 0.022  0.026  0.022  0.025  0.024  
Simmelian Tie -0.083 * -0.094 ** -0.084 * -0.084 * -0.093 * 
             
Manager   0.120 *     0.137 * 
Manager of     0.003    -0.044 + 
Subordinate of       0.024  0.023  
             
R^2 0.314 ** 0.327 ** 0.314 ** 0.315 ** 0.329 ** 
Adjusted R^2 0.298  0.31  0.297  0.298  0.310   
             
2000 Permutations            
+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01                     
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Table 2.19: DSP-MRQAP Incoming Task Distrust Tie Accuracy Model 
  0 1 2 3 4 
Workflow -0.099 * -0.089 + -0.096 + -0.104 * -0.094 * 
Task Trust In Tie 0.127 * 0.119 * 0.118 * 0.129 * 0.120  
Task  Distrust In Tie -0.043  -0.041  -0.048  -0.041  -0.039  
Friend In Tie -0.052  -0.053  -0.057  -0.049  -0.050  
Dislike In Tie 0.038  0.030  0.038  0.038  0.031  
Task Trust Out Tie 0.032  -0.027  0.025  0.032  -0.028  
Task Distrust Out Tie -0.090 + -0.119 * -0.098 + -0.087 + -0.116  
Friend Out Tie -0.061  -0.034  -0.059  -0.063  -0.036  
Dislike Out Tie 0.076 + 0.080 + 0.079 + 0.072  0.076 + 
Gender -0.004  -0.023  -0.009  -0.005  -0.025  
Gender (Target) -0.087 + -0.090 + -0.088 + -0.091 + -0.095 + 
Manager (Target) 0.096 * 0.110 * 0.101 * 0.080  0.094 + 
Same Gender 0.012  0.009  0.010  0.009  0.005  
Same Ethnicity -0.010  -0.003  -0.007  -0.007  0.000  
Same Manager 0.126 * 0.128 * 0.134 * 0.131 * 0.135 * 
Simmelian Tie 0.089  0.083  0.091  0.086  0.081  
            
Manager   0.124 *     0.123 * 
Manager of     0.045    0.005  
Subordinate of       0.040  0.043  
             
R^2 0.066 ** 0.078 ** 0.068 ** 0.067 ** 0.080 ** 
Adjusted R^2 0.020  0.030  0.019  0.018  0.025   
             
2000 Permutations            
+p<.1 *p<.05 
**p<.01 
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Table 2.20:  DSP-MRQAP Incoming Friendship  Ties Accuracy Model 
  0 1 2 3 4 
Workflow 0.158 ** 0.163 ** 0.160 ** 0.156 ** 0.161 ** 
Task Trust In Tie -0.017  -0.018  -0.020  -0.015  -0.016  
Task  Distrust In Tie 0.021  0.022  0.020  0.023  0.024  
Friend In Tie -0.014  -0.010  -0.015  -0.014  -0.009  
Dislike In Tie -0.083 * -0.086 * -0.083 * -0.083 * -0.086 * 
Task Trust Out Tie 0.169 ** 0.139 ** 0.166 ** 0.167 ** 0.138 ** 
Task Distrust Out Tie -0.003  -0.015  -0.004  0.000  -0.012  
Friend Out Tie 0.067  0.073  0.068  0.064  0.070  
Dislike Out Tie 0.028  0.030  0.029  0.024  0.026  
Gender 0.048  0.035  0.044  0.047  0.034  
Gender (Target) 0.082 * 0.083 * 0.083 * 0.079 * 0.079 * 
Manager (Target) 0.110 * 0.118 * 0.111 * 0.092 + 0.099 + 
Same Gender -0.015  -0.017  -0.016  -0.016  -0.017  
Same Ethnicity 0.034  0.027  0.034  0.036  0.029  
Same Manager 0.081 * 0.085 * 0.085 * 0.087 * 0.090 * 
Simmelian Tie 0.168 * 0.160 * 0.166 * 0.166 * 0.159 * 
             
Manager   0.086 +     0.087 + 
Manager of     0.026    -0.002  
Subordinate of       0.048  0.049  
             
R^2 0.190 ** 0.196 ** 0.191 ** 0.192 ** 0.198 ** 
Adjusted R^2 0.171  0.176  0.170  0.171  0.176   
             
2000 Permutations            
+p<.1 *p<.05 
**p<.01 
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Table 2.21: DSP-MRQAP Incoming Dislike Tie Accuracy Model 
  0 1 2 3 4 
Workflow 0.031  0.039  0.040  0.030  0.041  
Task Trust In Tie 0.111 * 0.115 * 0.090 + 0.112 * 0.103 + 
Task  Distrust In Tie -0.013  -0.008  -0.025  -0.013  -0.014  
Friend In Tie 0.025  0.050  0.025  0.026  0.048  
Dislike In Tie -0.017  -0.007  -0.010  -0.017  -0.005  
Task Trust Out Tie 0.042  -0.053  0.029  0.041  -0.049  
Task Distrust Out Tie 0.027  -0.020  0.011  0.027  -0.023  
Friend Out Tie -0.099 + -0.079  -0.093 + -0.099 + -0.078  
Dislike Out Tie -0.026  -0.012  -0.020  -0.026  -0.011  
Gender 0.054  0.015  0.032  0.053  0.007  
Gender (Target) 0.024  0.035  0.028  0.024  0.033  
Manager (Target) -0.032  -0.015  -0.018  -0.034  -0.016  
Same Gender -0.016  -0.007  -0.016  -0.016  -0.009  
Same Ethnicity 0.017  -0.001  0.014  0.018  0.002  
Same Manager 0.149 * 0.153 ** 0.169 ** 0.150 ** 0.168 ** 
Simmelian Tie 0.119  0.090  0.111  0.119  0.087  
            
Manager   0.203 *     0.177 * 
Manager of     0.130 *   0.076 + 
Subordinate of       0.004  0.018  
             
R^2 0.069 ** 0.102 ** 0.084 ** 0.069 ** 0.106 ** 
Adjusted R^2 0.024  0.055  0.037  0.022  0.055   
             
2000 Permutations            
+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01                     
 
 
 Manager status was significant in most of the DSP-MRQAP models, which tested 
the notion that being a manager would be related to increased accuracy compared to non-
managers. The support for this argument was relatively strong. Manager status was a 
significant predictor at the p<.05 level for outgoing task trust, incoming task trust, 
incoming task distrust, and incoming dislike accuracy (See table 2.22 of results below). 
Manager status was marginally significant for outgoing friendship tie accuracy and 
incoming friendship accuracy. In addition, the manager (target) variable (where the target 
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of perception was a manager) was significant at the p<.05 level for outgoing task trust, 
outgoing dislike, incoming task trust, outgoing task distrust tie accuracy. Another notable 
variable of interest was same manager (where the two parties had the same manager), 
which was significantly related to accuracy (at the p<.05 level) incoming task distrust 
trust ties, incoming dislike ties, and incoming friendship ties.  
 
Summary of Results Study 2 H4 and H5a and Variables of Interest 
 Manager of 
(H4)ᵃ 
Subordinate 
of (H5a)ᵇ 
Manager 
Status 
Manager 
(Target) 
Same 
Manager 
Outgoing Task Trust Tie Accuracy     * *   
Outgoing Task Distrust Tie 
Accuracy 
     *  
Outgoing Friend Tie Accuracy     +   + 
Outgoing Dislike Tie Accuracy       * + 
Incoming Task Trust Tie Accuracy +   * *   
Incoming Task Distrust Tie 
Accuracy 
    * + * 
Incoming Friend Tie Accuracy     + + * 
Incoming Dislike Tie Accuracy  +    * * * 
+p<.1 *p<.05      
These results are for the fully specified models     
 
Hypothesis 5b 
 Hypothesis 5b argued that subordinates would be more likely to be accurate about 
their managers’ networks than for each other’s networks.  This hypothesis was tested by 
comparing the mean accuracy for individuals who shared the same manager to mean 
accuracy for individuals’ direct managers, for all eight dependent variable networks. 
Thus, if the accuracy of subordinates to subordinates was lower than the accuracy of 
subordinates to managers, this would provide positive support for Hypothesis 5b.  
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 To test the significance between means, the two-sample t-test function was used 
in STATA v12.  The scores for “same manager” accuracy were compared to the scores 
for “subordinate of” accuracy. This was done by creating two vector scores for each 
network, such that all subordinate to subordinate accuracy scores were compiled into one 
vector, and all subordinate to manager scores were compiled in another vector. The 
number of responses for same manager was naturally greater than responses for 
“subordinate of” because there were many subordinates (29) within a few managers (10).  
This resulted in 158 scores for “same manager” and only 38 scores for “subordinate of” 
(this was because each person only scored their manager one time, while they scored 
multiple other subordinates within each manager).  Where individuals did not have ties 
and therefore Jaccard Index could not be calculated, values were undefined, and resulted 
in missing data. Thus, not all the t-test had numbers of equal subordinates and managers.  
 Results of the t-tests showed some support of Hypothesis 5b (See Table 2.23).  
For outgoing task trust (t = -3.474), incoming task trust (t = -3.491) and incoming friend 
tie accuracy (t = -2.218), individuals were more accurate on average about their 
managers’ networks than they were for fellow subordinates’ networks. For the other 
networks, outgoing task distrust, outgoing friendship, outgoing dislike, incoming task 
distrust and incoming dislike, subordinates were not more accurate for managers than for 
fellow subordinates. This method provided a general test of accuracy differences across 
all groups and managers and showed that, in general, subordinates were significantly 
more accurate for their own managers compared to each other for task networks and 
incoming friendship networks.  
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    Obs. M S.E. Difference 
in Means 
S.E. t-value sig. 
Outgoing Task Trust Tie Accuracy Same Manager 158 0.288 0.021         
Subordinate of 38 0.454 0.041 -0.165 0.047 -3.474 <.001 
                  
Outgoing Task Distrust Tie Accuracy Same Manager 118 0.084 0.017         
Subordinate of 35 0.139 0.04 -0.055 0.039 -1.421 <.1 
                  
Outgoing Friend Tie Accuracy Same Manager 158 0.289 0.019         
Subordinate of 38 0.354 0.044 -0.065 0.045 -1.431 <.1 
                  
Outgoing Dislike Tie Accuracy Same Manager 89 0.106 0.027         
Subordinate of 25 0.104 0.057 0.001 0.06 0.3 ns 
                  
Incoming Task Trust Tie Accuracy Same Manager 158 0.288 0.021         
Subordinate of 38 0.457 0.044 -0.168 0.048 -3.491 <.001 
                  
Incoming Task Distrust Tie Accuracy Same Manager 80 0.074 0.026         
  Subordinate of 21 0.071 0.049 0.003 0.056 0.057 ns 
Incoming Friend Tie Accuracy Same Manager 158 0.251 0.018         
Subordinate of 38 0.344 0.036 -0.093 0.041 -2.218 <.05 
                  
Incoming Dislike Tie Accuracy Same Manager 82 0.091 0.026         
Subordinate of 23 0.043 0.03 0.048 0.021 0.927 ns 
100 
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Discussion Study 2 
 This study tested the relationship between formal power and network accuracy by 
considering the dependence relationships between managers and subordinates.  Study 1 
argued that individuals with power were motivated to focus on particular tie content, such 
as instrumental ties in the social network more so than the powerless (non-managers), 
relating to greater accuracy of some social networks. This view was reasserted in this 
study. However, here I also argued that the dependence relationship between managers 
and subordinates will motivate attention relating to accuracy, thus managers will be more 
accurate about their subordinates’ social networks than for others in the network. In 
addition, I argued that based on previous theory, such as the power as control model 
(Fiske, 1993a), subordinates would increase their attention toward their manager, relating 
to accuracy of their managers’ social networks compared to others in the network. 
Finally, I argued that subordinates accuracy would be greater for their manager than for 
each other, because despite the dependence relationship subordinates have with each 
other, the outcome-control of managers would motivate increased attention toward them. 
Results largely did not support these arguments.  
 However, in some regression models, manager status was a significant predictor 
of network accuracy. This suggested that managers were more accurate about the social 
networks than non-managers for some network content, generally supporting the results 
of Study 1. This was the case while controlling for other relationship ties, similarities, 
and sender and receiver effects.  
 There was only weak support for managers being more accurate for their 
subordinates compared to non-subordinates in the network. In a few cases, there was a 
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significant positive effect for network accuracy for managers toward subordinates, but 
these results were wiped out when manager status was entered into the model. This might 
have something to do with the correlation between these variables —as would be 
expected, manager status was significantly correlated to being manager of a particular 
individual (r= .425, p<.01). Yet, if being the direct manager of a subordinate did in fact 
increase attention and focus toward that person, the positive effect should have remained 
when manager status was included in the model. That this variable lost significance when 
manager status was included might indicate that managers were more accurate across all 
others, including subordinates, but that they were not necessarily more accurate toward 
their own subordinates.  Thus, it could be that the effect of formal power on attention, 
focus and accuracy was more evenly distributed to network content in the organization, 
rather than localized to managers’ subordinates. 
 Another potential explanation was that these groups were quite small, and being 
accurate about your subordinates’ ties might translate to accuracy about those he or she 
was tied to. Thus, individuals’ accuracy about some individuals and not others was 
difficult to parse out in small networks where most people know each other, because to 
be accurate about one person’s network requires, by definition (when using individuals 
incoming and outgoing ties) means being accurate about those he or she is tied to.  This 
feature of small networks is an important consideration for future research because 
variance in accuracy of a small network, especially at the dyadic level, is likely to be 
minimal.  
 There was no evidence suggesting that subordinates were more accurate for their 
own managers compared to others who were not their manager. However, there was 
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evidence that subordinates might pay attention more to some networks of their own 
managers, relative to others for which they might have a dependence relationship (fellow 
subordinates). Not all networks showed this pattern, but for task trust and friendship, it 
seems that subordinates do attend to their managers’ ties more.  
 Other results showed some general patterns of accuracy based on relationships 
with the target of perceptions. These results were not surprising. For example, friendship 
accuracy was related to both having a task trust tie with the target of perception, as well 
as being embedded in a strong dyad ("Simmelian tie" Krackhardt, 1999), and sharing a 
manager. A very similar pattern of results was evident for incoming and outgoing task 
trust accuracy.   
 Gender played a role in some network accuracy models; for example being female 
was positively related to accuracy of the friendship network, and negatively related to 
outgoing task trust accuracy. Additionally, when the target of perception was female, 
individuals were more accurate about their friendship networks. Beyond demonstrating 
how receiver (target) effects can be important factors in understanding social network 
accuracy, this also highlights the importance that gender roles might play more broadly in 
how individuals perceive the network of others. Females might be more open about 
expressive relationships in the organization, which can result in more accurate 
perceptions toward them, but they are less open about their instrumental relationships in 
the network, affecting others’ accuracy. The role of gender in network perceptions seems 
to hold some interesting implications for organizations, and should receive additional 
attention from scholars in the future.  
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 In conclusion, Study 2 was not able to confirm that the dyadic dependence 
relationships between high and low power individuals were a factor in network accuracy. 
Further work is necessary to test these ideas given the potential limitations that small 
networks pose, and to tease out how general accuracy relates to dyadic accuracy. 
However, results were suggestive that manager status was an important factor in accuracy 
for task trust, task distrust, dislike and (marginally) for friendship networks. And for task 
trust and friendship networks, subordinates are more accurate for their managers than for 
each other. 
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Study 3 
Introduction 
 Study 1 and Study 2 investigated the influence of formal power on social network 
accuracy. Study 1 argued that individuals with formal power in an organization (i.e., 
managers) will be more accurate for those relationships which are related to task and goal 
completion, such as instrumental trust ties and negatively valenced expressive ties. Study 
2 tested the accuracy of individuals toward specific nodes—whether managers were more 
or less accurate about their subordinates than others in the organization, and whether 
subordinates were more or less accurate about their manager and their fellow 
subordinates in the organization. 
 Now I am turning to one’s accuracy about oneself—how accurate an individual is 
about the relational ties he or she receives from others. Just as theories of power bring 
special attention to managers in their perceptual accuracy of the broader network (Study 
1) and how power plays a role in network accuracy in a dyadic framework (Study 2), 
power can also influence an individuals’ perception of their own incoming ties in the 
social network.  
 Study 1 examined the view that managers were motivated to attend to some ties 
and not others, and this was due to the content of those relational ties which influenced 
attention and focus. Instrumental, task-related ties are prioritized by those with formal 
power, and therefore engender a greater level of attention and focus for managers, 
relating to greater accuracy compared to subordinates. Additionally, expressive ties with 
a negative valence were argued to be prioritized as well, as managers were motivated to 
attend to relationship that can hinder tasks and goals.  
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 From the situated focus theory approach, we would expect the same basic effects 
for how individuals with power perceive ties in close relational proximity (e.g., their 
incoming ties). Following the same logic, it is reasonable to argue that individuals with 
positions of power will focus on relational tie content which most directly impacts their 
focused priorities (i.e., activated constructs within the situation): tasks and goals 
(Guinote, 2010). Managers will therefore be more accurate than subordinates about their 
own incoming instrumental ties and expressive negative ties. However, there are 
theoretical views which would predict different results, namely self-regulatory theories of 
power, which see the powerful as individuals who are unconcerned about some social 
information, such as how others view them. A strong argument for this view was made 
by the Approach and Inhibition Theory of Power (Keltner et al., 2001).  
 
Hypothesis Development  
Keltner and colleagues (Keltner et al., 2001) based their model of power on 
Gray’s  behavioral approach system (BAS) and behavioral inhibition system (BIS) 
(Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1987). Essentially, Keltner and colleagues argue that 
having social power will activate an individuals’ approach system, which is related to 
goal pursuit, rewards and avoidance of punishment and experience of positive affect. 
Powerlessness activates the inhibition system, which is sensitive to punishment, non-
rewards and is related to negative affect, effectively limiting goal pursuit.  Thus, the 
power that a person holds can affect their behavior, cognition and emotions affecting 
their goal pursuit, feelings about others and social information processing (Keltner et al., 
2001).  
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Recent studies have sought to test the approach/inhibition theory of power, with 
generally positive results. For example, Anderson and Berdahl (2002) found that 
individuals high in personality dominance or who were given control over resources in 
task-focused dyads were more influential in task decisions than those low in personality 
dominance and those in a subordinate position. High power individuals expressed their 
opinion and attitudes more openly, experienced more positive emotions, and were more 
likely to perceive that their partner liked them (i.e., rewards) than when their partner was 
angry with them (i.e., punishments).  In another series of experiments, Smith and Bargh 
(2008) found evidence that the effects of power on the approach and inhibition tendencies 
can be activated unintentionally, outside of a task-related context. Individuals primed 
with high power exhibited increased approach tendencies; however, evidence did not 
support the link between power and avoidance-related behavior.  
 In a related stream of research, the powerful are argued to be focused on their 
own self-interest, and not inclined to taking another’s perspective—that is “stepping 
outside of one’s own experience and imaging the emotions, perceptions, and motivations 
of another individual” (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006a :1068). The powerful 
display behavior that is consistent with self-interest, focused on the self, rather than 
others (Keltner et al., 2001).  
In a novel study designed to test the effects of power on perspective taking, 
Galinsky and colleagues (2006a)  primed subjects with either high power or low power 
and were then instructed to draw an “E” on their own foreheads with a marker.  The 
option for each subject is to draw the E as it would appear to the subject (backwards 
according others’ point of view) or to draw the E on their own forehead so that it was 
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facing correctly to others (and backwards from the point of view of the subject). Results 
of this study clearly showed that high power primed individuals were significantly more 
likely to draw a self-oriented E (the E oriented as it would appear to the subject) as 
opposed to other-oriented E (the E as if it were written for another person to read).  
Additional studies further confirmed the basic argument that powerful individuals are less 
likely to take the perspective of others, and depend much more on their own vantage 
point. For example, powerful individuals tended to not consider that others did not posses 
their privileged information, and were not as accurate in detecting others’ emotional 
states (Galinsky et al., 2006a). 
Power is also related to a decrease in attention and focus on others emotions and 
affective states (Keltner et al., 2001). In face-to-face interactions listening to others’ 
stories of suffering, powerful individuals tend to have less empathy and compassion in 
response to other’s suffering (Van Kleef et al., 2008).  Coupled with the findings that the 
powerful may be less inclined to take the perspectives of others (Galinsky et al., 2006a) 
this suggests that the powerful might process the content of social information, such as 
the kind of relationships among subordinates, differently than the less powerful. The 
powerless, in contrast, are more likely to attend to threats in their immediate 
environment, in an effort to predict outcomes and gain some sense of control (e.g., Power 
as control model: Fiske, 1993a; Fiske & Dépret, 1996). The powerful are less concerned 
with threats because their power (position) allows them to control their own outcomes, 
where powerless individuals cannot. Thus, based on these arguments I can predict that 
individuals with formal power, will direct less attention and focus to incoming ties which 
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might represent threats, resulting in less accuracy compared to those without formal 
power. 
H6: Manager status will be negatively related to incoming 
negative relational tie accuracy 
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Method 
Sample  
 The sample for Study 2 consisted of all members of the call center from all four 
groups (for additional details, see Study 1). This was possible because the measures of 
interest were incoming tie accuracy, which related to the accuracy of each person’s 
perception of their own incoming ties, thus full CSS networks were not necessary. In 
addition, the full sample increases the sample size considerably, allowing for greater 
power in the statistical models.  
Figure 2.24: Description of Groups and Response Rates (n =52) 
 Group 1  Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Total 25 17 6 4 
Managers 5 5 1 1 
Response 88%* 100% 100% 100% 
Survey yes  yes  yes yes  
CSS yes  yes  no  no 
*CSS and electronic survey missing responses differ 
*No manager responses are missing from data 
 
 The data for this Study was combined from Stages 2 and 3 (see Study 1 for 
details). This was because members of Groups 1 and 2 filled out CSS data, which 
contained not only their perceptions of others’ network ties, but their perceptions of their 
own incoming ties within their respective groups. Therefore, in Stage 2, individuals in 
Groups 2 and 3 did not fill out those portions of the survey which would have repeated 
information (i.e., their outgoing and perceived incoming ties within their group). Group 1 
and 2 CSS data was combined with the digital survey questionnaire to compose the 
variables for this study. 
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 The sample consisted of 52 individuals, for which one individual did not respond 
to the survey and three had incomplete data (n= 48; 92% response rate); twelve 
individuals were managers (there was no missing data for managers).The sample was 
41% female and 38% non-minority (two individuals did not disclose their ethnicity) (see 
Table 2.25). College graduates represented 29.2% of the sample, while 62.5% had at least 
some college or post high school education (see Table 2.26). Tenure at the Company 
ranged from 5 months to 160 months (M = 34.4).  
 
Table 2.25: Education for Full Sample (n = 48) 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Some High School 1 2.1 2.1 
Finished High School 17 35.4 37.5 
Technical/Professional/ Certificate 6 12.5 50.0 
Associate Degree 10 20.8 70.8 
Graduated from College 14 29.2 100.0 
Total 48 100.0   
Table 2.26: Ethnicity for Full Sample (n = 48) 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Asian/Pacific Islander 8 16.7 16.7 
Black/African American 6 12.5 29.2 
Caucasian 27 56.3 85.4 
Hispanic 3 6.3 91.7 
Other/Multi-racial 2 4.2 95.8 
No response 2 4.2 100.0 
Total 48 100.0  
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Measures 
Accuracy (dependent variable) 
 Network accuracy was calculated for each individual using the Jaccard Index (see 
Study 1 for details). This was done by correlating each individual’s perceptions of their 
own incoming ties with others’ nominations of that person. Networks were collected 
from each participant. The roster method was used with the digital survey to collect 
network data (except those network responses from Group 1 and Group 2 available in 
their CSS networks). Each individual was asked in the survey to indicate who they had a 
particular relationship with in the organization by selecting the relationship next to the 
name of each person.   
 They were asked a total of four network questions (which were identical to the 
instructions provided in the CSS network questionnaires, and answers for each question 
were mutually exclusive): 1) who they considered be a friend or who they disliked in the 
organization, a 2) who they believed considered them a friend or disliked them in the 
organization, 3) who they trusted or distrusted for work related tasks they were asked to 
indicate, and 4) who they believed trusted or distrusted them for work related tasks. See 
questions below: 
1. Please select each person who you consider to be your personal friend at 
work, and please indicate each person who you consider to be someone you 
dislike at work by checking "personal friend" or "dislike" next to their name. 
If you don't know the person, please do not answer the question for that 
person.   
 
2. Please select each person you think considers YOU  to be his or her personal 
friend at work,  and please indicate each person who you think dislikes YOU 
at work by checking "personal friend to you" or "dislikes you" next to that 
person's name. If you don't know the person, please do not answer the 
question for that person.   
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3. For the people you know listed below, please indicate if you trust or distrust 
this person to complete a task that he or she had agreed to do and has the 
knowledge and competence needed to get tasks done.  If you don't know the 
person, please do not answer the question for that person.  
 
4. For each person you know below, please indicate who you think either trusts 
or distrust YOU to complete a task that you had agreed to do and that you 
have the knowledge and competence needed to get tasks done. If you don't 
know the person, please do not answer the question for that person 
 
 The responses to each of these network questions were formed into 48x48 
matrices. One individual was not listed on the network questionnaire when the digital 
survey was conducted, so the final sample used in the models was 48 individuals for a 
92% response rate. This individual was still given the survey to fill out, and did fill out 
the CSS survey; however they could not be nominated by others in the digital survey 
network, so this person was omitted from the statistical models.  However, their 
nominations were kept in the measures to insure that the most information available was 
brought to bear on the analysis.  
 For each 48x48 matrix, cell ij represented the relationship from i  to j:  for 
example if person i  indicated they were friends with person j,  the ij  cell in the matrix 
would receive a “1”, and a “0” otherwise for all i-j pairs. For the perception networks, 
cell ij represented i’s perceptions of j’s nomination of i. For example, cell ij would 
receive a “1” if i believed j considered i to be a friend, and that cell would receive a”0” 
otherwise. To calculate accuracy, the “outgoing” nomination matrices were transposed, 
such that each row represented a person’s incoming ties from others in the network.  
These matrices were then correlated, row-wise, with the respondents’ matrices that 
represented their incoming tie perceptions. The Jaccard Index correlations across these 
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matrix rows were used as the accuracy measure for each individual for their own 
incoming ties.  
Independent Variable: Formal Power 
 As in Study 1, the independent variable was the formal position (manager status) 
of the individuals as designated by the organization.  Managers were coded as a “1” and 
non-manager were coded as “0”.  
Other variables (Controls) 
Workflow Centrality 
 Individuals in the department often worked with others both within and outside 
their work group. Such interactions are important because they might provide additional 
information about their own workgroup through others, as additional information about 
the network can travel along these required workflow ties. Individuals might both 
engender more incoming ties as a result of these connections, and also might garner more 
information about their own network ties from others they are in contact with. Thus, I 
controlled for this possibility by including a measure of one’s centrality in the required 
workflow network. Using a roster method, each individual was asked to select those 
people in the department for which they either received inputs from, or sent outputs to.  
The answers to this question were used to create a 49x49 matrix of workflow ties. (One 
individual was not included on the original network roster; therefore that respondent was 
not included in the measure of workflow centrality). Using this network, in-degree work 
flow centrality was calculated in UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002) using the full sample (n 
= 48) of respondents as the number of nominations a person received as someone who 
receives outputs from others. This resulted in the variable “Workflow centrality”.  
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Network Centrality 
 An individuals’ position in the network of social ties can provide individuals an 
information advantage due to access to others in the network. Some individuals might be 
more central, and thus would access more information about the network, and central 
individuals will also have local access to more ties than those less central to the network 
(e.g., Bondonio, 1998; Casciaro, 1998; Casciaro et al., 1999; Krackhardt, 1990). Also, 
individuals who receive more network ties likely will have a greater cognitive load in 
perceiving those ties. Therefore, I controlled for individuals centrality in the positive and 
negative tie networks for the instrumental and expressive network accuracy models.  
 For each individual I calculated the number of nominations a person received in 
the organization to control for their structural position in the network (e.g., Casciaro, 
1998; Casciaro et al., 1999). These measures were calculated from the digital survey data 
and combined with the raw CSS data (for in-group ties reported by Group 1 and Group 2) 
via the LAS row-dominated aggregations which consisted of each person’s (i’s) 
nominations of others for each network relationship (j). Each person’s in-degree 
centrality was calculated from these matrices using UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). This 
resulted in four variables: “Task Trust Centrality”, “Task Distrust Centrality”, “Friend 
Centrality”, and “Dislike Centrality”.  
Perceived Network Ties (Network Perceptions) 
 Individuals might vary greatly in their perceptions of incoming ties. Some 
individuals perceive many incoming ties, while others perceive none at all (especially for 
the negative tie networks). For example, some individuals responded with no perceptions 
of ties for some negative tie networks (i.e., dislike and task distrust), while others saw 
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many.  These perceiver differences were controlled for by including the count of 
perceived incoming ties for each person in the regression models (e.g., Casciaro et al., 
1999) calculated as the in-degree centrality of the perceived incoming tie networks (with 
data combined from the CSS networks of Group 1 and Group 2 representing their 
perceptions of the in-group, incoming ties) in UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). Thus, for 
each individual, there were four variables corresponding to the four networks for each 
person, called “Network Perceptions”.  The variables included in the statistical models 
matched the network in the dependent variable. For example, when testing Friendship 
Accuracy, the Network Perception measure for Friend was included, and when testing 
Task Trust Accuracy, the Network Perception measure for Task Trust was included, and 
so on.  
Analytical Approach 
 Linear regression with robust standard errors was used to model the relationship 
between formal power and network accuracy (Hansen et al., 2005; Moulton, 1986; 
Rogers, 1994). This was because the association between the dependent and independent 
variables was predicted to be linear and the data was cross-sectional.  In addition, to 
control for group effects and supervisor effects (supervisors were within groups), 
individual respondents were pooled by supervisor in the regression models.  All network 
accuracy models were run in STATAv11 (StataCorp, 2011).  
Results Study 3 
 
 Pearson correlations (See Table 2.27) show that manager status was positively 
and significantly related to each incoming tie accuracy score, including task distrust (r = 
.330, p<.05) and dislike (r = .451, p<.05).  Manager was also significantly positively 
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related to task trust accuracy (r = .337, p<.05) and friend accuracy (r = .297, p<.05).  
Task trust accuracy was related to task trust centrality (r = .479, p<.05) and friend 
centrality (r = .409, p<.05); however this was not surprising give the high correlation 
between task trust and friend centrality (r = .726, p<.01). The only other network 
centrality measure related to network accuracy was friend centrality, which was 
significantly positively related to friendship accuracy (r = .307, p<.05).  The mean 
accuracy scores for the positive tie networks (task trust and friendship: .38 and .24) were 
higher than the mean accuracy scores of the negative tie networks (task distrust and 
dislike: .02 and .04).  This echoed the differences between positive and negative tie 
perceptions. Positive incoming tie perceptions (task trust M = 20.44; friendship M = 
10.75) were much higher than negative perceptions of incoming ties (task distrust M = 
1.17; dislike M = 1.23). Thus, individuals perceive positive ties at a much higher rate 
than negative ties.  Following a similar pattern, individuals’ mean positive tie centrality 
(task trust M = 22.67; friendship M = 12.52) was much higher than their mean negative 
tie centrality (task distrust M = 3.27; dislike M = 1.52). 
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  Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Task Trust Accuracy 0.38 0.19       
2 Task Distrust Accuracy 0.02 0.09 0.124      
3 Dislike Accuracy 0.04 0.17 0.215 0.138     
4 Friend Accuracy 0.24 0.16 .593** 0.032 .358*    
5 Manager 0.24 0.43 .337* .330* .451** .297*   
6 Workflow Centrality 20.21 6.63 .531** 0.103 -0.138 0.181 .429** 
7 Task Trust Centrality 22.67 7.16 .479** 0.066 -0.054 0.051 0.21 
8 Task Distrust Centrality 3.27 2.56 -0.184 0.156 -0.205 -0.022 0.242 
9 Friend Centrality 12.52 4.43 .409** 0.072 -0.078 .307* 0.118 
10 Dislike Centrality 1.52 1.69 0.07 0.159 -0.006 0.031 0.166 
11 Task Trust Perceived Ties 20.44 13.23 .698** 0.125 -0.058 .480** 0.19 
12 Task Distrust Perceived Ties 1.17 2.43 -0.076 .356* -0.074 -0.251 -0.06 
13 Friend Perceived Ties 10.75 9.85 .379** -0.031 0.034 .616** 0.059 
14 Dislike Perceived Ties 1.23 3.35 0.034 0.182 0.017 -0.203 0.004 
Note: *p< .05 **p<.01. Two-tailed tests.        
N = 48           
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  Variable 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
            
            
            
            
            
6 Workflow Centrality          
7 Task Trust Centrality .667**        
8 Task Distrust Centrality 0.147 -.405**       
9 Friend Centrality .595** .726** -0.187      
10 Dislike Centrality 0.131 -0.13 .514** -0.12     
11 Task Trust Perceived Ties .475** 0.281 0.017 .322* -0.031    
12 Task Distrust Perceived Ties -0.032 -0.059 -0.175 -.314* -0.099 -0.01   
13 Friend Perceived Ties 0.183 0.026 -0.008 0.277 -0.098 .505** -0.136  
14 Dislike Perceived Ties -0.048 -0.076 -0.117 -.402** -0.123 0.047 .793** -0.018 
Note: *p< .05 **p<.01. Two-tailed 
tests.  
        
N = 48                 
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 The mean accuracy for managers compared to non-managers clearly showed that 
managers had higher average accuracy for their incoming ties than non-managers (See 
Table 2.28).  
 
 Peculiar to this table was the complete lack of dislike accuracy for non-managers. 
Accuracy scores for the Jaccard Index indicate that only managers exhibited any accuracy 
for dislike ties. Additional analysis below showed that managers and non-managers did 
have negative incoming ties (See Table 2.29). Managers, on average, reported perceiving 
more task trust and friendship ties than did non-managers. However, on average 
managers reported almost identical numbers of task distrust (Managers M = .92; Non-
managers M = .94) and dislike ties (Managers M = 1.25; Non-managers M = 1.22) as 
non-managers. Thus, it isn’t the case that all managers had no ties incoming, nor that 
non-managers did not perceive any incoming negative ties.  Rather, non-managers simply 
failed to accurately perceive their incoming negative ties.  
 
Table 2.29 Mean and Total Number of Incoming Ties Perceived in Study 3 
 Task Trust Task Distrust Friend Dislike 
Mean Total Mean Total Mean Total Mean Total 
Manager (n =12) 25 297 .92 11 12 141 1.25 15 
Non-Manager (n= 
36) 
19 684 .94 45 10 375 1.22 44 
 
Table 2.28 Mean Accuracy for Incoming Ties in Study 3 
 Task Trust 
Accuracy 
Task 
Distrust 
Accuracy 
Friend 
Accuracy 
Dislike 
Accuracy 
Manager 0.49 0.08 0.32 0.17 
Non-Manager 0.34 0.01 0.21 0.00 
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Results: H6 
 Hypothesis 6 argued that manager status would be negatively related to incoming 
tie accuracy for the negative tie networks (task distrust and dislike). This hypothesis was 
tested by regressing network accuracy scores on manager status in hierarchical linear 
regression models. For each network accuracy model, first only the controls were entered 
into the model, then in step two the manager variable was entered.  For task distrust 
accuracy, entering the manager variable increased the variance explained by an additional 
8% above the controls only model (Table 2.30: R^2 = .32; Adjusted R^2 = .232). And 
manager was marginally significantly positively related to task distrust accuracy (b = 
.332, t = 1.897, p<.1). The relationship between dislike accuracy and manager status also 
showed a marginally significant relationship (Table 2.30: b = 6.55, t = 2.082, p<.1). 
Entering the manager variable in step two increased the explained variance by an 
additional 33% above the controls only model (Table 2.30 Dislike Accuracy model: R^2 
= .35, Adjusted R^2 = .28). Thus, manager status had a significant positive effect on 
incoming negative tie accuracy. I come to this result because the p-values were very close 
to the p<.05 level, and the increase in effect size when the independent variables were 
added to the models were 37% and 94%, respectively (for a discusion of Null-hypothesis 
significance testing, see Schwab, Abrahamson, Starbuck, & Fidler, 2011). Thus these 
results reject the null hypotheses and Hypothesis 6, which predicted a negative 
relationship between manager status and accuracy of incoming negative ties.   
 Supplemental models were also run for incoming positive tie accuracy (See Table 
2.31.) Using the same model parameters, manager status was significantly positively 
related to both task trust accuracy (b = .202, t = 2.293, p<.01) and friend accuracy (b = 
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.313, t = 3.641, p<.01).  Entering the manager variable into the regression increased the 
explained variance by an additional 3% above the controls only model for task trust 
accuracy (R^2 = .627, Adjusted R^2 = .583) and by nearly an additional 8% above the 
controls only model for friendship accuracy (R^2 = .489, Adjusted R^2 = .428).  Thus, 
individuals with formal power were more accurate for their own incoming task distrust 
and dislike than those without formal power.  (Result followed the same pattern when 
accuracy scores for individuals without reported ties were left out of the dependent 
variable, See Appendix H) 
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Table 2.30 Linear Regression for Incoming Negative  Tie Accuracy Model 
 Distrust Accuracy Dislike Accuracy 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
     
Workflow Centrality (0.231) (0.351) (0.154) -0.516+ 
 (-0.812) (-1.038) (-0.774) (-2.210) 
     
Negative Tie Centrality 0.441  0.371  0.019  (0.020) 
 (1.693) (1.404) (0.306) (-0.229) 
     
Positive Tie Centrality 0.425  0.408  0.024  0.171  
 (1.170) (1.034) (0.606) (1.281) 
     
Network Perceptions 0.451+ 0.453  0.021  0.056  
 (1.907) (1.777) (0.410) (0.767) 
     
Manager  0.332+  0.655+ 
  (1.897)  (2.082) 
     
N 48 48 48 48 
R-sq 0.233 0.32 0.02 0.355 
adj. R-sq 0.162 0.239 -0.072 0.278 
F 6.408 8.501 0.202 5.616 
df_m 4 5 4 5 
df_r 10 10 10 10 
     
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: Standard errors clustered around Supervisor are robust. 
+ p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01      
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Table 2.31 Linear Regression for Incoming Positive Tie Accuracy Model 
 Task Trust Accuracy Friend Accuracy 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
     
Workflow Density 0.235  0.162  (0.056) -0.222+ 
 (1.100) (0.765) (-0.449) (-1.979) 
     
Negative Tie Centrality (0.194) (0.237) 0.119  0.096  
 (-1.417) (-1.568) (1.433) (1.229) 
     
Positive Tie Centrality 0.084  0.073  0.192+ 0.253** 
 (0.340) (0.328) (1.830) (3.335) 
     
Network Perceptions 0.566** 0.566** 0.585** 0.577** 
 (6.742) (6.119) (5.677) (5.800) 
     
Manager  0.202*  0.313** 
  (2.293)  (3.641) 
     
N 48 48 48 48 
R-sq 0.595 0.627 0.413 0.489 
adj. R-sq 0.558 0.583 0.358 0.428 
F 66.88 122.4 14.05 13.44 
df_m 4 5 4 5 
df_r 10 10 10 10 
     
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses  
Note: Standard errors clustered around Supervisor are robust. 
+ p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01      
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Study 3 Discussion  
 This study tested accuracy of individuals’ own incoming ties—asking the 
question: were managers more or less accurate about their incoming ties than non-
managers? Study 1 argued that individuals with formal power would be motivated to 
focus on particular social tie content in the organization that related to instrumental 
outcomes, such as goal and task completion, and therefore would be more accurate in 
their perceptions of those kinds of ties.  This view was supported by arguments from the 
situation focus theory of power (Guinote, 2010) which links the experience of power to 
increased cognitive flexibility to focus on some information in the social environment 
and block out other, peripheral information. However, an alternative view, the approach 
and inhibition view of power (Keltner et al., 2001), suggests the experience of power 
might decrease individuals’ attention and accuracy for incoming social network ties. 
 The approach and inhibition view of power (Keltner et al., 2001) argues that 
power activates the approach system, linked with attention to rewards (and not 
punishments).  This view also argues that power increases attention based on one’s own 
self-interest at the expense of attending to others’ feelings and emotions, and less 
tendency to take the perspective of others (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006b; 
Van Kleef et al., 2008).  Based on the approach and inhibition view of power, I argued 
that individuals with formal power would not attend to their incoming negative ties, 
reducing their accuracy for the task distrust and dislike ties.  
 Results showed that power was related to increased accuracy of network ties. 
Each linear model tested across the four network types (task trust, task distrust, 
friendship, and dislike), found that manager status was positively related to accuracy.  
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Managers do not differentiate between positive and negative or expressive and 
instrumental relationship when it comes to their own incoming ties in this sample. These 
results seem to reinforce the view that managers can be more accurate about some 
network ties compared to non-managers. What was surprising was that managers were 
accurate for friendship ties as well. The situated focus view would argue that managers 
focus on task or instrumentally-related ties, and less on expressive positive ties such as 
friendship. In light of the results from this sample, it could be that power affords 
individuals greater leeway to confirm and question the existence of ties. Low power 
individuals might lack the social resources to follow suit, and because they are more 
dependent on others, they are likely to use less direct diagnostics in determining how 
others view them. Thus, managers (individuals with formal power) might be able to 
assess their incoming ties more completely than low power individuals, relating to 
increased accuracy.  
 In conclusion, and in line with the general findings of study 1 and 2, individuals 
with formal power can be more accurate than those lacking formal power across different 
kinds of social network content. This is especially true of incoming ties, as manager 
status was related to accuracy of all four different networks tested in the organization.  
Copyright © Joshua Eric Marineau 2012 
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Chapter 3:  General Discussion and Future Directions 
Discussion 
 The broad question this dissertation sought to answer was: 
How does formal power (i.e., manager status) relate to individuals’ 
perceptions of social network ties?  
 
 This question was motivated by the cognitive view of social networks: social 
networks existing in the minds of individuals as cognitive social structures or CSS 
(Krackhardt, 1987). This was contrasted with the view of most social network research, 
which treats networks as existing independently of the actors, as structural elements of 
the social world, which can be measured and analyzed as such (Borgatti et al., 2009).   
The CSS view sees each individual’s CSS as a data point, where their conceptions of the 
network ties are important features of how individuals act and think about the social 
environment.   
 In the context of organizations, those individuals whose accurate or inaccurate 
perceptions of the network that can have the most obvious consequences are individuals 
with formal social power: where individuals possess power and authority to determine 
the rewards and punishments of others (such as subordinates), and can influence the 
behavior of others by control of valued resources (Keltner et al., 2001; Overbeck & Park, 
2006).  In organizations, these individuals are easily identified as those who occupy a 
manager role, who have power over others’ valued resources and outcomes. Thus, this 
study focused on the perceptions of individuals with formal power in organizations.  
 Theory from the social psychology of power, specifically the situated focus theory 
(Guinote, 2010), was the theoretical framework used to argue for how individuals with 
power will perceive the social networks in the organization. To this end, organizationally 
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relevant relationships—instrumental and expressive positive and negative ties—were 
used to test how power influences individuals’ accuracy of the social network. Studies 
were conducted to answer the main research question using three theoretically driven 
perspectives, relating to different levels of network analysis (Knoke & Yang, 2008): the 
whole network level (Study 1), the dyadic level (Study 2), and the ego level (Study 3).  
 Study 1 tested the relationship between formal power (i.e., manager status) and 
individuals’ accuracy of the whole network. Results clearly showed that power was 
related to accuracy of the negative tie networks (task trust and dislike) but not the 
positive tie networks. This result was contrary to previous social network studies which 
have almost exclusively found a negative association between power and network 
accuracy (Casciaro, 1998; Simpson & Borch, 2005; Simpson et al., 2011). However, it 
revealed that there are certain limits to how power affects accuracy, such as in cases 
where managers are central to workflow or task trust networks: the positive effects of 
manager status on network accuracy were mitigated. Second, the size of the network 
might be another important feature which mitigates advantages of formal power in 
perceiving the network accurately. Small dense networks might reduce the variance 
among individuals’ accuracy, resulting in little explained variance left attributable to 
power.  
 Nonetheless, overall this study showed that formal power does relate positively to 
social network accuracy for some relationships. Individuals with formal power are more 
likely to perceive ties with task related consequences, and this applies especially to 
negative ties such as task distrust and dislike.  
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 Study 2 tested the link between power and accuracy by drilling down to the 
dyadic level, testing how managers and subordinates accuracy differed toward each other. 
This approach considered the effects of dependence on the perceptual accuracy of 
managers and subordinates. There was weak evidence suggesting that managers were 
more accurate about their subordinates networks compared to others in the network. 
When the manager status variable was included in the models, the effects of being a 
manager of the target was rendered non-significant at the p<.05 level. This was 
interpreted to mean that (in support of study 1) managers were more accurate in general 
compared to non-managers across different types of networks. When manager status was 
not included in the models, the dependence relationship showed a positive effect. A 
plausible explanation for this is that if a manager is accurate about their own 
subordinates’ networks, then inevitably they will be accurate for those individuals the 
subordinate is tied to—as the ties are bi-directional and include other actors. Thus, being 
accurate about one’s subordinates can influence accuracy overall. And naturally, this 
causal argument can be reversed: managers generally accurate about the network will 
likely be accurate about their own subordinates, especially in relatively small networks. 
This made it difficult to parse out the variance attributed to manager status generally and 
the dyadic relationship with subordinates, resulting in weak support for this idea in the 
statistical models.  
 Study 2 also applied the power as control view (Fiske, 1993a) which argued that 
low power individuals will pay special attention to those with power, and thus should be 
accurate about their managers’ social networks to a greater degree than for others in the 
network.  Results did not support this view. In addition, I tested the idea that if 
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subordinates do in fact pay close attention to those they are dependent on, that logic 
should apply even when the comparison groups are fellow subordinates who report to the 
same manager. There was some evidence that this was the case—subordinates were more 
accurate about their managers’ networks (compared to accuracy about their fellow 
subordinates).  Nonetheless, subordinates were not found to be significantly more 
accurate about the social networks of managers, or in general. These results were not a 
direct test of the PAC model, but they bring into question the underlying logic that low 
power individuals attend to high power individuals to a greater degree than vice versa. It 
is important to state that I did not directly test motivation (for example as separate from 
ability) in terms of subordinates’ or managers’ attention toward each other; rather I 
measured outcomes (i.e., accuracy). Thus, I cannot make a strong claim to have tested the 
underlying mechanisms of the PAC model.  With that limitation in mind, the evidence 
presented in this dissertation tended to support the situated focus view, and found little 
support for the PAC view that subordinates will pay greater attention to high power 
individuals. In none of the models did low power (subordinates) exhibit greater accuracy 
of others’ social networks (aside from the results mentioned above).  
 Study 3 tested the perspective that while power might relate to accuracy of the 
whole network and even the network of specific others, it is unclear how power relates to 
accuracy of one’s own incoming ties. The situated focus view would argue that accuracy 
should follow along the similar logic used in Study 1, that instrumentally relevant ties 
will receive the most focus and attention from the powerful compared to the less 
powerful. However, theories that consider how power affects attention to the emotional 
states of others toward the self (e.g., Keltner et al., 2001; Van Kleef et al., 2008) 
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suggested power might reduce accuracy of incoming ties when those ties are negative.  
Results showed that managers were more accurate for negative and positive instrumental 
and expressive ties, not less accurate. One possible explanation for this is that managers 
possess greater diagnostic ability to help assess their accuracy. In other words, managers 
have more leeway to investigate potential positive and negative ties than non-managers 
because of their greater access to resources and greater autonomy. However, it cannot be 
assumed that power does not increase the attention and focus on one’s immediate ties as a 
result of cognitive information processing differences and flexibility.  This is because the 
importance of knowing one’s political position in the organization for the purposes of 
maintaining or growing power and influence can motivate such increased attention and 
focus on the social environment. Thus, the situated focus theory might apply differently 
to different levels of analysis: for an individuals’ own social position, they seem to be 
motivated to see things accurately without regard to the instrumental content of the 
information.  This leads directly into questions of how individuals achieve positions of 
power, as having an accurate read on who are one’s friends and enemies might be a 
critical component of achieving higher formal positions. This is a very promising line of 
research, and should be investigated to test the potential differences in how power affects 
processing of different kinds of information, and how that might play in to procuring 
positions of formal power.  
 Overall, these three studies demonstrated that power is associated with increased 
accuracy about the social network, not less.  These findings are particularly robust 
because they were generally consistent across three different levels of analysis and in 
some cases, across a diverse set of relational ties. In addition, Studies 1 and 2 used two 
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separate work groups to generalize the findings across two samples. While these groups 
were very similar (i.e., in the same organization and the same department) they did 
represent different workers who had different roles and tasks.   
 One consistent factor that posed a challenge and also offered some insight was 
that these groups were different sizes: one with seventeen actors and the other with 
twenty-five. Beyond the caveats about sample size, there was evidence to suggest that 
group size (and network density) can be potentially critical factors in network accuracy.   
 The results of this dissertation should encourage additional work in understanding 
how power affects the way in which individuals perceive the social environment, and 
begin to modernize our view from the powerful as “cognitive miser”, to the powerful as 
accurate perceiver.  
 
Limitations 
 This study had clear limitations, the most obvious of which was the sample size. 
First, it is difficult to generalize to other contexts based on a small sample in one 
organization. Cognitive social structure data is very time-intensive to collect for 
respondents and increasing the size of the sample is problematic.  Including more than 45 
individuals, for example, in a single CSS study would likely produce unreliable data. 
Thus, sample sizes are traditionally small for this work (e.g., Casciaro, 1998; Casciaro et 
al., 1999).  I attempted to offset this disadvantage by using two separate groups in the 
same organization. I tried to demonstrate the effects of formal power on network 
accuracy could be detected in somewhat different contexts. These groups had significant 
differences, which were evident in the regression model results. Future work should 
combine additional samples together, to broaden the applicability of these findings.  
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  Additionally, network studies such as this are difficult to generalize to other 
networks and organizations. Clearly the contextual features of this sample are unique, and 
results found in this sample might not be found in other contexts.  Every effort was made 
to control for those features of the context which might make this study difficult to 
generalize to other contexts given the limitations such small samples pose to statistical 
power. Small sample sizes limit the statistical options in analyzing some data, in terms of 
specifying the model and avoiding Type II error. This was not an issue for the DSP-
MRQAP models, where the observations were the set of all NxN data (691 observations), 
which allowed for more highly specified models. The linear regression models were very 
limited in statistical power, which required a judicious inclusion of control variables with 
sample sizes of n=39 in study 1 and n=48 in study 3. Thus additional controls for 
individual attributes were not tested here, but based on results from Study 2 (in particular 
the effects of gender), there are many variables that might be important to the study of 
social network perceptions. Here, the focus was on power, and efforts were made to 
control for those aspects of the organization and the data that would be most pertinent to 
proper tests of power in relation to network accuracy. Naturally, a long list of potential 
control variables are possible, but were simply not possible to include in the linear 
models.  
 No causal surety can be claimed in the results presented here. This is due to the 
cross-sectional nature of the data, and a lack of process variables. For example, it is 
unknown whether individuals in positions of formal power achieve those positions 
because of their accuracy, or if, in fact, as the theory argues, power changes the way 
individuals think about and attend to the social environment (Guinote, 2007b). The 
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relevant research from which the theory for this dissertation was based were nearly all 
based on controlled lab experiments, which are often designed to remove such causal 
ambiguity. However, experiments and field studies are different, and because 
experiments find a causal link between power and cognitive flexibility and attention does 
not mean that fields studies of managers in an organizations experience power the same.   
 The use of the Jaccard index to measure accuracy might have been a factor in the 
lack of results in some models in this dissertation. While largely appropriate for these 
studies, the use of the Jaccard index also was limited when certain network features were 
present, such as those instances where individuals lacked incoming or outgoing ties. The 
Jaccard index essentially ignores these factors, and this makes calculating accuracy 
problematic. As discussed at length in Appendix H, there are other options, but given the 
advantages and disadvantages of these approaches, the Jaccard index was the best option.  
The difficulty in assessing accuracy in sparse networks and the difficulty of assessing 
accuracy in general will continue to be important issues in social structure perception 
research. And I encourage future scholars to introduce new methods and measure that can 
improve and expand options for this research to move this work forward.  
Future Research 
 This dissertation offers many areas that could prove to be fruitful avenues of 
future research. One clear area for future research is to begin to investigate the role of 
network accuracy for individual outcomes, such as performance. The ability for a person 
to accurately assess the network might provide an information advantage that result in 
performance above those who lack accuracy. This line of inquiry has garnered little 
attention, other than a study examining how accuracy influences reputational (informal) 
power (Krackhardt, 1990). Understanding how network accuracy can affect individuals’ 
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ability to navigate the social world, whether by avoiding or exploiting knowledge of 
negative ties or instances of  disconnections among individuals (e.g.,  "structural holes", 
See Burt, 1992), would be very valuable. Thus, it might not be just who you know, but 
“who you know knows who”. 
 Second, individuals in positions of formal power in most cases attained those 
positions through promotions or advancement in the organization. A key question is does 
network accuracy play a role in the attainment of power (specifically formal position)? 
Answers to this question might help to disentangle the causal ambiguity of the cross-
sectional nature of the data presented here. The theory presented in this dissertation 
argues that the experience of power actually distinguishes individuals in terms of their 
cognition, behavior, and judgment. But, the possibility that there is a link between 
accuracy and attainment of formal position  suggests that there might be an individual 
level attribute which accounts for accuracy which also can explain the need for power, or 
need for achievement (Steers & Braunstein, 1976). Ideally, a longitudinal study which 
can measure both relevant individual-level attributes and accuracy prior to attainment of 
formal position, and accuracy after promotion could help answer this question.  
 Lastly, despite the growing interest in cognitive social structure research, there 
has not been an attempt to systematically understand how it is that people actually recall 
or experience “networks”. Do individuals see maps, or do they experience more general 
associations or affiliations among groups (Freeman, 1992)? Do individuals recall 
networks as dyadic links or whole networks of actors? This also pertains to how network 
perceptions are measured by researchers. Are there systematic differences between 
methods which collect cognitive networks with a set of all possible dyadic, person to 
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person questions, or the more graphical matrix approach used in this study?  
Understanding how individuals store and recall relational information as knowledge 
structures or schemas is a fundamentally important area of research, which could 
potentially impact current and future theories of network perceptions and network theory 
in general.  
 In conclusion, I presented only some of the possible areas in the study of social 
network perception which invite future research.  It is my hope that this modest study can 
offer some key insights and contributions which can inspire future work in this very 
important area of social science.  
Managerial Implications 
 As it was argued in this dissertation, the role of the manager has particular interest 
in the study of network accuracy. This is because the manager  is more likely to make 
decisions which impact others in the organization, and these decisions often include the 
relationships among employees. Decisions which are based on inaccurate information can 
prove disastrous.  Given that most decisions managers make impact people, such as 
assigning work teams and individual tasks, granting promotions and demotions, as well 
as solving interpersonal conflict, making good decisions should require accurate 
information about the social environment in the organization.  Thus, understanding how 
managers as individuals with formal power, perceive the relationships among others in 
the organization sheds light on these issues.   
 This study has clear managerial implications. Managers do pay attention, but for 
some aspects of the social environment they are not paying attention enough. For 
example, Study 1 suggested that managers might be placing greater attention on negative 
ties, at the expense of positive ties. If managers are not attending to the positive features 
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of the social environment they will not be able to leverage those particular relationships 
to their advantage.  The same applies to task-related ties, such as task trust. Knowing 
accurately who trusts who can inform managers in how to structure workflow, and can 
also help identify workflow bottlenecks and sources of conflict. Investing some energy in 
assessing the positive instrumental tie networks in the organization can help managers 
immensely. Overall, managers aware of their “blind spots” will be better able to know 
where knowledge is lacking or faulty, and take action to shore up that knowledge to 
perform managerial duties better.  
Conclusion 
 This study set out to test how formal power influenced social network accuracy. 
The main findings suggest that managers can be more accurate about the social network 
than non-managers, and power does positively influence accuracy. That accuracy is 
limited to some tie content, specifically negative ties when perceiving the network as a 
whole, but applies more generally to both positive and negative ties when perceiving the 
ties of specific others in the network. Finally, managers seem to be more accurate about 
their own incoming ties than non-managers, regardless of tie type. These results 
challenged previous conclusions about the role of power in individuals’ perceptions of 
the network, which argued that power relates to inaccuracy. Thus, it is clear that the 
powerful are not simply lazy observers of the social world, but are active, accurate 
perceivers of a wide variety of network relationships within organizations. 
Copyright © Joshua Eric Marineau 2012 
 
 
138 
 
Appendices 
A: Dual-processing models 
 There are many dual-processing views that have propagated over the years. 
Scholars in the cognitive and social psychology traditions, in an attempt to clarify the 
construct, have predominantly separated these into two “system 1” and “system 2” 
(Kahneman, 2011). However, not all scholars are in agreement in this framework of 
parallel, separate cognitive systems (for a comprehesive review, see Evans, 2008).  
Generally, however, the systems can be understood as two different modes of cognitive 
processing: System one relates to heuristic processing, which is rule-based, unconscious 
and is engaged in familiar situations when individuals have experience or established 
knowledge structures, meaning it requires less cognitive strain, such as when using 
stereotypes. Power is associated with increased heuristic processing of social information, 
relating to less accuracy and more stereotypes of the less powerful (Depret & Fiske, 
1993). System two can be described as systematic processing, which is conscious and 
controlled, and engaged in unfamiliar situations, where knowledge is low (i.e., little 
experience or established knowledge structures).  It is also used when motivations for 
accuracy are high, such as for low power individuals who, because of a lack of control 
over their own outcomes, seek to maintain control by systematically processing 
information in the social environment (Depret & Fiske, 1993).   
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B: Power as Control Model 
One of the most prominent, and productive, views on power pertaining to 
interpersonal cognition and behavior in organizations is Fiske’s (1993) Power as Control 
model.  This view is based on foundational concepts within social cognition, that 
individuals are faced with an infinitely complex amount of social information and this 
information is processed selectively (Higgins & Bargh, 1987).   According to this view, 
humans have limited cognitive capacity, and therefore limit their use of cognitive energy 
– individuals don’t process all available social information and are “cognitive misers” 
(Fiske and Taylor, 1993).  However, the goals and motivations of individuals can affect 
the level and type of processing a person employs toward social stimuli (Brewer, 1979; 
Fiske, 1998). The ways in which individuals process information are generally separated 
into dual-processing models which broadly identify two ways people process information 
these can be referred to as heuristic or automatic processing and systematic or controlled 
processing  (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). 
  According to Fiske and colleagues, drawing on this dual-processing view, power 
and control are exercised through direction and attention processes—where the powerful 
tend toward automatic processing and the less powerful tend toward controlled 
processing. Powerful people process information by categorizing subordinates such as 
using stereotypes, rather than perceiving them as individuals. This is due to the argument 
that attention follows power, and power relates to outcomes (Fiske, 1993a). Powerful 
individuals’ potential for stereotyping is due in part to the interdependence of outcomes, 
or lack thereof, for the powerful. They pay less individual attention (e.g., automatic 
processing) to the less powerful because they can afford to, while the less powerful pay 
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more individual attention (e.g., controlled processing) to the powerful to offset their lack 
of resource control.  
Research within this tradition suggests that power affects social attentiveness, in 
that powerful people do not have to pay attention to others because they are less 
dependent on subordinates for achieving outcomes (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, 
Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008; Galinsky et al., 2006a). Power is also likely to increase the 
psychological distance from the less powerful (Kipnis, 1972), which can decrease the 
precision with which the powerful perceive the inter personal relationships of the less 
powerful. This line of research forwards the notion that powerful individuals will be less 
likely to individuate the less powerful and are more likely to objectify the less powerful 
in terms of their instrumental value—e.g., as a means to an end. Evidence from both field 
studies (e.g., Guinote & Phillips, 2010), and lab experiments (e.g., Gruenfeld et al., 2008) 
have supported this view.  
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C: Semi-structured Interview protocol 
WORK: Nature of work 
• How long have you been employed here? 
• Please describe your work here at the COMPAY. 
o Position/title 
o Area of work 
o Type of work 
• Does your work require you to work with others in order to accomplish your 
work? If not, do you still go to others to help with your work? 
•  
Relationships at Work: Help/Performance 
• Can you think of a relationship you have here at work that has been very 
important or helpful for you to accomplish your work tasks? 
• Can you think of a relationship you have here at work that has been very 
important or helpful generally, more in terms of advancing your career? How 
have they helped you?  
• Are there any relationships that make work more difficult for you?  
o Can you describe an example of this? 
 
• Do you feel like you have an advantage here if you “know the right people”? 
• What are the most important relationships to be aware of or know about in order 
to get things done here at COMPANY? 
•  
Relationships at Work: Perceptions 
• Can you describe the relationships among your co-workers?  
• Do you think you are accurate about knowing who friends are and who are 
enemies in your department? or among managers? Why? 
• Are you aware of any interpersonal conflict in your department or division? Can 
you describe it? 
• Is conflict pretty obvious in your department?  
• Is it pretty obvious when someone is avoiding another person? 
• Do you have any conflict with co-workers? Can you give an example? 
• Do you know of someone that you would consider being especially influential, 
even non-managers? How do they influence others? Can you give an example?
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D: All Variables Collected 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOCIAL REWARDS SATISFACTION 
Survey Code: (socsat) 
(Source: Michigan Organizational Assessment Questionnaire; Cammann, Fichman, 
Jenkins, and Klesh, 1979;  Seashore, Lawler, Mirvis and Cammann, 1982) 
 a. How satisfied are you with the way you are treated by the people you work 
with? 
b. How satisfied are you with the respect you receive from the people you work 
with? 
c. How satisfied are you with the friendliness of the people you work with? 
 
 INTENTION TO TURNOVER 
Survey Code:  (ITT) 
(Source: Michigan Organizational Assessment Quest; Cammann, Fichman, Jenkins, 
and Klesh, 1979) 
 a. Here are some statements about you and your job. How much do you agree or 
disagree with each? 
b. I will probably look for a new job in the next year. 
c. I often think about quitting. 
d. How likely is it that you could find a job with another employer with about the 
same pay and benefits you now have? 
 OVERALL JOB SATISFACTION 
Survey Code: jobsat 
(Source: Cammann, Fichman, Jenkins, and Klesh, 1979; 
Seashore, Lawler, Mirvis and Cammann, 1982) 
 a. All in all, I am satisfied with my job. 
b. In general, I don’t like my job. 
c. In general, I like working here. 
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POLITICAL SKILL INVENTORY 
Survey Code: PSI 
(Source: Ferris et al., 2005; 2007) 
a. I spend a lot of time and effort at work networking with others 
b. I am able to make most people feel comfortable and at ease around me 
c. I am able to communicate effectively with most people 
d. It is easy for me to develop good rapport with most people 
e. I understand people very well 
f. I am good at building relationships with influential people at work 
g. I am particularly good at sensing the motivations and hidden agendas of others 
h. When communicating with others, I try to be genuine in what I say and do 
i. I have developed a large network of colleagues and associates at work whom I can call on for support when I really need to get things done 
j. At work, I know a lot of important people and am well connected 
k. I spend a lot of time at work developing connections with others 
l. I am good at getting people to like me 
m. It is important that people believe I am sincere in what I say and do 
n. I try to show a genuine interest in other people 
o. I am good at using my connections and network to make things happen at work 
p. I have good intuition or savvy about how to present myself to others 
q. I always seem to instinctively know the right things to say or do to influence others 
r. I pay close attention to people's facial expressions 
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SELF-MONITORING 
Code: SM 
Source: 
Snyder, M. and S. Gangestad (1986). "On the nature of self-monitoring: Matters of 
assessment, matters of validity." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51(1): 
125. 
 
a. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people. 
b. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like. 
c. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe. 
d. I can make impromptu speeches even on topic about which I have almost no information. 
e. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others. 
f. I would probably make a good actor. 
g. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention. 
h. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons. 
i. I am not particularly good at making other people like me. 
j. I’m not always the person I appear to be. 
k. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their favor  
l. I have considered being an entertainer. 
m
. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting. 
n. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations. 
o.  At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going. 
p. I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should. 
q. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end). 
r. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them. 
 
PANAS SCALE 
Code: PA/NA 
Source: Watson et al., 1988 
(From: Very slightly or not at all … to extremely) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     a. Alert  k. Distressed  
b. Ashamed  l. Excited  
c. Inspired  m. Upset  
d. Nervous  n. Strong  
r. Determined  o. Guilty  
f. Attentive  p. Scared  
g. Jittery  q. Hostile  
h. Active  r. Enthusiastic  
i. Afraid  s. Proud  
j. Interested  t. Irritable  
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ROLE AMBIGUITY ROLE CONFLICT 
Rizzo, J. R., R. J. House, et al. (1970). "Role conflict and ambiguity in complex 
organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly 15(2): 150-163. 
 
 
Role Conflict 
 
I have to do things that should be done differently. 
 
I receive an assignment without the manpower to complete it. 
 
I have to buck a rule or policy in order to carry out an assignment.  
 
I receive incompatible requests from two or more people. 
 
I do things that are apt to be accepted by one person and not accepted by others.  
 
I work with two or more groups who operate quite differently. 
I receive an assignment without adequate resources and materials to execute it. 
I work on unnecessary things.  
 
  
 
Role Ambiguity 
 
I feel certain about how much authority I have 
 
I have clear, planned goals and objective for my job. 
 
I know that I have divided my time properly. 
 
I know what my responsibilities are. 
I know exactly what is expected of me. 
Explanation is clear on what has to be done. 
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LEADER MEMBER EXCHANGE 
Code: LMX* 
*Collected for Employees and Managers, replaced “supervisor” with “employee” 
 
Liden, R. C. and J. M. Maslyn (1998). "Multidimensionafity of Leader-Member Exchange: 
An Empirical Assessment through Scale Development." Journal of Management 24(1): 43. 
 
Affect: 
1.  I like my supervisor very much as a person 
2.  My supervisor is the kind of person one would like to have as a friend. 
3.  My supervisor is a lot of fun to work with. 
Loyalty: 
4. 
My supervisor defends my work actions to a superior, even without complete 
knowledge of the issue in question. 
5. My supervisor would come to my defense if I were “attacked” by others. 
6. 
My supervisor would defend me to others in the organization if I made an honest 
mistake.  
Contribution: 
7. 
 I do work for my supervisor that goes beyond what is specified in my job 
description. 
8. 
 I am willing to apply extra efforts, beyond those normally required, to further the 
interest of my work group.  
Professional Respect: 
9.  I am impressed with my supervisor’s knowledge of his/her job. 
10.  I respect my supervisor’s knowledge of and competence of the job. 
11.   I admire my supervisor’s professional skills.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
147 
 
 
 
 
NEED FOR ACHIEVEMENT NEED FOR AFFILIATION NEED FOR DOMINANCE 
Code: nAch and nAff nDom r= reverse coded 
Source:Steers, R. M. and D. N. Braunstein (1976). "A behaviorally-based measure of manifest needs in 
work settings* 1." Journal of Vocational Behavior 9(2): 251-266. 
 
nAch I try to avoid any added responsibilities on my job. [r] 
nAff I find myself talking to those around me about non-business related matters.  
 nAch I try to perform better than my co-workers.  
 nAch I try very hard to improve on my past performance at work. 
 nAff I prefer to do my own work and let other do theirs. [r] 
nAch I do my best work when my job assignments are fairly difficult. 
 nAff I pay a good deal of attention to the feelings of others at work. 
 nAff When I have a choice, I try to work in a group instead of by myself. 
 nAch I take moderate risks and stick my neck out to get ahead at work. 
 nAff I express my disagreements with others openly. [r] 
nDom I seek an active role in the leadership of a group. 
 nDom  I avoid trying to influence those around me to see things my way. [r] 
nDom  I find myself organizing and directing the activities of others. 
 nDom  I strive to gain more control over the events around me at work. 
 nDom  I strive to be "In command" when I am working in a group. 
  
 
 
INFLUENCE AT WORK 
 For each individual in your organization, including yourself, please select the answer 
that best describes the level of influence each person has in the everyday activities of the 
XX Division (from [1] not at all influential, to [5] highly influential): 
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E: Example of CSS matrix used in this dissertation 
 
149 
 
F: Network statistics for Groups 1 and 2 
 
 
Table F.1 Reciprocated ties as a proportion of all ties reported 
in Groups 1 and 2 
 Task Trust Task Distrust Friendship Dislike 
Group 1 .56 .00 .49 .00 
     
Group 2 .65 .14 .62 .18 
Table F.2  Network Density for Groups 1 and 2 
 Task Trust Task Distrust Friendship Dislike 
Group 1 .51 .13 .31 .05 
     
Group 2 .60 .10 .50 .04 
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G: BNAM Notes and model code in R  
 
Negative tie network: 
Network<-bbnam.actor(data, nprior=0.08, emprior=c(3,5), 
epprior=c(3,5),diag=FALSE, mode="digraph", reps=5, draws=500, 
burntime=5000,quiet=TRUE, anames=ids, onames=NULL, compute.sqrtrhat=TRUE) 
 
Positive tie network: 
Network<-bbnam.actor(data, nprior=0.3, emprior=c(3,5), epprior=c(3,5),diag=FALSE, 
mode="digraph", reps=5, draws=500, burntime=5000,quiet=TRUE, anames=ids, 
onames=NULL, compute.sqrtrhat=TRUE) 
 
Model Parameter Definitions (Taken directly from Butts’ Hierarchical Bayesian Network 
Accuracy Model Documentation: http://svitsrv25.epfl.ch/R-
doc/library/sna/html/bbnam.html): 
 
• Nprior = Network prior matrix (probability of i sending j a tie in the criterion 
matrix) 
• emprior/eprior= Probability of a false negative/false positive 
• Diag = Whether diagonals are included in the data 
• Mode = Whether the data is a “graph” or “digraph” 
• Reps = Number of replicate chains for the Gibbs sampler 
• Draws = the total number of draws to take from the posterior distribution 
• Burntime = the burn-in time for the Markov Chain 
• Quiet = Display MCMC diagnostics in the output 
• Anames= Names in the digraph 
• Onames= Names for the observers 
• Compute.sqrthat = whether or not Gelman et al.’s (1995) potential scale reduction 
should be computed 
 
It should be noted that strong assumptions are made for this model. For example, 
Butts assumes that variation in each person’s CSS is due to random variation in 
measurement, in relation to some underlying truth. That is, one person’s CSS is 
uncorrelated to others outside of that “true” network. Here I assume that individuals’ 
variations in perception are not necessarily due to random error, but to features of the 
perceiver, and structural factors, i.e., manager status, centrality.  Secondly, with use of 
the Bernoulli parameters for the criterion graph “independence in priors does not imply 
independence in the joint posterior” which may violate assumptions of independence in 
dyads (http://svitsrv25.epfl.ch/R-doc/library/sna/html/bbnam.html). For additional 
details, see:  Butts, C. T. (2003). ``Network Inference, Error, and Informant 
(In)Accuracy: A Bayesian Approach.'' Social Networks, 25(2), 103-140. 
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H: Jaccard Index Measure 
A potential issue with using the Jaccard Index correlation for this data was that the 
negative tie networks were very sparse; and subsequently, the numbers of ties individuals 
reported (outgoing) or received (incoming) were small. In some cases, individuals 
reported no outgoing negative ties, and others received no incoming negative ties. The 
two tables below are simple counts of the number of outgoing and incoming task distrust 
ties (Table H.1) and outgoing and incoming Dislike ties (Table H.2), for employees (e) 
and managers (m) used in this study.  
The main issue was where subordinate accuracy of their managers’ network was 
concerned. When an individual lacked in or out ties, calculations of accuracy were not 
possible. This is due to the nature of the Jaccard Index, which results in zero accuracy 
when the comparison set is empty (i.e., when the criterion network contains no ties). 
Below I discuss the potential difficulties with this in the data used in this dissertation, 
potential alternate approaches, and why the Jaccard Index remains the best option given 
its strengths over those other approaches. 
It is important to consider the effects of a lack of ties on the Jaccard Index accuracy 
calculation for this data. This only affected the negative tie networks, as no individuals 
were missing ties in the positive tie networks (all tie counts for individuals were ≥1 for 
the friendship and task trust networks). There were two managers who had no outgoing 
task distrust ties (m6 and m9, Table H.1), and one manager who had no incoming task 
distrust ties (m8).  For the dislike network, there were five managers without outgoing 
ties (m1, m4, m6, m8, and m9). And there was one manager without an incoming dislike 
tie (m9) (See Table H.2).   
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Table H.1 Reported Outgoing (out ties) and Incoming( in ties) Task Distrust Ties 
For Employees (e) and Managers (m) 
  Out  In      Out  In      Out  In      Out  In  
e1 0 3  e12 6 2  e23 5 1  m1 2 3 
e2 6 2  e13 0 6  e24 1 2  m2 7 2 
e3 1 0  e14 2 6  e25 1 4  m3 4 8 
e4 0 7  e15 3 3  e26 0 1  m4 1 4 
e5 0 1  e16 12 0  e27 5 1  m5 5 3 
e6 11 1  e17 1 0  e28 0 1  m6 0 1 
e7 2 4  e18 0 0  e29 0 4  m7 2 1 
e8 0 1  e19 4 4  e30 0 3  m8 3 0 
e9 2 0  e20 1 2  e31 2 2  m9 0 2 
e10 0 3  e21 6 0  e32 0 4  m10 3 1 
e11 0 5   e22 0 0                 
Scores are raw data, groups are mixed.        
 
Table H.2 Outgoing (out) and Incoming( in) Dislike Ties For Employees (e) and 
Managers (m) 
 Out In   Out In   Out In   Out In 
e1 0 0  e12 3 0  e23 2 0  m1 0 2 
e2 11 0  e13 0 2  e24 2 1  m2 2 1 
e3 0 1  e14 0 3  e25 0 0  m3 1 2 
e4 0 2  e15 2 1  e26 0 0  m4 0 2 
e5 0 1  e16 5 0  e27 0 0  m5 1 1 
e6 1 1  e17 0 0  e28 0 1  m6 0 1 
e7 2 2  e18 0 0  e29 1 0  m7 1 2 
e8 0 0  e19 1 6  e30 1 1  m8 0 1 
e9 1 0  e20 0 2  e31 0 0  m9 0 0 
e10 0 1  e21 3 0  e32 0 3  m10 1 1 
e11 0 0  e22 0 0         
Scores are raw data, groups are mixed.       
 
 The Jaccard index measures the degree of agreement between the criterion 
network (the true or reported network) and the perceived network (derived from each 
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individual’s CSS).  More formally, the Jaccard index consists of three elements (Real & 
Vargas, 1996): 
 
 
𝐴 : Number of attributes present in A and not B  
𝐵: Number of attributes present in B and not A 
𝐶: Number of attributes present in both A and B 
 
Where A= Perceiver, B= Target 
𝐽 =
𝐶 
𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶′
 
Thus, in the case where one tie is perceived, but no ties exist, the formula would look 
this way: 
0 =
0 
1 + 0 + 0′
 
Thus, accuracy is zero. As a matter of fact, in any case where a tie is not present in B, 
the accuracy is zero.  When a tie exists in B and A, the formula would look this way: 
1 =
1 
0 + 0 + 1′
 
The difficulty is that when there are no ties to perceive, this assumes that the 
perceiver is inaccurate, even though they might correctly perceive a lack of ties. Other 
methods which do allow for the lack of values in the formula don’t fare much better in 
dealing with this issue. Another method to calculate accuracy uses a similar formulation, 
but includes a variable which contains the set of common absences (as in the case where 
no tie exists in the criterion network and no tie is perceived by the observer). Krackhardt 
(1990) used this formulation when calculating the accuracy scores for cognitive social 
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structure data (p 348) (and noted that this measure provides the same value as a Pearson 
correlation): 
Where,  
A = Number of attributes present in neither A nor B  
B = Number of attributes present in A, but in B 
C = Number of attributes present in A, but not in B 
D = Number of attributes present in both A and B 
 
𝐾 = �� 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑐 −
𝑏
𝑏 + 𝑑� �
𝑎
𝑎 + 𝑏 −
𝑐
𝑎 + 𝑑�
 
For example,  if there were ten possible ties, and the perceiver sees one, but the target 
has no reported ties, the result would be the following, where a = 10, b = 1, c = 0 and d = 
0, the same problem persists, that if the target has no ties, the outcome will be zero:  
0 = �� 1010 + 1 −
0
1 + 0� �
10
10 + 1 −
1
10 + 0�
 
   
 An alternative to the Jaccard and Krackhardt approaches is to calculate matches 
between the perceiver and the target’s networks.  This would be the number of digits 
(attributes) which agree between the perceiver and target, which avoids the problem of 
zeros in the equations. For example, if the perceiver sees 1 tie and 9 zeros out of ten 
possible and the target contains10 zeros, the score would be 9. This can be considered as 
a proportion, such that 1 tie and 9 zeros would be 9/10ths, or a 90% match.  This seems 
reasonable to some extent. However, even this simple approach has major difficulties 
given the nature of the data being analyzed in this study.  
 The problem with this approach is that there is no way to know if the zero 
represents a lack of knowledge or actual knowledge of a non-tie. That is, the zero could 
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represent certainty that the tie did not exist, or uncertainty that it existed. The data for this 
dissertation was collected such that if the person wasn’t sure, they were informed to leave 
the answer blank. Meaning, the lack of response indicated a lack of certainty. The 
matching approach applies the same weight to a lack of information to that of positive 
information (in this case, the belief of a tie existing versus lack of knowledge that a tie 
exists). Each match is scored as a 1, whether the data is positive (i.e., a tie exists) or 
absent/uncertain (i.e., a zero). This is difficult to rationalize because the individual filling 
out the questionnaire asserted positive belief about some information, and left other 
information blank, and these responses were not equivalent. The matching approach 
would treat these answers equivalently, which is difficult to defend.  
 The Jaccard index does not adequately handle those situations when individuals 
do not have ties in the criterion network (in which case those accuracy scores are 
essentially undefined or missing). Thus, the models for Study 2 were run with those 
scores where individuals did not have reported ties as missing data.  If it were the case 
that managers in the sample had no recorded ties at all for some network, (where all 
manager ties were zeros) then the statistical models used would not be appropriate. In 
some cases described above, at least some (if not most) individuals (managers and non-
managers) did have ties, but despite this fact, those cases where individuals lacked ties, 
and the associated statistical models, should be interpreted with due caution (with 
particular attention to manager’s outgoing dislike ties).  
 Below I analyzed the results of Study 3 with missing data in place of zeros for 
those individuals who were lacking incoming negative ties (See Table H.5). As in Study 
2, individuals without incoming ties the Jaccard index could not be calculated. Finally, I 
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included the same analysis with informal power included (Table H.6) (see Appendix K 
for more detail).  
 
 
Table H.5 Incoming Negative  Tie Accuracy with Missing Data 
 Distrust Dislike 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
     
Workflow Centrality -0.365 -0.501 -0.347 -0.613* 
 (-1.000) (-1.498) (-1.615) (-2.804) 
     
Negative Tie Centrality 0.480 0.382 -0.094 0.005 
 (1.517) (1.476) (-0.813) (0.064) 
     
Positive Tie Centrality 0.530 0.482 0.170+ 0.176 
 (1.138) (1.172) (1.962) (0.936) 
     
Network Perceptions 0.558+ 0.557+ 0.406* 0.206* 
 (2.052) (2.128) (2.329) (2.485) 
     
Manager  0.365*  0.625+ 
  (2.347)  (1.929) 
     
N 43 43 34 34 
R-sq 0.327 0.421 0.150 0.409 
adj. R-sq 0.256 0.343 0.033 0.303 
F 2.918 10.73 4.729 15.93 
df_m 4 5 4 5 
df_r 10 10 10 10 
     
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses  
Note: Standard errors are robust.    
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Table H.6 Incoming Negative  Tie Accuracy with Missing Data (with 
Informal Power) 
 Distrust Dislike 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
     
Workflow Centrality -0.745 -0.715 -0.905** -0.860** 
 (-1.606) (-1.604) (-3.690) (-3.826) 
     
Negative Tie Centrality 0.484 0.397 -0.116 -0.016 
 (1.633) (1.560) (-0.830) (-0.165) 
     
Positive Tie Centrality 0.380 0.397 0.015 0.099 
 (1.089) (1.168) (0.147) (0.569) 
     
Network Perceptions 0.558* 0.558* 0.324** 0.188 
 (2.262) (2.233) (4.083) (1.749) 
     
Informal Power 0.537 0.327 0.758+ 0.375 
 (1.776) (1.202) (2.136) (1.578) 
     
Manager  0.318*  0.557 
  (2.455)  (1.739) 
     
N 43 43 34 34 
R-sq 0.371 0.436 0.251 0.430 
adj. R-sq 0.286 0.342 0.117 0.303 
F 3.330 5.537 27.16 9.919 
df_m 5 6 5 6 
df_r 10 10 10 10 
     
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: Standard errors are robust.    
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I: Review of Social Network Research and Network Perceptions 
 
Social Network Perception 
 Even though there is relatively little research that uses a social cognition or social 
psychology framework to investigate how individuals perceive social relationships, there 
is a legacy of research, which has either explicitly or implicitly involved how individuals 
perceive social relationships in theoretical and empirical work.  For example, early work 
by Newcomb (1961) and Heider (1958) as well as subsequent work by Kumbasar, 
Romney and Batchelder (1994) initiated many of the research approaches used today in 
studying social structure perception. They highlighted an “egocentric” cognitive approach 
focusing on the ways in which individuals experience and react to cognitive tension when 
imbalances arise  (Festinger, 1958; Heider, 1958) . That is, when an individuals’ attitude 
toward some object differs from his or her friend, then cognitive tension can arise which 
motivates action to resolve the tension. For example, if you really like your professor but 
your friend really dislikes your professor, it can cause cognitive tension which might 
motivate either: A) changing your view of your friend, or B) changing your view of your 
professor. This research largely concentrated on motivational forces related to cognitive 
consistency, and the human desire to relieve cognitive “stress” (i.e., balance theory and 
cognitive dissonance) (e.g., Hummon & Doreian, 2003).  For example, having two 
friends who dislike each other can cause cognitive stress or tension and can  motivate the 
individual to act to relieve that tension by dissolving or changing one of the relationships 
to achieve balance (Heider, 1958). The balance view assumes that individuals make 
inferences from social relationship perceptions, such as the nature of indirect 
relationships (i.e., between the two alters in a triad). They key to the balance approach is 
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that it supposes that the focal person perceives indirect relationships, and that perceptions 
have clear consequences for the focal person.1 The common thread among these early 
social cognition theories is that these views presume the importance of social structure 
perception.   
Social structure perception is also implicit in the work of scholars not generally 
thought to be part of the social structure perception tradition. Take for example Simmel’s 
work on the social structures of conflict and the tertius gaudens, or “third who benefits”. 
The tertius  is a third party who has ties to two warring factions, and by occupying a 
central structural position the tertius can derive benefits by mediating between those 
parties, choosing sides or using the conflict between the parties as a tool to extract 
resources from one side or both. Of particular interest is the use of social perception as an 
underlying theme in Simmel’s model.  The focal person perceives the interactions of the 
other parties, and acts upon that information. The key is that in Simmel’s model, the focal 
person must be aware of the relationship between the other parties in order to 
intentionally benefit.  And while this assumption is implicit in Simmel’s theory, this 
particular notion has not received an empirical test (to my knowledge) of the necessity of 
knowledge of the social structure as an ingredient to the tertius activity. Nonetheless, the 
importance of perception of social ties, both positive and negative, has received 
theoretical attention from a broad base of disciplines due to the critical nature of knowing 
which ties exist and to whom.  
                                                 
1 This is in contrast to Cartwright and Harrary’s (1956) structural balance theory view, which was a 
generalization of Heider’s (1959) and Newcomb’s (1961) general social psychology view. Cartwright and 
Harrary argued for a structural view of balance, wherein the “balance” of the social structure related to 
productive outcomes, rather than psychological states of individuals perceiving imbalance in the network. 
They considered balance in terms of the positive and negative charge of relationships within a social 
structure; where a balanced structure had a net positive charge, while an imbalanced structure had a net 
negative charge. 
 
160 
 
These inferences about indirect relationships are likely to be influenced by 
cognitive schemas and scripts, such as the tendency toward transitivity —where if a 
person has two friends she is likely to think her friends are also friends with each other— 
and these schemas are another important concept pertaining to the perception of social 
relationships (Krackhardt & Kilduff, 1999).  More recent work has expanded this 
approach, by considering the role of schemas in the construction of individual social 
maps (e.g., Janicik & Larrick, 2005).   
While initial interest and research on social structure perception began with the 
early social psychologists, most of the work that has addressed cognition of social 
structures over the last few decades has been in the social networks tradition, mainly 
from management scholars.   This work has made some progress in delineating the 
influence of social structure and personality traits on how accurate individuals are in 
perceiving the social network.   
More recently, scholars have begun to intentionally sketch out some of the 
antecedents and consequences of cognitive social structures (CSS)  (Krackhardt, 1987). 
Specifically, more recent work on the antecedents of social structure perception have 
included focusing on how social structure influences individual cognitive accuracy  (e.g., 
Bondonio, 1998). Additionally, scholars have also identified personality traits which can 
influence social structure perception (e.g., Casciaro et al., 1999; Flynn et al., 2006). The 
notion of the “small world” phenomenon (e.g., Kilduff, Crossland, Tsai, & Krackhardt, 
2008; Milgram, 1967) has also been studied as an important element in how individuals 
perceive social structures. And, while a large majority of work being done in social 
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structure perception has concentrated on antecedents, there have been a few studies 
which have used the CSS view to predict individual outcomes (cf Krackhardt, 1990).  
 
Social Network Perception and Network position 
  A key ingredient to understanding how individuals might perceive their social 
world might be linked to their position within the social world. Thus, one’s social 
structure position might influence their perception of the social structure. This view 
argues that information access and proximity to others will increase the flow of 
information and interactions to a person who is more central to the network (Bondonio, 
1998; Borgatti, 2005; Freeman, 1979), and therefore that person will not only observe, 
but be privy to social relationship information from others.  For example, if a person has 
a relatively high number of friends in a network, they can expect more information from 
those friends than a person who has relatively fewer friendship ties.2  Likewise, a person 
who is sought out for advice more than others might generate a more accurate picture of 
the larger advice network.  An alternative view is that if increased social information in 
the network produced information that is overwhelming, it could be that high centrality 
increases cognitive load, making accuracy of ties more difficult. Research on this topic 
has largely supported the structure-information-processing view.  
 Casciaro  (1998) studied the role of social structure and individual accuracy about 
the social network found that the more incoming friendship nominations ties a person 
had, the more accurate they were about the structure of the friendship network. Casciaro 
                                                 
2 Structural hole theory (Burt, 1992) would argue that if one’s friends are all connected to each other, 
then the information benefits will be reduced because those friends are likely to have similar information. 
Thus, the increase in total number of ties, i.e., centrality, might not result in increased information access 
under certain conditions. However, a long line of research has demonstrated the positive effects of 
centrality for information access. 
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also found that the more direct incoming advice ties a person had, the more accurate the 
person was about the structure of the advice network. 
 In a study of 33 individuals in a small entrepreneurial firm, Bondonio (1998) 
found evidence of a link between individual centrality and accuracy of informal social 
networks. She also concluded that centrality in the friendship and advice networks were 
related to the individuals’ accuracy of the advice and friendship networks. This was the 
case for both network level and dyadic level accuracy. Individuals who were more central 
were more accurate about the whole network and individuals that were more central were 
also more accurate about others’ individual networks at the dyadic level.  
 Perceptions of the social structure environment might also be influenced by the 
local structure in which a person is embedded, beyond ones degree centrality.  
Krackhardt and Kilduff (2002) tested the idea that cultural awareness as measured by 
individual accuracy of the advice and friendship networks, can be influenced by the 
strong ties a person is embedded within. Krackhardt and Kilduff analyzed the role of 
“Simmelian” ties, or dyads embedded in strongly tied triads as a correlate for observer 
agreement of the perceived social network.  These Simmelian triad structures increase 
information sharing and trust among dyads which can provide a stable and strong 
relational structure. The study found evidence through analysis of gamma correlations 
that strongly tied triads (i.e., Simmelian ties) were more likely to have agreement on the 
social network structure than those in regular, non Simmelian dyads. 
 Thus, these studies suggest that the position of the individual within the social 
network, i.e., their centrality, or embeddedness, is predictive of the individuals’ accuracy 
for both the whole network and, at the dyadic level, other individuals’ networks.  The 
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logic for this conclusion is that individuals have information advantages through direct 
ties with others in the network.  
Social Network Accuracy and Individual Differences/Traits 
 Beyond the structural arguments, it is possible that individual differences such as 
personality traits can focus an individual’s attention toward relational cues and 
information in such a way in which information gathering and information processing is 
biased  (Higgins & Bargh, 1987).   A handful of studies have found that certain individual 
differences affect social structure perception, reviewed below.  
 Casciaro, Carley and Krackhardt (1999) found evidence that, in the same study 
mentioned above, that individuals who were high in the positive affectivity trait 
(Tellegen, 1982) were more likely to have improved accuracy of the broader friendship 
network, but not the advice network. Positive affectivity is defined as the positive 
emotional valence of an individual associated with increased enthusiasm, alertness, and 
pleasantness (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). They also found that the positive 
affectivity trait was related to a decrease in local accuracy of the advice network, but not 
the friendship network. Local accuracy referred to the individuals’ accuracy of those 
direct relationships, such as who thought of the individual as a friend; and the global 
network referred to the ties among all others in the broader network. The logic behind 
these results is that positive affectivity provides an overly optimistic view of local ties, as 
the affectively positive person has a positive bias in terms of their own relationships—
seeing more friends than exist. However, the positive affectivity makes the individual 
more accurate about the broader network, due to the notion that happiness improves 
cognitive “organization and flexibility” (Casciaro et al., 1999: 290) and improves 
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cognitive processing of complex information (e.g., Scheier, Weintraub, & Carver, 1986) 
which should apply to the complexity of social interactions in an organization.  
 In a paper examining the personality trait of self-monitoring on an individuals’ 
perceived generosity and social status, Flynn and colleagues (Flynn et al., 2006) tested 
whether high self-monitors would be more accurate in reporting the existence (or 
absence) of exchange relationships than low self-monitors.  High self-monitors were 
argued to be more aware of social and informational cues, and to have acute awareness 
and superior understandings of social situations (Flynn et al., 2006). The results from this 
study suggest that high self-monitors possess greater accuracy of perceiving exchange 
relationships among others within the social network than low self-monitors.   
 In a paper testing a number of personality traits on network perceptual accuracy, 
Casciaro (1998) found that need for achievement and need for affiliation (Steers & 
Braunstein, 1976) were particularly important measures related to perceptual accuracy of 
the friendship and advice networks.  She found that even accounting for the effects of 
hierarchy and in degree centrality, select personality traits explained significant portions 
of variance in individuals’ accuracy of the friendship and advice networks.  Arguably the 
strongest effect was found for need for achievement (Steers & Braunstein, 1976), which 
was related to greater accuracy for the friendship and advice networks. Individuals’ goal 
orientations will be strong motivators for learning the social networks which might be 
instrumental in particular goal achievement. Individual traits will bias the perceptual 
attentions of the observer in relation to particular social networks.  For example, a person 
who has a need for achievement might be particularly interested in determining the 
“right” people to seek advice from, and would therefore be motivated to learn the advice 
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network. Secondly, individuals who have need for affiliation will be more likely to learn 
the friendship network, and those individuals will devote more attention to the friendship 
network. It is important to note that other personality traits in this study were not good 
predictors of social perceptual accuracy in the advice and friendship networks:  self-
monitoring and extroversion were not significant predictors (Casciaro, 1998). 
These studies suggest a connection between individual differences and perceptual 
accuracy of the social network. Thus, how individuals perceive the social network is at 
least partially related to how they process social information, in terms of their attention, 
focus and perceptual biases.  While these studies have found connections among a few 
key traits, they have clearly only touched the surface of possible correlates with social 
structure perception. The difficulty, as with investigating any psychological phenomena, 
is that there is essentially an infinite list of possible choices when it comes to personality 
variables that might be important.  
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J: Definitions and notes on power 
 
 Power is a fundamental concept for understanding behavior in organizations 
(Pfeffer, 1981). And as Dahl remarked, “The concept of power is as ancient and 
ubiquitous as any that social theory can boast.” (Dahl, 1957:201). Power has been 
criticized by some as a one-size-fits-all approach to explaining behavior, so much so, that 
its place as an explanatory variable has been challenged (see below). Nonetheless, power 
is a permanent feature of organizational life.  
  Bertrand Russell famously claimed that “power has been suspected of 
transforming how people act and live their lives” (Russell, 1938)—highlighting the 
importance of power not only for the power holder, but those who are subject to the 
power of others. There are many definitions of power.   Power can be  conceptualized as  
“quantitative capacity” where one person has more of something, some resource, which 
allows the person to act according to his or her preference (Hindess, 1996; Overbeck, 
2010).  Weber (1946) described power as “the probability that one actor within a social 
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of 
the basis on which this probability rests”.  Mintzberg defined power as the “capacity to 
effect (or affect) organizational outcomes… to be able to get desired things done, to 
effect outcomes—actions and the decisions that precede them” (1983: 4). Galinsky and 
colleagues, drawing on the work of  Blau (1964), Depret and Fiske (1993), Keltner, 
Gruenfeld, and Anderson  (2001) and Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) defined power as 
“asymmetric control over valued resources in social relations” (Galinsky et al., 2008).  
Researchers also distinguish social power from person power (Overbeck & Park, 2006).  
Social power is the power one has over the outcomes of another person—power 
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associated most closely with formal power, such as a manager over a subordinate. Person 
power refers to the independence of a person, who, due to having superior or adequate 
resources such as money or alternative choices is not beholden to others and can act 
individually without interference or influence. In studies comparing social and personal 
power results indicate that these types of power have different psychological and 
behavioral consequences. For example, social power and person power differ in terms of 
the stereotyping and individuating behaviors of the powerful toward low powerful others 
(Overbeck & Park, 2006).   
 Pfeffer (1981) in his classic book about power distinguishes power from 
authority. To him, authority is institutionalized power.  The accepted norms of behavior 
and attribution toward authority are different than the exercise of power. Because the 
authority is accepted, according to Pfeffer, the dependencies and relational dynamics of 
power are not engaged. Even if one party has more power, authority is respected out of 
norms of accepted behavior toward a role or office. Pfeffer relays an example where low 
level subordinates might actually have more power, in the form of specialized knowledge 
and ability which the manager lacks. Thus, the subordinates have control over a vital 
resource, yet rarely if ever use that power to change the behavior of the manager. While 
Pfeffer admits managers have the authority to fire employees and provide increases in 
salaries and benefits, he argues that those powers are rarely exercised. This seems 
presumptuous; nonetheless the exercise of power and having power can have similar 
effects. Knowing that one can be fired can be surety enough that a subordinate will 
acquiesce.  Similarly, managers can exercise power in many ways which are not readily 
apparent—for instance, managers can decrease or increase the quality of individuals’ or 
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groups work and or work environment. They can arrange the physical environment, 
reduce leisure time, increase expected output, demand greater commitment, and punish 
and reward in numerous ways beyond merely firing and remuneration. Promotions, for 
instance, are a key resource which is valuable to subordinates the control of which 
generally falls to managers. Similar are letters of recommendation—lack of a positive 
review or referral can do irreparable harm to one’s reputation and chance of promotion or 
transfer. In other words, manager can make one’s life miserable, without ever firing or 
officially punishing a subordinate.  Generally, a person with formal authority has wide 
latitude to act on subordinates.  
 
 
169 
 
K: Informal Power 
I controlled for the possibility that the effects of manager status on accuracy were 
potentially due to the notion that managerial status relates to other kinds of power, such 
as informal power. Thus, I provide additional analysis which controls for informal power. 
Informal power was measured by asking each individual in the organization to rate each 
other individual on how influential they believed the person was in the organization. The 
average for each individual’s incoming ratings of influence was used as the measure for 
informal power, based on the following question from the digital survey: 
“For each individual in your organization, including yourself, please select the 
answer that best describes the level of influence each person has in the everyday 
activities of the XX Division (from [1] not at all influential, to [5] highly influential)” 
 
Study 1 
First, I tested the variables in Study 1 with the inclusion of informal power. Results of 
linear regression analysis regressing manager status on accuracy of instrumental and 
expressive network accuracy (See tables K.1 and K.2 below) follow the results of the 
models presented in the manuscript (Tables 2.10 and 2.11). The main difference is that in 
the dislike LAS model, manager status is not significant at the p<.05 level. However, 
manager status is significant in the dislike model for the BNAM network (b=.464; t 
=2.511, p<.05).  
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  Task Trust  Task Distrust 
  LAS Model BNAM Model LAS Model BNAM Model 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Group 0.230** 0.224** 0.733** 0.717** -0.103 -0.118 -0.640** -0.614** 
  (3.593) (3.343) (7.823) (7.429) (-1.040) (-1.195) (-4.889) (-4.544) 
           
CSS Density 0.784** 0.792** 0.135+ 0.157+ 0.739** 0.742** 0.09 0.084 
  (13.418) (12.558) (1.698) (1.878) (5.445) (5.829) (0.693) (0.588) 
           
Workflow Centrality 0.084 0.083 0.020 0.018 -0.154 -0.152 0.072 0.069 
  (0.745) (0.742) (0.113) (0.105) (-1.017) (-1.073) (0.305) (0.301) 
           
Task Distrust Centrality 0.004 0.015 0.212 0.242 0.129 0.171 0.086 0.011 
  (0.033) (0.115) (1.049) (1.105) (0.864) (1.092) (0.402) (0.055) 
           
Task Trust Centrality 0.022 0.035 0.106 0.140 0.255 0.297 0.011 -0.065 
  (0.127) (0.188) (0.407) (0.502) (1.228) (1.364) (0.049) (-0.317) 
           
Informal Power 0.045 0.052 0.087 0.106 0.283 0.318 0.393 0.331 
  (0.331) (0.394) (0.457) (0.591) (1.314) (1.560) (1.620) (1.320) 
           
Manager  -0.029  -0.078  -0.11  0.198 
   (-0.478)  (-0.775)  (-1.069)  (1.341) 
           
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
R-sq 0.906 0.906 0.772 0.775 0.764 0.772 0.483 0.51 
adj. R-sq 0.887 0.884 0.727 0.723 0.718 0.719 0.383 0.395 
F 53 47.46 17.25 15.01 13.36 13.57 7.181 9.456 
Standardized beta coefficients; t-statistics in parentheses: Note: Standard errors are robust. + p<.10 * p< .05 **p< .01 
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  Friendship Dislike 
  LAS Model BNAM Model LAS Model BNAM Model 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Group 0.236** 0.247** 0.651** 0.632** 0.591** 0.604** 0.207 0.23 
  (2.909) (2.875) (5.185) (5.176) (2.871) (2.873) (1.162) (1.334) 
           
CSS Density 0.747** 0.729** 0.118 0.148 0.330* 0.380* 0.168 0.254+ 
  (6.249) (6.275) (0.800) (0.986) (2.363) (2.405) (1.237) (1.779) 
           
Workflow Centrality 0.246 0.24 0.242+ 0.252 -0.38 -0.436 -0.508 -0.605* 
  (1.671) (1.647) (1.709) (1.594) (-1.281) (-1.587) (-1.342) (-2.414) 
           
Task Distrust Centrality 0.048 0.042 -0.018 -0.008 -0.045 -0.07 0.23 0.187 
  (0.479) (0.434) (-0.136) (-0.065) (-0.338) (-0.426) (1.629) (1.288) 
           
Task Trust Centrality -0.022 -0.020 0.004 0.000 -0.172 -0.146 -0.248 -0.202 
  (-0.194) (-0.170) (0.021) (0.002) (-0.819) (-0.676) (-1.149) (-0.954) 
           
Informal Power -0.164 -0.188 -0.013 0.027 0.440 0.331 0.809* 0.621+ 
  (-1.273) (-1.515) (-0.065) (0.134) (1.457) (1.126) (2.328) (1.924) 
           
Manager  0.053  -0.09  0.269  0.464* 
   (0.506)  (-0.729)  (1.554)  (2.511) 
           
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
R-sq 0.824 0.826 0.649 0.654 0.412 0.461 0.344 0.488 
adj. R-sq 0.79 0.786 0.581 0.573 0.298 0.335 0.217 0.369 
F 21.16 17.82 11.39 9.958 6.904 8.457 4.281 6.756 
Standardized beta coefficients; t-statistics in parentheses Note: Standard errors are robust. + p<.10 * p< .05 **p< .01 
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Study 3 
I also included the measure of formal power in the models from Study 3. Inclusion of 
the informal power variable did not change the pattern of results reported in Study 3.  
Task Trust, Task Distrust, Friendship and Dislike accuracy were all significantly 
positively related to manager status, controlling for informal power (See Table K.3 and 
K.4 below): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
K. 3 Incoming Negative  Tie Accuracy with Informal Power 
 Distrust Accuracy Dislike Accuracy 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
     
Workflow Centrality -0.646 -0.582 -0.824+ -0.827+ 
 (-1.244) (-1.113) (-1.943) (-2.097) 
     
Negative Tie Centrality 0.444 0.384 -0.028 -0.041 
 (1.645) (1.404) (-0.464) (-0.476) 
     
Positive Tie Centrality 0.286 0.327 -0.128 0.078 
 (1.117) (1.041) (-1.237) (0.660) 
     
Network Perceptions 0.457+ 0.457 -0.033 0.024 
 (1.956) (1.807) (-0.540) (0.338) 
     
Informal Power 0.563 0.337 0.846+ 0.439 
 (1.350) (0.983) (2.062) (1.357) 
     
Manager  0.280+  0.589+ 
  (2.121)  (2.007) 
     
N 48 48 48 48 
R-sq 0.281 0.334 0.142 0.384 
adj. R-sq 0.195 0.237 0.039 0.294 
F 5.468 5.437 1.280 4.617 
df_m 5 6 5 6 
df_r 10 10 10 10 
Standardized beta coefficients; t-statistics in parentheses Note: Standard errors are 
robust. + p<.10 * p< .05 **p< .01 
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K. 4 Incoming Positive Tie Accuracy with Informal Power 
 Task Trust 
Accuracy 
Friend Accuracy 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
     
Workflow Density -0.102 -0.072 -0.412 -0.406 
 (-0.429) (-0.328) (-1.418) (-1.477) 
     
Negative Tie Centrality -0.203 -0.231 0.103 0.089 
 (-1.582) (-1.674) (1.220) (1.082) 
     
Positive Tie Centrality -0.057 -0.031 0.128 0.209* 
 (-0.244) (-0.137) (1.160) (2.403) 
     
Network Perceptions 0.506** 0.520** 0.603** 0.589** 
 (5.669) (5.958) (6.379) (6.323) 
     
Informal Power 0.511+ 0.387 0.435 0.249 
 (1.896) (1.641) (1.186) (0.652) 
     
Manager  0.143*  0.276** 
  (2.276)  (5.555) 
     
N 48 48 48 48 
R-sq 0.631 0.645 0.445 0.499 
adj. R-sq 0.588 0.593 0.379 0.425 
F 66.14 89.77 13.99 16.39 
df_m 5 6 5 6 
df_r 10 10 10 10 
Standardized beta coefficients; t-statistics in parentheses Note: Standard errors are 
robust. + p<.10 * p< .05 **p< .01 
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